United States v. Staggers

Decision Date09 June 2020
Docket NumberNo. 18-31213,18-31213
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff - Appellee v. Andre Patrick STAGGERS, also known as Dre Staggers; Leonard Morrison, also known as Leonard London ; Corey Session, Defendants - Appellants
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Jeffrey Ryan McLaren, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Kevin G. Boitmann, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office Eastern District of Louisiana, Diane Hollenshead Copes, Esq., Assistant U.S. Attorney, Matthew Richard Payne, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Christopher Albert Aberle, Mandeville, LA, for Defendant-Appellant Andre Patrick Staggers, also known as Dre Staggers.

Samantha Jean Kuhn, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender's Office, Eastern District of Louisiana, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant-Appellant Leonard Morrison, also known as Leonard London.

Peter Franklin Theis, New Orleans, LA, for Defendant-Appellant Corey Session.

Before KING, JONES, and COSTA, Circuit Judges.

KING, Circuit Judge:

Andre Staggers, Leonard Morrison, and Corey Session were jointly indicted and tried in a drug-conspiracy prosecution. Staggers and Session were found guilty of the charged conspiracy, but Morrison was found not guilty. The jury also found that both Staggers and Session knew or reasonably should have known that the conspiracy involved one kilogram or more of heroin. Because of their prior convictions, Staggers and Session each received a mandatory term of life in prison due to the jury's verdict on the conspiracy charge and its drug-quantity finding. Several weeks after they were sentenced, Congress passed the First Step Act, which reduced the mandatory minimum sentence applicable to defendants like Staggers and Session. On appeal, Staggers and Session argue that they should be resentenced, since their convictions were not final when the First Step Act became effective. We conclude, however, that the relevant provisions of the First Step Act do not apply to defendants who were sentenced before the Act's effective date.

In addition to finding Staggers and Session guilty of conspiracy, the jury found all three defendants guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits convicted felons from possessing firearms. When the district court tried this case, our precedent—along with precedent from every other circuit court to have considered the issue—held that knowledge of one's felon status was not an element of a § 922(g)(1) offense. The Supreme Court overruled this precedent while this appeal was pending, so Staggers and Morrison now contend that they are entitled to a new trial. We hold that they are not so entitled.

Finally, we address several issues, each of which affects only one defendant. Morrison argues that the warrantless search of his home was not consensual and that the district court should therefore have granted his motion to suppress the fruits of that search. Session, meanwhile, contends that one of the district court's evidentiary rulings was an abuse of discretion and that there was legally insufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that he knew or reasonably should have known that the conspiracy involved one kilogram or more of heroin.

We conclude that Morrison's argument regarding his motion to suppress is the only single-defendant issue having any merit. At the suppression hearing, the district court heard testimony setting out two very different versions of events regarding the search of Morrison's home. Both versions agreed, however, that no one objected when law-enforcement officers entered Morrison's home. The district court erroneously believed that this was enough to render the entry—and the subsequent search—consensual, so it did not decide which version of events to credit. Because a credibility determination was necessary, we vacate the district court's decision to deny Morrison's motion to suppress and remand for further proceedings. In all other respects, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I.
A.

The Drug Enforcement Administration, in partnership with state and local law enforcement, began investigating drug trafficking in LaPlace and St. Rose, Louisiana after receiving a tip from a confidential informant in January 2015. The DEA subsequently obtained judicial authorization for wiretaps of telephones belonging to Andre Staggers, Corey Session, and two other subjects of the investigation. Based in part on these wiretaps, the DEA obtained search warrants for Staggers's residence, Session's residence, and a suspected stash house.

The DEA executed those search warrants on February 25, 2016. At Staggers's residence, the DEA found: (i) approximately 460 grams of heroin; (ii) a loaded assault rifle; (iii) drug paraphernalia; (iv) a money counter; (v) over $460,000 in cash; and (vi) mail addressed to Staggers. Session's residence contained: (i) a loaded assault rifle; (ii) a loaded pistol; (iii) bottles of mannitol, a cutting agent used to dilute cocaine and heroin; (iv) drug paraphernalia; (v) over $1,000 in cash; and (vi) mail addressed to Session. Inside the third house, the suspected stash house, the DEA seized: (i) over 500 grams of heroin; (ii) 11 grams of powder cocaine; (iii) 37 grams of crack cocaine; (iv) an assault rifle; (v) a pistol; (vi) ammunition of various calibers; (vii) bottles of mannitol; (viii) drug paraphernalia; (ix) a money counter; (x) $14,000 in cash; (xi) mail addressed to Session; and (xii) identification cards belonging to Session.

On the same day, the DEA conducted a warrantless search of Morrison's residence. The United States and Morrison disagree about whether this search was consensual—and, hence, whether it yielded admissible evidence—but they do not dispute its results. As relevant to this appeal, the law-enforcement officers searching Morrison's house asked him whether there was a weapon in the house. Morrison told them that he found a firearm in his attic and moved it to his bedroom closet for safekeeping. The officers found that firearm, which was partially loaded, in the location that Morrison had indicated.

Staggers, Session, and Morrison were jointly charged with federal drug-trafficking and firearms offenses. Among other things, all three defendants were charged with conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute powder cocaine and heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846. According to the indictment, Staggers and Session knew or reasonably should have known that the conspiracy involved one kilogram or more of heroin and five kilograms or more of cocaine, whereas the amount of drugs allegedly attributable to Morrison was considerably lower, no heroin and only five-hundred grams or more of cocaine. In addition to the conspiracy charge, all three defendants were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing firearms.

B.

Before trial, Morrison moved the district court to suppress the evidence obtained during the warrantless search of his residence, arguing that the search—particularly the initial entry of law-enforcement agents into his house—was not consensual. The district court held an evidentiary hearing at which the United States called the two law-enforcement officers who made that entry, Rohn Bordelon and David Biondolillo, to the stand. Bordelon and Biondolillo testified that they knocked on Morrison's door at approximately 6:00 a.m. and identified themselves to Shlonda Jupiter—Morrison's live-in girlfriend and the mother of his children—who answered the door. They asked her whether Morrison was present and, while speaking with Jupiter, the officers saw Morrison in the hallway behind her, which led Bordelon to call out to him. Bordelon testified that: (i) Jupiter "stepped back and opened the door some more"; (ii) he subsequently asked Morrison whether he could come inside and talk; and (iii) Morrison answered in the affirmative. Similarly, Biondolillo testified that he remembered Jupiter "kind of moving out the way, her opening the door allowing us in."

Once inside, Bordelon told Morrison that he "smelled a strong odor of burnt marijuana and that it smelled like it was still burning." Morrison replied that he had smoked a marijuana cigarette the night before. Bordelon commented that it smelled like the marijuana was still burning, which prompted Morrison to lead Bordelon to the master bedroom to show him a partially burnt marijuana cigarette on the dresser. At about this time, Bordelon read Morrison his Miranda rights and Morrison agreed to continue talking to Bordelon. Bordelon then asked Morrison for consent to search the property and to sign a consent-to-search form. Morrison gave his consent and signed the form after Bordelon explained its contents. Both Bordelon and Biondolillo testified that no one threatened to arrest Jupiter or take away Morrison's children if he refused to sign.

Morrison, on the other hand, called Jupiter as a witness, and she told a significantly different story regarding the initial entry into her residence. Jupiter testified that she stood between the door and the doorframe while talking to Bordelon and Biondolillo, who "pushed the door open and came bumping in." According to Jupiter, Bordelon and Biondolillo did not speak to Morrison while standing outside the house, much less obtain permission from Morrison to enter. Instead, the officers "pushed past" Jupiter and stood in the living room until Jupiter brought Morrison out of the bedroom to speak with them. Additionally, Jupiter testified that, after being released from jail following his arrest, Morrison "said they told him they was going to take the kids and bring [her] to jail" if he did not sign the consent-to-search form.

The district court denied Morrison's motion to suppress. It found that Bordelon and Biondolillo did not coerce Morrison to sign the consent-to-search form by threatening to arrest...

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