United States v. State of Alabama, Civ. A. No. 479-E.

• Decision Date: 17 November 1960
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 479-E.
• Citation: 188 F. Supp. 759
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF ALABAMA; Wheeler Dyson, and Charles Donald Scott, Registrars of Voters of Macon County, Alabama, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

188 F. Supp. 759

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF ALABAMA; Wheeler Dyson, and Charles Donald Scott, Registrars of Voters of Macon County, Alabama, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 479-E.

United States District Court M. D. Alabama, E. D.

November 17, 1960.

Ben Brooks, D. Robert Owen, Attorneys, U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., and Hartwell Davis, U. S. Atty., Montgomery, Ala., for plaintiff.

MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen., Willard W. Livingston, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Leslie Hall and Gordon Madison, Asst. Attys. Gen., State of Alabama, for defendants.

JOHNSON, District Judge.

This cause is now submitted upon the motion of the defendants filed herein on October 18, 1960, separately and severally, wherein said defendants seek to have this Court dismiss the complaint as amended and supplemented, said amended and supplemental complaint having been filed herein on October 7, 1960.

The defendants' motion to dismiss is based upon over one hundred grounds and is directed to the sufficiency of the complaint as amended and supplemented, jurisdictional questions, parties to the suit, and contentions that the United States has no right to commence or prosecute this action because it seeks preventive relief on behalf of a group or class of persons. Included in these contentions is an attack on the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and the Civil Rights Act of 1960.

The amended and supplemental complaint alleges certain acts and practices on the part of the defendants by which certain citizens have been deprived of a right and privilege secured by § 1971(a), Title 42 U.S.C.A., namely, the right and privilege of citizens of the United States who are otherwise qualified by law to vote to be entitled and allowed to vote without discrimination or distinction because of race or color.¹ It should be noted that these allegations include and follow the essential requirements of the Congressional enactment.

It should also be noted that the Congress of the United States in enacting § 1971(c), Title 42 U.S.C.A.,² specifically authorizes the Attorney General of the United States to institute litigation for preventive relief "whenever any person has engaged or * * * is about to engage in any act or practice which would deprive any other person of any right * * * secured by subsection (a) * * *." Thus, it is apparent that the complaint as amended and supplemented seeks the preventive relief authorized by Congress, and the public officer, that is, the Attorney General of the United States, is authorized to institute such litigation for the purpose of obtaining such preventive relief.

The various contentions in defendants' motion to dismiss attacking the jurisdiction of this Court are clearly unfounded. The Congress of the United States expressly conferred jurisdiction on "the district courts of the United States" by § 1971(d), Title 42 U.S.C.A.³ The related contentions that the relief sought by the plaintiff is not within the jurisdictional power of the courts of the United States and that the courts of the United States have no jurisdiction to enjoin the state and its officers were treated by this Court in State of Alabama, etc. v. Rogers, 187 F.Supp. 848, 854, where this Court said:

"Although the particular qualifications one must possess to exercise this right to vote are left to the states — as long as that exercise is within the constitutional framework — the power to protect voters who are qualified is confided to the Congress of the United States."

See also this Court's opinion in In re Wallace et al., 170 F.Supp. 63, wherein this Court ruled against a similar claim that was predicated upon the theory that the states have exclusive jurisdiction in the field of voting.

Those grounds in defendants' motion to dismiss that are predicated upon the theory that the United States is not the real party in interest and that this is a "vicarious controversy" are unfounded. This issue was disposed of in United States v. Raines et al., 362 U.S. 17, 80 S.Ct. 519, 526, 4 L.Ed.2d 524, wherein the Supreme Court stated:

"But there is the highest public interest in the due observance of all the constitutional guarantees, including those that bear the most directly on private rights, and we think it perfectly competent for Congress to authorize the United States to be the guardian of that public interest in a suit for injunctive relief."

It necessarily follows that since the United States is the real party in interest in actions such as this, the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States presents no bar to the institution and prosecution of this action. See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 12 S.Ct. 488, 36 L.Ed. 285, and United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 67 S.Ct. 1658, 91 L.Ed. 1889.

The related contentions of the defendants that the State of Alabama is not accountable for any discriminatory acts on the part of its registration officials are also without merit. Any discriminatory acts on the part of state officials while acting in the discharge of their official duties, which deprive citizens of their constitutional rights are properly imputed to the state when the action to prevent such discrimination is to secure rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. As a matter of fact, it is only because of the states' constitutional responsibility that the actions on the part of state officials fall within the prohibition of these constitutional amendments. See United States v. Raines et al., supra, and Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 1401, 1409, 3 L.Ed.2d 5, in this latter case the Supreme Court stating:

"`When an official is clothed with the State's power, his act is

...