United States v. State of California
Decision Date | 28 February 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 18246.,18246. |
Citation | 328 F.2d 729 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Ramsey Clark, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roger P. Marquis, and Hugh Nugent, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Francis C. Whelan, U. S. Atty., and James R. Akers, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen. for State of California, Los Angeles, Cal., and George C. Hadley, Richard L. Franck, Charles E. Spencer, Jr., Morse A. Taylor and Robert E. Reed, Los Angeles, Cal., for appellee.
Before HAMLEY and BROWNING, Circuit Judges, and MacBRIDE, District Judge.
The United States sued the State of California in the District Court to recover losses resulting from allegedly negligent acts of State employees in starting a fire in a national forest, and in attempting to extinguish it. The complaint was filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1345, which grants to district courts original jurisdiction over "all" civil actions commenced by the United States.1
The District Court dismissed the action on the ground that Section 1345 "does not confer upon a Federal district court jurisdiction over a State in a civil action brought by the United States to recover from the State damages resulting from negligence of State agents, absent a waiver of the State's sovereign immunity."2
The District Court read this exception into the language of Section 1345 in part because the court entertained "serious Constitutional doubts" as to the power of Congress to extend the jurisdiction of district courts to suits by the United States against a State without the State's specific consent unless a federal question is presented.3
It is not clear whether the asserted lack of power pertains to all federal courts or only to those inferior to the Supreme Court. Nor is it clear whether an issue of federal supremacy is thought essential, or whether any kind of federal question will suffice.4 Neither is it evident why a suit by the United States to collect damages from the State for injury to the national forests does not meet any subject-matter limitation which may be thought to exist.5
It is unnecessary to consider these problems, however, for we are satisfied that the Constitution grants original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over civil suits brought by the United States against a State without specific consent regardless of the nature of the controversy, provided the issue is justiciable, and that the Constitution empowers Congress to confer upon the district courts concurrent jurisdiction over such suits.
Article III,6 Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution extends the federal judicial power "to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party."
Clause 2 vests the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over "all Cases * * * in which a State shall be a Party." Since the latter grant does not exclude cases in which the United States is the opposite party, the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over suits by the United States against a State. Each State impliedly consented to such suits "when admitted into the Union upon an equal footing in all respects with the other States," and no further consent is needed. United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646, 12 S.Ct. 488, 494, 36 L.Ed. 285 (1892).7 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has repeatedly entertained suits by the United States against a State, without the State's consent.8
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court extends to suits by the United States against a State "without regard to the subject of such controversies" (United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. at 646, 12 S.Ct. at 494, 36 L.Ed. 285) for "it is apparent upon the face of these clauses that in one class of cases the jurisdiction of the courts of the Union depends `on the character of the cause, whoever may be the parties,'9 and, in the other, on the character of the parties, whatever may be the subject of controversy." 143 U.S. at 643, 12 S.Ct. at 492, 36 L.Ed.2d 285. There is no suggestion in any of the opinions in cases brought by the United States against a State in the Supreme Court that the subject matter of the controversy was relevant to the Court's jurisdiction.
The policy considerations underlying Supreme Court jurisdiction over such suits precludes the imposition of a subject-matter limitation. The jurisdiction exists because if it did not the United States would be forced to resort to the courts of the State which was resisting the federal claim (if, indeed, that State would permit suit against it in its own courts), or no means at all would be available for finally resolving the dispute short of an ultimate test of physical strength;10 and neither of these alternatives is compatible with our constitutional scheme. The problem is the same whatever the nature of the controversy between the two governments. It therefore calls for the same solution without regard to the kind of question presented, provided the subject matter be justiciable and hence appropriate for judicial resolution.11
As a result of Convention compromise the Constitution vested in Congress discretion to establish such lower federal courts as it might think proper;12 "and it seems to be a necessary inference from the express decision that the creation of inferior federal courts was to rest in the discretion of Congress that the scope of their jurisdiction, once created, was also to be discretionary." Hart & Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 18 (1953).13
The power of Congress to confer jurisdiction upon lower courts is not limited by the constitutional grant of original jurisdiction over certain cases to the Supreme Court.14 "The true rule in this case is * * * that the grant of jurisdiction over a certain subject-matter to one court, does not, of itself, imply that that jurisdiction is to be exclusive." Gittings v. Crawford, 10 Fed.Cas. 447, 450 (No. 5465) (C.C.D. Md.1838).15 That this was in fact the intention of the framers appears from changes made in article III in the course of the Convention.16
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held in Börs v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252, 4 S.Ct. 407, 28 L.Ed. 419 (1884), that Congress may grant jurisdiction to lower courts over suits against aliens, including consuls, despite the provision of article III that "In all Cases affecting * * * Consuls * * * the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." And at the same term the Court in Ames v. Kansas, 111 U.S. 449, 4 S.Ct. 437, 28 L.Ed. 482 (1884), concluded that the grant of original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court over cases "in which a State shall be a Party," does not preclude Congress from vesting concurrent jurisdiction over such actions in lower courts.17 Since Ames v. Kansas, statutes granting jurisdiction to lower courts over suits by the United States under particular legislation have been repeatedly construed as including suits against a State and, as so interpreted, have been uniformly upheld.18
There is nothing to indicate that the power of Congress in this regard is limited by the subject matter of the controversy.
Since the character of the parties is a basis of federal judicial power distinct and independent from that of the nature of the controversy,19 there is no logical reason why Congress may not treat these two heads of jurisdiction separately in distributing the judicial power to lower courts. And Congress has in fact done so from the beginning. Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, for example, granted district courts jurisdiction based solely upon the nature of the cause ("all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction"), upon both the nature of the cause and the character of the parties ("all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States"), and solely upon the character of the parties ("all suits at common law where the United States sue").20
The relevant court decisions support the view, evidently entertained by Congress, that congressional power to confer jurisdiction upon lower courts based upon the character of the parties is not limited by the subject matter of the controversy.
The subject matter of Börs v. Preston, supra, 111 U.S. 252, 4 S.Ct. 407, 28 L.Ed. 419, was the tortious conversion of personal property, and among the decisions relied upon by the Court was an action against a counsel to collect a promissory note.21 In Ames v. Kansas, supra, 111 U.S. 449, 4 S.Ct. 437, 28 L.Ed. 482, the Court relied primarily upon these and other authorities upholding lower court jurisdiction over suits against consuls without regard to subject matter,22 and there is nothing in Ames v. Kansas, or in the opinions in cases which have followed it,23 suggesting that the power of Congress to grant jurisdiction to lower courts over suits against States, unlike suits against consuls, is limited by the nature of the controversy. In context, the unqualified assertion by Chief Justice Waite in Ames v. Kansas that it is "within the power of Congress to grant to the inferior courts of the United States jurisdiction in cases where the Supreme Court has been vested by the Constitution with original jurisdiction" (111 U.S. at 469, 4 S.Ct. at 447, 28 L.Ed. 482), cannot be discounted as unintentionally broad.24
The fact that there is no subject-matter limitation upon the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over suits by the United States against a State argues strongly against a subject-matter limitation upon lower court jurisdiction over such suits. If a subject-matter limitation were applicable only to lower courts, States could be sued in district courts when questions of constitutional power and overriding federal interest were at stake, but could be sued only in the Supreme Court when disputes concerned nonfederal issues, of relatively minor consequence in the...
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