United States v. Starks
Citation | 239 F.2d 544 |
Decision Date | 16 January 1957 |
Docket Number | No. 11778,11779.,11778 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard STARKS et al., etc., Third Party Defendants-Appellees. UNITED STATES RUBBER CO., Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard STARKS et al., etc., Third Party Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
John G. Laughlin, Appellate Section, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., A. M. Fitzgerald, R. G. Heckenkamp and John B. Stoddart, Jr., U. S. Atty., Springfield, Ill., George Cochran Doub, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paul A. Sweeney, Atty., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Thomas B. Dunn, Morris, Ill., Dunn & Hayes, Morris, Ill., for appellees.
Before FINNEGAN, LINDLEY and SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judges.
In a complaint filed in the district court by the Trustees1 of Funk Farms Trust against the United States of America and United States Rubber Co., a corporation, plaintiffs sought recovery for damage to plaintiffs' cattle alleged to have been caused by the negligence of defendants' employees in spraying arsenic over a part of the Joliet Arsenal Military Reservation in Will County, Illinois, which, pursuant to a contract with the United States, was being operated by the rubber company and the United States army. Plaintiffs allege that in 1953 the United States entered into a lease with Richard Starks and Frank J. Barr, doing business as Starks & Barr, for agricultural grazing purposes on said reservation and that in May or June of 1953 plaintiffs entered into a bailment for hire with Starks & Barr, pursuant to which the cattle were grazing on the reservation.
Count I of the complaint seeks recovery from the United States under several sections of the Federal Tort Claims Act.2 Count II seeks recovery from the rubber company, basing jurisdiction upon diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy; and count III joins both defendants. The latter filed answers, and, pursuant to leave of court, third-party complaints. In its third-party complaint, the United States sought a judgment against Starks & Barr for any sums which the Funk Farms Trust might recover in this action against the United States. The rubber company's third-party complaint sought similar relief against Starks & Barr in the event that a judgment was entered against it in favor of the Trust.
The district court on motions of Starks & Barr dismissed both third-party complaints,3 and this appeal followed.
Both third-party complaints involve the following clause contained in the lease between the United States, as lessor, and Starks & Barr, as lessees:
This is referred to as the indemnity clause. The district court filed a memorandum, stating the grounds of its action. That court held that the indemnity clause is contrary to public policy. Starks & Barr insist that the Tort Claims Act has indicated a clear intention to permit the United States to be sued for the negligence of its officers and employees and that therefore the indemnity clause here is contrary to a public policy so expressed. The district court also held that it was not the intention of the parties to the lease that the lessee should hold the United States harmless for damages to a third party arising from its own wrongful act.
The United States argues that since the lease is a government contract, the validity of the covenant, as well as the rights and obligations thereunder, present federal questions to be resolved by resort to federal law. Starks & Barr agree. The rubber company says that the law of Illinois controls and that under the Illinois law the indemnity clause is valid. Contending that, in a diversity case, the law of the state is to be followed with respect to the cause of action created, it asserts that exculpatory or indemnifying provisions in a lease are not against the public policy of the State of Illinois but are valid and enforceable. The rubber company argued no other point in this court. It relies on Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, at page 78, 58 S.Ct. 817, at page 822, 82 L.Ed. 1188, where, the court said:
The rubber company also cites Canvas Fabricators v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 7 Cir., 199 F.2d 485, at page 486, where the court said:
"This being a diversity case, it can hardly be doubted but that the main question for decision is controlled by local law."
But neither of these cases involved a government contract, which is the kind involved in the case at bar.
In United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, at page 183, 64 S.Ct. 908, at page 913, 88 L.Ed. 1209, the court said:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Woodbury v. United States
...Garden Apts., Inc., 9 Cir., 1959, 268 F.2d 380, 382, cert. denied, 1959, 361 U.S. 884, 80 S.Ct. 156, 4 L.Ed. 2d 120; United States v. Starks, 7 Cir., 1957, 239 F.2d 544, 546; see also National Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 1945, 323 U.S. 454, 456, 65 S.Ct. 354, 89 L.Ed. 383; Clearfiel......
-
Ward v. United States
...law, an exculpatory clause similar to this one was upheld against a claim that it was contrary to public policy in United States v. Starks, 7 Cir., 1957, 239 F.2d 544. However, in the opinion of this Court such a clause does not operate to relieve a lessor from liability under circumstances......
-
Maloof v. United States
...v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174, 64 S.Ct. 908, 88 L.Ed. 1209 (1944); see cases cited 322 U.S. 183, 64 S.Ct. 914; United States v. Starks, 239 F.2d 544 (7 Cir. 1957); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Robertson, 214 F.2d 746 (4 Cir. 1954). The cases hold that the interpretation of a "hold harm......
-
Jaeger v. United States
...of open messes, and its employees, to its members, are governed by Federal common law rather than Maryland law. Cf. United States v. Starks, 239 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1956). As the parties have not discussed the issue, and in the absence of any indication that it would make a difference in thi......