United States v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co.

Decision Date13 October 1911
Citation191 F. 172
PartiesUNITED STATES v. STANDARD SANITARY MFG. CO. et al.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Edwin P. Grosvenor, John Philip Hill, and James A. Fowler, for the United States.

Herbert Noble, William L. Marbury, and Hartwell P. Heath, for Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. and others.

Robert B. Honeyman, for Colwell Lead Co.

Before GOFF and PRITCHARD, Circuit Judges, and ROSE, District Judge.

ROSE District Judge.

The United States brings this suit. It will be called the government. Its petition is filed under the fourth section of the Sherman anti-trust act. It charges that the defendants have violated the first and second sections of that act. It says that they have conspired to restrain interstate trade in sanitary enameled iron ware, and have attempted to monopolize such trade therein. All the defendants are concerned in making and selling that ware. It is made of cast iron. It is coated with enamel. It has the appearance of being porcelain lined. Bathtubs, lavatories, closet bowls, and tanks, sinks and urinals are among the more important articles made of it. It will be referred to as the ware.

There are 50 defendants. Sixteen are corporations. They will be called the corporate defendants. Thirty-four are individuals. They are styled individual defendants. One of them is Edwin L. Wayman. With him each of the corporate defendants made an agreement. These agreements the government says restrain trade in the ware, and attempt to monopolize it. The other 33 individual defendants are officers of the corporate defendants. The government charges that they each were among the persons who knowingly caused the corporate defendants to do that of which it complains.

These 16 agreements were, with exceptions to be mentioned identical in their language. At least 15 of the 16 corporate defendants had directly or indirectly taken part in drafting the common form. They were executed by nearly all the corporate defendants on the same day and at the same place. No defendant entered into the agreement without knowing that at least 13 of the other corporate defendants had executed it, or intended so to do. Without this knowledge no one of them would have become a party to it. Each of these agreements is in the form of a license granted by Wayman accepted by a corporate defendant. The patents under which the licenses purported to be granted were first put into Wayman's name two days before most of the agreements were executed. The terms of the agreements had been definitely settled at least two weeks earlier. There were three patents. They all were for automatic dredgers. A dredger is a tool used in the enameling step of making the ware. The licenses were granted for a period of two years, beginning June 1, 1910. Each licensee promised on the 5th day of each month to pay $5 a day for each furnace used by it for the making of the ware during the preceding month. Wayman undertook that he would three months later pay back $4 out of every $5. This undertaking was conditioned upon the licensee having in the meantime done all he had agreed to do. There are about 25 working days a month. Wayman on the 5th of every month, therefore, received $125 for each furnace continuously operated during the preceding month by any one of his licensees.

One hundred dollars of this he was eventually to pay back. This repayment was not to be made until three months had gone by. After the first four months, he would always have in his hands $300 of his licensees' money for every furnace of theirs in steady use. As it actually turned out, he usually held between $40,000 and $50,000 belonging to them. This money was in the nature of cash bail. Each corporate defendant in this manner gave security that he would keep his bargain, or be good, as one of the licensees expressed it. Each corporate defendant promised to do three things: (1) It would not sell any 'seconds' or 'Bs' of any of the ware except bathtubs. It apparently reserved the right to market what the trade calls 'nonguaranteed' bathtubs. (2) It would not sell any ware to any jobber who did not sign the jobber's resale agreement to be presently described. (3) It would not sell anybody any ware at a lower price or upon more attractive terms than those named in the agreement or in a schedule attached to it. This schedule named standard prices for each article of the ware and for each size, shape, and grade of that article. All the corporate defendants promised that they would not sell some articles below the scheduled price. Some of them undertook not to sell any articles below these prices. Some of the corporate defendants had not the established reputation of others, or they had not as efficient a selling force. They would not take licenses unless they were allowed to sell some articles at a little lower price than those quoted by their stronger rivals. After much negotiation, it was settled by a committee of the corporate defendants that some of them should be allowed to sell some articles at a discount of 2 1/2 in some instances, of 5 per cent. in others, from the scheduled prices. The permission to give this discount, granted to some of the corporate defendants and not to others, was the only respect in which there was any difference among any of the agreements as executed. The negotiation as to which of the corporate defendants should be allowed by the others to give these preferential prices to their customers and how great the permitted discount should be was finished before any of the agreements were executed and before any of the patents had been put in Wayman's name. The resale agreement which the jobber in the ware was required to sign bound him in two respects: (1) He could not buy any ware from any one other than the corporate defendants. (2) He could not sell ware to anybody at a lower price or on more attractive terms than those named in the resale price lists.

The principles upon which these resale prices were to be worked out in detail had been agreed upon between Wayman and a committee chosen by nearly all of the corporate defendants. This agreement was reached before any licenses were accepted, and before any of the patents had become Wayman's. The licenses provided that no changes in the sale or resale prices could be made without the consent of Wayman and the majority of a committee elected by the corporate defendants. The agreements restricted in a number of ways the freedom of both the corporate defendants who made the ware and the jobbers who sold it to the plumbers.

An article of the ware must always be billed separately from other goods sold at the same time to the same person. Many articles could not be shipped uncrated. No allowance could be made for a returned crate and so on. There were jobbers to whom these rules or some of them were distasteful. Dealers were forced to change their methods of doing business which they had followed for years to the mutual satisfaction of themselves and their customers. These requirements had a purpose. Competition in price cannot be altogether shut off unless everybody is made in some respects to do business in precisely the same way as everybody else. Each jobber, like each maker, was called on to give cash security that he would carry out his bargain. He had to pay 5 per cent. more for the ware than the maker expected to get out of it. If he had not cut prices and had not bought ware from any one other than the corporate defendants at the end of the calendar year, he was entitled to receive a rebate of 5 per cent. on the amount paid by him during the year. If his purchases from all the corporate defendants combined had amounted to as much as $30,000, his rebate was to be at the rate of 10 per cent. Applications for rebates were to be made to Wayman. When he approved them, they were paid by the corporate defendant or defendants which had sold the applicant the ware. Nearly 400 jobbers signed these agreements. They constituted more than four-fifths of all the jobbers in the country. The consumption of the ware is large. Wayman doubtfully estimated the annual value of the national output of it at $14,000,000. It is hardly less than $10,000,000. It may be much more. Upwards of 80 per cent. of the jobbers took licenses. They probably handled at least 80 per cent. of the product; that is, their total yearly purchases from the corporate defendants must have footed up about $8,000,000. A rebate of 5 per cent. on $8,000,000 amounts to $400,000 of 10 per cent. to $800,000. Towards the close of every calendar year the corporate defendants would among them hold in the neighborhood of half a million of the jobbers' money. Moreover, the agreements told the jobbers in plain words that, if they cut prices or bought ware from anybody other than the corporate defendants, none of the latter would sell them again. There were jobbers who did not like some of the new rules. Some of them thought their money would be more useful in their own bank account than in that of the corporate defendants. A little less than one-fifth of them refused to sign the agreements.

On the other hand, there was from the jobbers' standpoint much that was attractive in the scheme as a whole. Competition had been fierce. It had not always been either wise or honest. A badly made article may look well enough to deceive the average householder. Many such had been put on the market. When the defects were speedily discovered, the jobber might have to take back the article. The cost of doing so ate up the profit on a number of like articles which were not returned. There was little profit in handling the ware. If every dealer signed the agreement, none of them could gain by taking from the makers and putting off on the public any ware...

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4 cases
  • United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri
    • March 31, 1920
    ... ... and legislative control as other contracts. In United ... States v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. (C.C.) 191 F. 172, ... 190, it was held: ... 'A ... patentee is as ... ...
  • United Shoe MaChinery Co. v. La Chapelle
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • July 3, 1912
    ... ... Bouck, 98 C. C. A. 184, 174 F. 312; ... Silliman v. United States, 101 U.S. 465, 25 L.Ed ...          2. It ... was of no ... commerce. Standard Oil Co. v. U. S., 221 U.S. 1, 59 ... to 62, 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619, ... 373, 408, 31 S.Ct. 376, 55 L.Ed ... 502; U.S. v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. (C. C.) 191 ... F. 172. The modern machinery for the manufacture ... ...
  • Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 4525.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois
    • April 21, 1948
    ...duties, the occupancy of an official position is not enough to demonstrate contumacious participation. See United States v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., C.C., 191 F. 172, 194, affirmed 226 U.S. 20, 33 S.Ct. 9, 57 L.Ed. 107; Worden v. United States, 6 Cir., 204 F. 1; United States v. Taystee ......
  • Irvington Mfg. Co. v. Utica Drop Forge & Tool Co.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • November 6, 1911
    ... ... 169 IRVINGTON MFG. CO. v. UTICA DROP FORGE & TOOL CO. No. 1,524.United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.November 6, 1911 ... ...
2 books & journal articles
  • Governmental Indirection Patent Infringement: The Need to Hold Uncle Sam Accountable Under 28 U.S.C. § 1498
    • United States
    • Capital University Law Review No. 36-4, July 2008
    • July 1, 2008
    ...are enough to entitle complainant to an injunction to prevent the threatened injury.”); United States v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 191 F. 172, 193 (enjoining a contributory infringement, at the government’s request, which caused the defendant to violate the Sherman Antitrust Act). Could C......
  • RPM as an Exclusionary Practice
    • United States
    • Sage Antitrust Bulletin No. 55-2, June 2010
    • June 1, 2010
    ...AREEDA, supra note 14, at 99. Fornumerous real-life examples of nonprice competition, see United States v.Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 191 F. 172, 175–76 (D. Md. 1911). See also Ittai Pal-dor, The Vertical Restraints Paradox: Justifying the Different Legal Treatment ofPrice and Non-price Ver......

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