United States v. Stangland
| Decision Date | 13 January 1956 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 838,844. |
| Citation | 137 F. Supp. 539 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Ethan STANGLAND. UNITED STATES of America v. Max MUNK. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
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Casper M. Murphy, U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Chicago, Ill., Phil M. Mc-Nagny, Jr., U. S. Atty., Fort Wayne, Ind., John E. Logue, Asst. U. S. Atty., Fort Wayne, Ind., for plaintiff.
Robert E. Albright, Lewis E. Basom, Columbus, Ohio, Clifford E. Simon, Jr., Fort Wayne, Ind., for defendant.
These are actions for the collection of wheat marketing quota penalties assessed by the Government under the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1281 et seq. It is claimed that these penalties are due because the defendants seeded for harvest in 1954 an acreage of wheat on their respective farms which was in excess of their wheat acreage allotments, and thereby produced a farm marketing excess of wheat.
The pleadings in these cases are substantially identical. The Government has filed a motion to strike the First and Third Defenses of defendants' answers, and to require them to file a more definite statement of their Fourth Defense. It also has objected to defendants' interrogatories numbered One to Eight, Seventeen and Eighteen. The Government also has filed a motion for summary judgment. These matters have all been heard and now stand submitted for decision.
The First Defense of defendants' answer reads as follows:
"The defendant, as to the allegations contained in paragraph II of the complaint, denies that all the conditions precedent required by the Act were performed by the Secretary of Agriculture, namely that as required by 7 U.S.C. § 1336, a referendum `shall be conducted' by the Secretary of Agriculture `between the dates of the issuance of any proclamation of any national marketing quota for wheat and July 25th' and this condition precedent was not performed in accordance with the statutory requirements."
The Government contends that the First Defense does not conform to the requirements of Rule 9(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S. C.A. This rule provides that "A denial of performance or occurrence of conditions precedent shall be made specifically and with particularity." It is my view that defendants have substantially complied with the rule by their assertion that the referendum of the wheat producers was not conducted "between the dates of the issuance of any proclamation of any national marketing quota for wheat and July 25th". However, another reason was discussed at the hearing which I think requires the granting of the motion. This is particularly so in light of the fact that defendants have not indicated any desire to amend their First Defense. Section 336 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1336, provides that "Between the date of the issuance of any proclamation of any national marketing quota for wheat and July 25, the Secretary shall conduct a referendum, by secret ballot, of farmers who will be subject to the quota specified therein to determine whether such farmers favor or oppose such quota." The date of the referendum for the 1954 wheat crop was changed by an Act of Congress enacted July 14, 1953. 67 Stat. 152. This Act provides that "the referendum with respect to the 1954 crop of wheat may be held as late as August 15, 1953." According to 18 F.R. 5707 the referendum with respect to the 1954 wheat crop was held on August 14, 1953. 44 U.S.C.A. § 307 provides that "the contents of the Federal Register shall be judicially noticed." Since it positively appears that the time within which the referendum covering the 1954 wheat crop could be held was extended by Congress beyond July 25, the First Defense, even though it complies with Rule 9(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, does not as a matter of law constitute a defense. For that reason, rather than for the one stated, the motion to strike the First Defense is granted.
The motion also seeks to strike the Third Defense for the reason that it fails to state a defense sufficient in law. This defense reads as follows:
"Incorporating herein all the allegations of the first and second defenses as though rewritten herein, the defendant has never accepted any benefits either directly or indirectly nor registered or rendered himself subject to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as amended or of the regulations thereunder and is not subject to said Act."
There is nothing in the Agricultural Adjustment Act that requires the producer of wheat to accept benefits by way of loans or payments or to register before he is subject to the marketing quota provisions or to the penalties of the Act. A producer of wheat is subject to a penalty on the farm marketing excess of wheat grown on his farm during any marketing year for which quotas are in effect.1 In other words, to be subject to a penalty only two conditions are required: (1) the person against whom the penalty is asserted must be a producer of wheat, and (2) he must have produced an excess of farm marketing wheat over his quota. For this reason the allegations in the Third Defense that the defendant "has never accepted any benefits either directly or indirectly nor registered" are not material and do not constitute a defense in law. The motion to strike this portion of the Third Defense is granted. It may plausibly, however, be argued that the remaining allegation, i. e., that the defendant has never "rendered himself subject to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, or of the regulations thereunder and is not subject to said Act" raises an issue of material fact; that is, was the defendant a producer and did he produce a farm marketing excess of wheat? For that reason the motion to strike this part of the Third Defense is denied.
The Fourth Defense reads as follows:
"Incorporating herein all the allegations of the first, second and third defenses as though rewritten herein, the defendant states that the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as amended and the regulations thereunder, is in violation of the Constitution of the United States and the amendments thereto, namely Article 1 § 8, Article 1 §§ 7 and 9, Article 4 § 2, Article 1 § 1, and Articles 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States and is repugnant to Article 13 § 1 of the United States Constitution."
The motion asks that defendants file a more definite statement of this defense, specifically stating in what respects the Agricultural Adjustment Act and the regulations thereunder violate the provisions of the Constitution of the United States. The defendants have attempted to comply with this request by filing an amended answer. The motion is denied.
The Government objects to the following interrogatories propounded by the defendants:
The basis of the Government's objection is that these interrogatories relate solely to matters over which the Court has no jurisdiction in this case. An analysis of the interrogatories shows that they have to do with the manner and method of determining defendants' wheat acreage allotments and farm marketing excess of wheat. I agree with the Government's contention that the Court in these suits has no jurisdiction over the determination of these matters. Sections 363, 365, 366 and 367 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1363, § 1365, § 1366 and § 1367, cover the procedure a producer must follow in obtaining a review of his farm marketing quota. Section 363 permits a review of the quota by a local review committee composed of three farmers. Section 365 provides that a farmer dissatisfied with the determination of the review committee may within a limited time file a suit either in a federal or a state court to have such determination reviewed. Section 366 outlines the procedure to be followed in such judicial review and Section 367 provides in pertinent part:
The method outlined by these sections to test the determination of a farm marketing quota is exclusive. Therefore, the information which the defendants seek by these interrogatories is not material to any of the issues in this case. The defendants cannot defend by putting into issue the validity of the determinations of their quotas. That issue can only be raised by a proceeding under sections 365 and 366. This holding is directly supported by Lee v. Roseberry, D.C.E.D.Ky.1950, 94 F.Supp. 324, and United States v. R. L. Dixon & Bro., D.C.N.D.Tex.1940, 36 F. Supp. 147.
Objection is also made to defendants' Interrogatory 17 which inquires:
"Does the plaintiff claim the defendant has accepted any payments or loans under the A.A.A. Act of 1938?"
The objection must be sustained for the same reasons that required the striking of the Third Defense.
The last objection is directed to defendants' Interrogatory 18 which asks:
"Does...
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