United States v. State of Alaska, 118
| Decision Date | 21 April 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 118,O,118 |
| Citation | 112 S.Ct. 1606,118 L.Ed.2d 222,503 U.S. 569 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF ALASKA. rig |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Pursuant to, inter alia, § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (RHA), the Secretary of the Army, through the Army Corps of Engineers, granted Nome, Alaska, a federal permit to build port facilities extending into Norton Sound. The permit's issuance was conditioned on the submission by Alaska of a disclaimer of rights to additional submerged lands that it could claim within its boundary if the facilities' construction moved the coastline seaward. However, the disclaimer also provided that Alaska reserved its right to the accreted submerged lands pending a decision by a court of competent jurisdiction that federal officials lacked the authority to compel a disclaimer of sovereignty as a condition of permit issuance. After the facilities were constructed, the United States Department of the Interior proposed a lease sale for minerals in Norton Sound. Alleging that the proposal involved lands subject to its disclaimer, Alaska announced its intention to file suit challenging the Corps' authority to require the disclaimer. The United States was granted leave of this Court to commence this action, and both parties have filed motions for summary judgment.
Held: The Secretary of the Army acted within his discretion in conditioning approval of the Nome port facilities on a disclaimer by Alaska of a change in the federal-state boundary that the project might cause. Pp. 575-593.
(a) This Court's review of the Corps' construction of a statute that it administers involves an examination of § 10's language, this Court's decisions interpreting § 10, and the Corps' longstanding construction in fulfilling Congress' mandate. On its face, § 10—which prohibits the building of any structure in navigable waters of the United States "except on plans recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army"—appears to give the Secretary unlimited discretion to grant or deny a permit for construction of a structure such as the one at issue. While both the RHA's legislative history and § 10's statutory antecedents offer little insight into Congress' intent, the idea of delegating authority to the Secretary was well established in the immediate precursors to the RHA. This Court's decisions also support the view that § 10 should be construed broadly, see, e.g., United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 53 S.Ct. 614, 77 L.Ed. 1250, to authorize consideration of factors other than navigation during the permit review process, cf. United States v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 411 U.S. 655, 93 S.Ct. 1804, 36 L.Ed.2d 567. In addition, since the late 1960's, the regulations adopted by the Corps have interpreted its statutory authority as empowering it to take into account several "public interest" factors—including a full range of economic, social, and environmental factors—in addition to navigation in deciding whether to issue a § 10 permit. See, e.g., 33 CFR § 320.4(a)(1). Pp. 576-583.
(b) There is no merit to Alaska's argument that any statutory mandate authorizing the Secretary to consider factors in addition to navigation is exceeded by 33 CFR § 320.4(f), which authorizes consideration of a project's consequences on the federal-state boundary. Contrary to Alaska's position, the Corps' practice does not conflict with the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (SLA), which provides that a coastal State's boundary extends three miles from its coastline. Although coastlines are subject to change from natural or artificial alterations, see, e.g., United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139, 176-177, 85 S.Ct. 1401, 1421, 14 L.Ed.2d 296 (California II ), the Secretary is making no effort to alter a State's existing rights to sovereignty over submerged lands within three miles of the coastline. Rather the Corps is, in a reasonable exercise of its authority, determining whether an artificial addition to the coastline will increase the State's control over submerged lands to the detriment of the United States' legitimate interests. Neither the SLA nor its legislative history addresses the effect of artificial additions to the coastline, and this Court sanctioned, in California II, supra, at 177, 85 S.Ct., at 1422, the mechanism exercised by the Secretary in this case. Nor do this Court's decisions prohibit the Secretary from considering in the permit review process changes in federal-state boundaries that will result in the establishment of one boundary for international purposes—since artificial additions always affect such boundaries—and a different one for domestic purposes. Specifically, the Secretary's action does not conflict with California II, because that case did not specify a goal of achieving a single domestic and international coastline. Pp. 583-591.
(c) There is also no merit to Alaska's argument that, even if the regulations are valid, they do not authorize the Corps to force a coastal State to abdicate rights to submerged lands as a condition to a permit's issuance. It is untenable to say that the United States' legitimate property interests fall outside the relevant criteria for a decision that requires the Secretary to determine whether a permit's issuance would affect the "public interest." And it would make little sense, and be inconsistent with Congress' intent, to hold that the Corps legitimately may prohibit construction of a port facility, and yet to deny it the authority to seek the less drastic alternative of conditioning the permit's issuance on the State's disclaimer of rights to accreted submerged lands. The Corps' failure to identify in the regulations the option of conditioning disclaimers does not render the policy contrary to law. See United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1267, ----, 113 L.Ed.2d 335. The Corps cannot be said to have acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner, since it notified state officials promptly of the objection to the project, specified a curative option, and afforded Alaska ample time to consider the disclaimer, consult with federal officials, and then draft the disclaimer. Nor can Alaska contend that it lacked notice, since the disclaimer is similar to those Alaska has filed in past § 10 proceedings. Pp. 591-592.
United States' motion for summary judgment granted; Alaska's motion for summary judgment denied.
Jeffrey P. Minear, Washington, D.C., for plaintiff.
John G. Gissberg, Juneau, Alaska, for defendant.
Ever since the Nome gold rush of 1899 to 1901, the Seward Peninsula in western Alaska has been a focus of attempts to gain control over the region's natural riches. See In re McKenzie, 180 U.S. 536, 21 S.Ct. 468, 45 L.Ed. 657 (1901). The city of Nome sprang to life almost overnight, with some 20,000 gold seekers arriving by vessel in the summer of 1900 when the spring thaw opened up seaward passage. Since that time, Nome has never been linked to interior Alaska by road—travelers and traders must arrive by air, sea, or dog sled. This heavy reliance on seaward traffic, and the lack of a natural port in the region, inspired Nome in the early 1980's to develop plans to construct port facilities, including a causeway with road, a breakwater, and an offshore terminal area, extending into Norton Sound. The implications of this construction for the federal-state offshore boundary lie at the heart of this lawsuit, which comes to us on a bill of complaint filed by the United States. The question presented is whether the Secretary of the Army may decline to issue a permit to build an artificial addition to the coastline unless Alaska agrees that the construction will be deemed not to alter the location of the federal-state boundary.
On August 25, 1982, the city of Nome applied for a federal permit to build port facilities with the Alaska District Corps of Engineers of the United States Department of the Army under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (RHA), 30 Stat. 1151, 33 U.S.C. § 403, and § 404 of the Clean Water Act, 86 Stat. 884, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 1344.1 The Corps issued a Public Notice of Application for Permit on October 20, 1982, and invited interested persons to comment on whether the permit should be granted. On November 22, 1982, a division of the United States Department of the Interior filed an objection to the issuance of a Department of the Army permit on the ground that Nome's construction of these port facilities would cause an "artificial accretion to the legal coast line." Joint Stipulation of Facts 2. It requested that the Corps require Alaska to waive any future claims pursuant to the Submerged Lands Act (SLA), 67 Stat. 29, as amended, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq., that might arise from a seaward extension of Alaska's coastline caused by the building of these facilities. The Solicitor of the Interior Department issued an opinion to the same effect, stating that the Nome project would " 'move Alaska's coastline or baseline seaward of its present location' " and that " '[f]ederal mineral leasing offshore Alaska would be affected because the state-federal boundary, as well as international boundaries, are measured from the coastline or baseline.' " Joint Stipulation of Facts 2-3. Accordingly, the Solicitor recommended that " 'approval of the permit application be conditioned upon Alaska executing an agreement or a quit claim deed preserving the coastline and the state-federal boundary.' " Id., at 3.
On July 1, 1983, the Corps transmitted the Solicitor's letter to the Alaska Department of Natural Resources and advised the State that the federal permit would not be issued until a " 'waiver or quit claim deed has been issued preserving the coastline and the State-Federal boundary.' " Ibid. The ...
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