United States v. Standard Oil Co.

Decision Date22 September 1938
Docket NumberNo. 11365.,11365.
Citation24 F. Supp. 575
PartiesUNITED STATES v. STANDARD OIL CO. (INDIANA) et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Wisconsin

W. P. Crawford, of Superior, Wis., John Henry Lewin, Hammond E. Chaffetz, W. B. Watson Snyder, and Grant W. Kelleher, Sp. Assts. to Atty. Gen., and John J. Boyle, U. S. Atty., of Madison, Wis., for the United States.

William J. Donovan, of New York City, Herbert H. Thomas, of Madison, Wis., J. Edward Lumbard, Jr., Ralstone R. Irvine, and Granville Whittlesey, Jr., all of New York City, and San W. Orr, of Madison, Wis., general counsel for defendants.

Louis L. Stephens, Buell F. Jones, Weymouth Kirkland, David Fisher, and John McInerny, all of Chicago, Ill., for defendants Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) and others.

W. P. Z. German and Alvin F. Molony, both of Tulsa, Okl., for Skelly Oil Co. and another.

Wm. Dewey Loucks and John F. O'Ryan, both of New York City, and E. C. Mead, of Tulsa, Okl., for Barnsdall Refining Corp. and another.

Ralph Horween, of Chicago, Ill., for Globe Oil & Refining Co. (Okl.) and others.

Rupert Thomas, Jr., and Bethuel M. Webster, Jr., both of New York City, for Edward L. Shea and others.

J. C. Denton and John P. Greve, both of Tulsa, Okl., and J. Craig McLanahan, of Baltimore, Md., for Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. and others.

Don Emery, of Bartlesville, Okl., Amos L. Beaty, of Houston, Tex., Walter L. Barnes., of Des Moines, Iowa, and Rayburn L. Foster, of Bartlesville, Okla., for Phillips Petroleum Co. and others.

Louis Mead Treadwell, of New York City, for Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., and others.

Goldthwaite H. Dorr, of New York City, for Charles E. Arnott.

James J. Cosgrove and William H. Zwick, both of Ponca City, Okl., and Dan Moody, of Austin, Tex., for Continental Oil Co. and others.

Vinson, Elkins, Weems & Francis and Charles I. Francis, all of Houston, Tex., and Carl N. Hill, of Madison, Wis., for Pure Oil Co. and others.

Samuel A. Mitchell and Truman Post Young, both of St. Louis, Mo., for Shell Petroleum Co. and others.

G. T. Stanford, Roy T. Osborn, and Frederick Wood, all of New York City, for Sinclair Refining Co. and another.

J. H. Marshutz, of Milwaukee, Wis., for Wadhams Oil Co. and another.

Charles E. Gately, of New York City, E. L. Wingert, of Madison, Wis., Chas. A. Frueauff, of New York City, and Theo. Brazeau, of Wisconsin Rapids, Wis., for Cities Service Co. and others.

STONE, District Judge.

At the close of the testimony, motions were made on behalf of each of the defendants for a directed verdict. While the Court was of the opinion that in some cases the motions were well taken, the testimony was so voluminous, the exhibits so extensive in number, that it seemed impelling that no ruling on the motion be made until there was opportunity for a thorough study of the evidence, and a careful and deliberate consideration of the law, with the aid of arguments and briefs. The jury had been sequestered from October, 1937 to January, 1938, which included the Thanksgiving, Christmas and New Year's Holidays, and to hold it for a further time sufficient to permit the Court to rule properly, seemed a further hardship which I could not inflict upon the jury, and one which should be avoided if possible. Under these circumstances, and with full knowledge and acquiescence of counsel for all parties, the Court denied the various motions for directed verdict under an explicit reservation of its ruling on the questions of law incident thereto, with the right to pass on the questions of law after verdict, as of the time made, and as the record, upon careful study, might require. Not only was no objection made to this procedure, except by one of the counsel for some of the defendants, but there was no suggestion from anyone that the Court might lack the power to reserve its ruling on these questions of law, or that the practice was in any way out of the ordinary. If any serious question in this respect had been raised, it is obvious that the jury might have been asked to retire until the Court had disposed of the motions. Its convenience would have to yield to the requirement that the Court perform its plain, judicial duty, and not put itself into a position where it would have to take the verdict with but two alternatives, viz., to sentence innocent defendants, or put them to a new trial. American justice recognizes the principle that the protection of the innocent is equally as important as conviction of the guilty.

The Court was in no doubt whatever about the power to reserve its ruling on these questions of law, and to pass thereon after the verdict with the same force and effect as before verdict. Had the practice here followed been as novel and so devoid of judicial power as the Government now claims, it would seem that the Court was entitled to some suggestion to that effect at the time the rulings were reserved. Neither was the question raised on the oral argument on the motions after verdict nor on the briefs filed by Government counsel on the motions after verdict.

Certainly the power as exercised in this case is no broader or different in principle than the admitted power to dismiss before taking a verdict. A question of law does not become a question of fact by an unwarranted submission of the case to a jury. However, in the face of an express reservation of the questions of law involved, such a result is impossible.

The constitutional right of a defendant to a trial by jury requires that all questions of law be decided by the Court and questions of fact by a jury. It is just as important that the defendant be given the benefit of the one as of the other, and if he be denied one or the other, his constitutional right to that extent has been denied.

In the careful and full review of the record and study of the briefs filed on the motions before and after verdict, the Court was definitely of the opinion that as to most of the defendants dismissed by the order of July 19th last, there was no substantial evidence indicating participation in the conspiracy; and that as to others the evidence adduced was clearly as consistent with innocence as with guilt, which raises a question of law for the Court, not one of fact for the jury, and in such circumstances it becomes the duty of the Court to grant the motions for a directed verdict. To do otherwise is clearly error. The following cases hold that where the evidence is as consistent with innocence as with guilt, it is the duty of the Court to direct a verdict for the defendant: Romano v. U. S., 2 Cir., 9 F.2d 522; Van Gorder v. U. S., 8 Cir., 21 F.2d 939; Salinger v. U. S., 8 Cir., 23 F.2d 48; Leslie v. U. S., 10 Cir., 43 F.2d 288; Tinsley v. U. S., 8 Cir., 43 F.2d 890; Parnell v. U. S., 10 Cir., 64 F.2d 324; Nicola v. U. S., 3 Cir., 72 F.2d 780; Paul v. U. S., 3 Cir., 79 F.2d 561; Nosowitz v. U. S., 2 Cir., 282 F. 575.

In the following cases the appellate court, having decided that the motions of the defendant for a directed verdict on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence or for other legal reasons should have been granted, reversed and remanded without direction for a new trial: Smith v. U. S., 151 U.S. 50, 14 S.Ct. 234, 38 L.Ed. 67; Schaefer v. U. S., 251 U.S. 466, 40 S.Ct. 259, 64 L.Ed. 360; Gebardi v. U. S., 287 U.S. 112, 53 S.Ct. 35, 77 L.Ed. 206, 84 A. L.R. 370; Grau v. U. S., 287 U.S. 124, 53 S.Ct. 38, 77 L.Ed. 212; Nathanson v. U. S., 290 U.S. 41, 54 S.Ct. 11, 78 L.Ed. 159; Nosowitz v. U. S., 2 Cir., 282 F. 575; O'Brien v. U. S., 7 Cir., 51 F.2d 674; Hogan v. U. S., 5 Cir., 54 F.2d 924; United States v. Otto, 2 Cir., 54 F.2d 277; Nazzaro v. U. S., 10 Cir., 56 F.2d 1026; Dolff v. U. S., 7 Cir., 61 F.2d 881; Cherry v. U. S., 7 Cir., 78 F.2d 334; Paul v. U. S., 3 Cir., 79 F.2d 561; Sonzinsky v. U. S., 7 Cir., 86 F.2d 486; Kassin v. U. S., 5 Cir., 87 F.2d 183; United States v. Kind, 2 Cir., 87 F.2d 315; United States v. Buchalter, 2 Cir., 88 F.2d 625 (Sherman Anti-trust violation); United States v. Kaplan, 2 Cir., 89 F.2d 869; Copeland v. U. S., 5 Cir., 90 F.2d 78; Lapadura v. U. S., 3 Cir., 91 F.2d 639; Reiner v. U. S., 9 Cir., 92 F.2d 823; Forte v. U. S., 68 App. D.C. 111, 94 F.2d 236; Czarnecki v. U. S., 3 Cir., 95 F.2d 32; Kauz v. U. S., 5 Cir., 95 F.2d 473; Rader v. U. S., 3 Cir., 95 F.2d 506; Merrill v. U. S., 9 Cir., 95 F.2d 669.

In each of the following cases, the appellate courts, having decided that defendant's motion for a directed verdict for insufficiency of the evidence should have been granted, reversed with direction to dismiss the defendant: France v. U. S., 164 U.S. 676, 17 S.Ct. 219, 41 L.Ed. 595; Romano v. U. S., 2 Cir., 9 F.2d 522; Klee v. U. S., 9 Cir., 53 F.2d 58; United States v. Bonanzi, 2 Cir., 94 F.2d 570.

The Court is thoroughly satisfied that the procedure here adopted and now complained of by the Government is not only sound in principle, but is fully supported by an abundance of authorities.

In Collenger v. U. S., 7 Cir., 50 F.2d 345, the Court held that under the ruling in Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co., 228 U.S. 364, 33 S.Ct. 523, 57 L.Ed. 879, Ann.Cas.1914D, 1029, it could not in a criminal case (where no reservation of ruling had been made by the trial court) remand with instructions to dismiss, but was confined to ordering a new trial. A careful study of the Collenger Case does not indicate that it is authority against what was done in the particular circumstances of the case at bar; rather, the contrary seems clear.

The Slocum Case was a civil action. In the majority opinion a careful review of the rules of the common law was undertaken in order to ascertain what was the trial by jury guaranteed and preserved by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution, U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 7. The Court came to the conclusion that at the time of the adoption of the Seventh Amendment, the common law did not recognize the power to grant a motion for judgment non obstante veredicto (in a case where the trial court had not reserved...

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