United States v. Stephens

Decision Date11 May 2022
Docket NumberCivil Action 4:21-CR-00019-JHM
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA PLAINTIFF v. COREY STEPHENS DEFENDANT
CourtU.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Joseph H. McKinley Jr., Senior Judge

This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence [DN 26]. Fully briefed, this matter is ripe for decision. For the following reasons, the Motion to Suppress Evidence is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

On March 19, 2021, law enforcement officers applied for a search and seizure warrant on the knowledge and belief that Corey Stephens (Stephens) had engaged in the distribution of child pornography. See [DN 26-1]. The warrant application requested permission to search the premises described in “Attachment A.” [DN 26-3 at 1]. Attachment A described “3530 State Route 181 Greenville, Kentucky 42345” as a “single-story grey/blue brick residence with two white iron rod decorative columns on the front porch, with dark blue/black shutters and a light grey metal roof.” [DN 26-1 at 30]. The warrant application also sought to seize various electronic devices and files involved in the distribution of child pornography including “cellular phones capable of storage ....” [Id. at 36]. This Court authorized the warrant. See [DN 26-3]. Neither the warrant or its application mentioned vehicles. See generally [DN 26-1]; [DN 26-3].

On the morning of May 20, 2021, officers executed that warrant. [DN 35-3 at 5]. Waiting until Stephens left work that morning, the officers followed him home.

[DN 45 at 6:20-21]. There, Stephens parked his vehicle in the driveway adjacent to the residence. [Id. at 7:1015]. Officers immediately approached the car and served the warrant. [Id. at 6:22-25]. While Stephens remained in the vehicle, Officer Brad Harper (“Officer Harper”) and Special Agent Derek Curtis (“Agent Curtis”) observed him making “furtive movements”-specifically, “fiddling down in the console area” as if he was “hiding something.” [Id. at 27:13-25, 28:1-4]. The officers do not recall him reaching for anything. [Id. at 27:13-17]. After Stephens exited the vehicle, officers briefly questioned him outside the vehicle-“where the cab and the bed meet”-and then escorted him to a police cruiser. [Id. at 17:18]. Stephens never sought to reenter the vehicle, but, according to Agent Curtis, the officers would have limited his access upon request. [Id. at 34:1-13].

Once Agent Curtis escorted Stephens to his police cruiser, Officer Harper climbed into Stephens's automobile to search for weapons, premising this search on Stephens's previous movements inside the truck. [Id. at 45:2-8]. Within the automobile, he discovered a firearm and a cellular phone lodged between the passenger seat and the center console. [Id.]. At the evidentiary hearing, Agent Curtis claimed officers could see the phone through the windows, but he admitted he did not see it from the driver-side window. [Id. at 20:10-12]. Officer Harper added that he did not immediately see the phone from the passenger-side window. [Id. at 44:210]. It was not until Officer Harper climbed into Stephens's automobile that the officers viewed Stephens's cellular phone. [Id.]. During the investigation, the officers noticed a charging cable connected to the car's dashboard, but they acknowledge it did not connect to the phone. [Id.]. Before seizing the phone, the officers photographed the passenger compartment and the device's placement, [Id.at 9:15-22]; they also seized a “smart” watch from within the car-though neither Officer Harper or Agent Curtis recall this device. [Id. at 23:15-22, 42:11-17].

Meanwhile, Agent Curtis interviewed Stephens in the police vehicle. [Id. at 30:13-15]; see also [DN 35-2]. In this interaction, Stephens openly discussed his alleged crime. See generally [DN 35-2]. Stephens told Agent Curtis his phone's password and revealed an encrypted folder on his device-information which the officers did not previously possess. [DN 45 at 31: 6-17]. Towards the end of their conversation, Stephens signed a property abandonment form for his phone. See [DN 35-4]. By the time Stephens had signed this document, the officers outside had seized the device. [DN 45 at 33:19-22]. Afterwards, the officers obtained and executed an arrest warrant for Stephens. [Id. at 27:6-12]; see also [DN 23].

Stephens moves to suppress all physical evidence obtained from his vehicle-including his cell phone and “smart” watch, contending the officers conducted an unreasonable, warrantless search. See generally [DN 26]. Additionally, he seeks to suppress the statement he gave Agent Curtis under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. [Id. at 8-9].

II. Discussion

The Fourth Amendment states: “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and, no Warrant shall issue, but upon . . . particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under this amendment, the Court must first determine whether the warrant authorized a search of Stephens's automobile. If not, the Court then analyzes whether an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement covers this search. The Court addresses these issues in turn.

A. The Warrant Requirement

Generally, to conduct a search, the government must obtain “a warrant . . . particularly describing the place to be searched[.] Id. “The test for determining whether the description in the warrant is sufficient to satisfy the particularity requirement is whether ‘the description is such that the officers with a search warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended.' United States v. Gahagan, 865 F.2d 1490, 1496 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503 (1925)). [A] warrant that fails to conform to the particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.” Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 n.5 (1984).

The Court's analysis begins with the search warrant's text. For the location of the property to be searched, the warrant states only: “See Attachment A.” [DN 26-3 at 1]. Attachment A lists the location to be searched as “3530 State Route 181, Greenville, Kentucky 42345, ” describing it as “single-story grey/blue brick residence with two white iron rod decorative columns on the front porch, with dark blue/black shutters and a light grey metal roof.” [DN 26-1 at 30]. It does not mention any automobiles. See [DN 26 at 4]; [DN 30 at 3]. With this language, the United States argues “a reasonable officer would identify the place to be searched as the premises, ” including the automobile, “not simply the residence and mailbox.” [DN 30 at 3]. Thus, the issue is whether a search warrant listing an address and describing that residence authorizes law enforcement officers to search a vehicle at that location.

The United States contends words in the warrant's attachments encompass Stephens's automobile. [Id.]. “The Fourth Amendment by its terms requires particularity in the warrant, not in the supporting documents.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004). “A search warrant may be construed with reference to a supporting affidavit if the affidavit accompanies the warrant and the warrant incorporates the affidavit by reference.” United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1024 (6th Cir. 1991). The search warrant references “Attachment A”-not Officer Harper's entire affidavit. [DN 26-3]. Therefore, while Officer Harper's affidavit uses broad language like “entire property” and “premises, ” the search warrant does not incorporate that document. The Court confines its analysis to Attachment A.

Since Attachment A includes only Stephens's residential address and a description of his home, for the search of Stephens's automobile to be valid, that information alone must satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement. As the United States notes, courts outside the Sixth Circuit have held that warrants listing residential addresses authorized automobile searches at those locations. See, e.g., United States v. Napoli, 530 F.2d 1198, 1200-01 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding a warrant for the “premises known as 3027 Napoleon Avenue” was “sufficient to embrace the vehicle parked in the driveway on those premises”); see also United States v. Hibbs, 905 F.Supp.2d 862, 875 (C.D. Ill. 2012) (“A warrant that identifies a premises with a particular street address also authorizes . . . the search of a vehicle owned by the owner of the premises that is parked at the premises.”).

The United States supplies no Sixth Circuit cases supporting this position. In Fine v. United States, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a search of a suspect's shed when the warrant used the word “premises, ” finding that word-among others-to be “broader than a mere description of the house and certainly include[d] the curtilage.” 207 F.2d 324, 325 (6th Cir. 1953); see also United States v. Bennett, 170 F.3d 632, 637-639 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding a search of the suspect's “premises”). A few unpublished cases have held “that a warrant authorizing the search of a certain premises usually includes any vehicles within its curtilage if the particular objects of the search might be located in the vehicles.” United States v. Brown, No. 96-5414, 1998 WL 68931, at *4 (6th Cir. Feb. 11, 1998) (unpublished); see also United States v. Thompson, No. 955881, 1996 WL 428418, at *2-3 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished). But this search warrant- through Attachment A-does not use the word “premises, ” specifying only Stephens's “residence.” [DN 26-3 at 1].

Upon considering the search warrant's text and pertinent caselaw, the...

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