United States v. Stanton, Case No.: 3:06cr11/LAC/EMT
| Decision Date | 26 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 3:06cr11/LAC/EMT,Case No.: 3:13cv423/LAC/EMT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL STANTON |
This matter is before the court upon Defendant's Motion under § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody (doc. 134). The Government has filed a response (doc. 138), and Defendant has filed a reply (doc. 142). The case was referred to the undersigned for the issuance of all preliminary orders and any recommendations to the district court regarding dispositive matters. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). After a careful review of the record and the arguments presented, it is the opinion of the undersigned that Defendant has not raised any issue requiring an evidentiary hearing and that the § 2255 motion should be denied. See Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases 8(a) and (b).
Defendant was charged in a two-count indictment with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(e) ("Count One"), and possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii) ("Count Two") (doc. 4). The Office of the Federal Public Defender was appointed to represent the defendant until he retained Barry McCleary as counsel. Represented by Mr. McCleary, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to Count Two of the indictment (doc. 25) and was found guilty after a trial on Count One, the firearm charge (doc. 32).
The Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR") was disclosed to the defense on June 6, 2006 (doc. 34). Defendant's base offense level was 34, and a two-level upward adjustment was applied due to Defendant's possession of a dangerous weapon (PSR ¶¶ 32, 33). Defendant's total offense level would have been 36 but for the application of the career offender provision of the guidelines, § 4B1.1, pursuant to which his total offense level was 37 (PSR ¶¶ 40, 41). Defendant's criminal history category was VI, whether calculated by counting his criminal history points or considering his Career Offender status (PSR ¶¶ 60-62).
Defendant objected to the drug weight attributed to him and to the probation officer's failure to credit him with an acceptance of responsibility adjustment (docs. 37, 51). At sentencing, the parties indicated they had reached an agreement on the issue of drug weight. The Government stated on the record that it concurred that 143.4 grams of cocaine base could be fairly attributed to Defendant (doc. 51 at 5). Defendant's base offense level was thus reduced, but because he was a career offender under § 4B1.1, this adjustment did not affect his ultimate guidelines level. The court overruled Defendant's objection on the acceptance of responsibility adjustment, but declined to penalize him for obstruction of justice (doc. 51 at 6). The court noted that it was "troubled by the defense that [defendant] presented at trial. . . which is so bizarre as to not have any credibility at all" (id. at 8).1 The court sentenced Defendant to a term of 360-months imprisonment, at the low end of the guidelines range, in order to take into account the plea he entered on Count Two and his cooperation with the Government. Defendant did not immediately appeal.
In June of 2007, Defendant filed a § 2255 motion seeking to vacate his sentence (doc. 45). One of his claims was that his retained attorney, Barry McCreary, failed to file an appeal as instructed. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that the motion be denied (docs. 65, 67). The district court adopted the recommendation and denied the motion (docs. 69, 70, 76). The Eleventh Circuit found that counsel failed to meaningfully "consult" with his client about an appeal, and reversed to allow Defendant the option to exercise his right to pursue an out-of-time appeal (doc. 113). Judgment was reentered, Defendant appealed, and his conviction and sentence were affirmed (docs. 115, 116, 117, 132, 133).
Defendant timely filed the instant motion to vacate raising three grounds for relief. Two of his claims allege that counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance with respect to the plea process, and his third claim is that he is entitled to re-sentencing under Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) . Defendant has also requested leave to add an additional claim based on the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). The Government opposes Ground One of the motion but did not respond to Defendant's other claims.
Collateral review is not a substitute for direct appeal, and therefore the grounds for collateral attack on final judgments pursuant to § 2255 are extremely limited. A prisoner is entitled to relief under section 2255 if the court imposed a sentence that (1) violated the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) exceeded its jurisdiction, (3) exceeded the maximum authorized by law, or (4) is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1194 n.8 (11th Cir. 2011). "Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 'is reserved for transgressions of constitutional rights and for that narrow compass of other injury that could not have been raised in direct appeal and would, if condoned, result in a complete miscarriage of justice.'" Lynn v. United States, 365 F.3d 1225, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The "fundamental miscarriage of justice" exception recognized in Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986), provides that it must be shown that the alleged constitutional violation "has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent . . . ."
The law is well established that a district court need not reconsider issues raised in a section 2255 motion which have been resolved on direct appeal. Rozier v. United States, 701 F.3d 681, 684 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 2000); Mills v. United States, 36 F.3d 1052, 1056 (11th Cir. 1994). Once a matter has been decided adversely to a defendant on direct appeal, it cannot be re-litigated in a collateral attack under section 2255. Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1343 (quotation omitted). Broad discretion is afforded to a court's determination of whether a particular claim has been previously raised. Sanders v. United States,373 U.S. 1, 16 (1963) ().
Because a motion to vacate under section 2255 is not a substitute for direct appeal, issues which could have been raised on direct appeal are generally not actionable in a section 2255 motion and will be considered procedurally barred. Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234-35; Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621 (1998); McKay v. United States, 657 F.3d 1190, 1195 (11th Cir. 2011). An issue is "'available' on direct appeal when its merits can be reviewed without further factual development." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1232 n.14 (quoting Mills, 36 F.3d at 1055). Absent a showing that the ground of error was unavailable on direct appeal, a court may not consider the ground in a section 2255 motion unless the defendant establishes (1) cause for not raising the ground on direct appeal, and (2) actual prejudice resulting from the alleged error, that is, alternatively, that he is "actually innocent." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1234; Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622 (citations omitted). To show cause for procedural default, a defendant must show that "some objective factor external to the defense prevented [him] or his counsel from raising his claims on direct appeal and that this factor cannot be fairly attributable to [defendant's] own conduct." Lynn, 365 F.3d at 1235. A meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel can constitute cause. See Nyhuis, 211 F.3d at 1344.
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are generally not cognizable on direct appeal and are properly raised by a § 2255 motion regardless of whether they could have been brought on direct appeal. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503 (2003); see also United States v. Franklin, 694 F.3d 1, 8 (11th Cir. 2012). In order to prevail on a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was below an objective and reasonable professional norm and that he was prejudiced by this inadequacy. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390 (2000); Darden v. United States, 708 F.3d 1225, 1228 (11th Cir. 2013). Strickland's two-part test also applies to guilty pleas. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985)). A defendant will be required to show that but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have instead insisted on proceeding to trial. Id. at 1384-85 (quoting Hill, 474 U.S. at 59). A defendant's "after the fact testimony concerning his desire to plead, withoutmore, is insufficient to establish" prejudice. Pericles v. United States, 567 F. App'x 776, 782 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Diaz v. United States, 930 F.2d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1991)); Rosin v. United States,786 F.3d 873 (11th Cir. 2015). The Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel extends specifically "to the negotiation and consideration of plea offers that lapse or are rejected." In re Perez, 682 F.3d 930, 932 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Missouri v. Frye, — U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012); Lafler v. Cooper, —U.S. —, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012)). A defendant who claims that ineffective advice led him to reject a plea offer must show that but for ineffective...
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