United States v. Stevens, 19-12858

• Decision Date: 19 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-12858,19-12858
• Citation: 997 F.3d 1307
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Julius STEVENS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

997 F.3d 1307

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Julius STEVENS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-12858

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 19, 2021

Jonathan Colan, Andrea G. Hoffman, U.S. Attorney Service - Southern District of Florida, U.S. Attorney Service - SFL, MIAMI, FL, Kathryn Dalzell, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney's Office, GRAND RAPIDS, MI, Emily M. Smachetti, U.S. Attorney's Office, MIAMI, FL, for Plaintiff - Appellee

Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Tracy Michele Dreispul, Tracy Michele Dreispul, Federal Public Defender's Office, MIAMI, FL, for Defendant - Appellant.

Before LAGOA, ANDERSON, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.

LAGOA, Circuit Judge:

Julius Stevens appeals the district court's order denying his motion for a sentence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. On appeal, Stevens argues that (1) the district court erred in finding that he was ineligible under the First Step Act, and (2) the district court abused its discretion in determining that, even if the First Step Act applied, it would exercise its discretion and deny him a sentence reduction.¹

On appeal, the government concedes that Stevens was eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act and that the district court erred in finding otherwise. We agree. Notwithstanding the government's concession, we must still decide whether the district court, in its alternative holding, abused its discretion in denying Stevens's motion for a sentence reduction, and in so doing we must answer the question this Court left open in United States v. Jones , 962 F.3d 1290 (11th Cir. 2020) —whether consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) ’s sentencing factors is mandatory for a district court exercising its discretion in granting or denying a sentence reduction under section 404(b) of the First Step Act. We hold that the First Step Act does not require that the district court consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors when exercising its discretion to reduce a sentence under section 404(b) of the First Step Act. The district court's decision, however, must allow for meaningful appellate review. Indeed, it is a fundamental principle of appellate review that a district court must provide some justification for the exercise of its decision-making authority. Because the district court's alternative ruling denying Stevens's request to reduce or terminate his term of supervised release failed to provide a sufficient explanation to allow for meaningful appellate review, we vacate the order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1999, a federal grand jury charged Stevens with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute detectable amounts of cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, and being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Stevens pleaded guilty to the conspiracy count, and the firearm count was dismissed. Pursuant to his plea agreement, Stevens agreed that the relevant drug quantity for sentencing purposes was "at least fifty (50) grams, but less than one hundred and fifty (150) grams" of cocaine base or crack cocaine. This quantity was again confirmed during his plea colloquy and was unobjected to in his presentence investigation report ("PSI").

Based on his PSI, the mandatory statutory range was ten years to life imprisonment pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and the PSI calculated his base offense level as 32. Because of the characteristics of the specific offense and based on his role in the offense, Stevens's adjusted offense level was 37. Stevens's criminal history was initially determined to be category V, but was increased to category VI based on the determination that Stevens qualified for career offender status. Stevens's resulting guideline range was 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment with a supervised release term of five years.

The district court sentenced Stevens to 262 months’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release—the low end of the guideline range. Stevens appealed his conviction and sentence, but the appeal was dismissed pursuant to the appeal waiver in his plea agreement. Stevens then filed various post-conviction motions to reduce his sentence, each of which was denied. In each order denying the sentence reduction requests, the district court held that even if Stevens was eligible for any reduction, he was not warranted such a reduction because his original sentence was reasonable and sufficient.

Of significance to this appeal, on January 16, 2018, Stevens completed his term of imprisonment and was released from prison. He then immediately began his five-year term of supervised release. In 2019, Stevens filed a counseled motion to reduce his sentence under section 404 of the First Step Act, arguing that he was eligible for relief and that the district court should exercise its discretion, enter an amended judgment sentencing him to 151 months, and terminate the remainder of his term of supervised release. Specifically, Stevens claimed that, based on the career offender guideline and a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, his total offense level would be 29, resulting in a guideline range of 151 to 188 months’ imprisonment with three years of supervised release. According to Stevens, in light of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2018, Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Alleyne v. United States , 570 U.S. 99, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013), his sentence should be reduced to 151 months’ imprisonment followed by three years of supervised release because the district court originally sentenced him to the bottom of the guideline range. Under that reduced sentence and considering his time served, Stevens argued that he would have already completed his entire sentence, including his five-year term of supervised release. Stevens further argued that the sentencing factors identified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) militated toward a reduced sentence. Specifically, Stevens stated that he had made significant progress in post-sentencing rehabilitation, had been compliant with all the terms of his supervised release for a year and a half, and the termination of his supervised release would allow him to obtain a commercial truck driver's license and become a truck driver. He conceded, however, that any decision related to a sentence reduction was entirely within the discretion of the district court.

In its written order denying Stevens's motion, the district court outlined the posture of the case, stated that it had "considered the court file and [PSI]," indicated that Stevens was not eligible for relief, and alternatively held that, "[e]ven if the First Step Act applied, the Court would still impose a sentence of five (5) years of supervised release." The district court further stated that it "would exercise discretion and not give Stevens credit for time served beyond any reduced sentence" and that it "would not terminate supervised release." This timely appealed ensued.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo whether a district court had the authority to modify a term of imprisonment. United States v. Jones , 962 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020). We review a district court's denial of an eligible movant's request for a reduced sentence under the First Step Act for abuse of discretion. Id . A district court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard or makes a clear error of judgment. United States v. Denson , 963 F.3d 1080, 1086 n.4 (11th Cir. 2020) ; Diveroli v. United States , 803 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2015).

III. ANALYSIS

A district court generally lacks the authority to "modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Congress, however, created exceptions to that general rule of finality, and one of those exceptions provides that a district court "may" modify a sentence when the modification is "expressly permitted by statute." Id. § 3582(c)(1)(B).

In 2018, Congress enacted the First Step Act, which made the Fair Sentencing Act's² modifications to statutory penalties for covered offenses retroactive, and expressly granted district courts the authority to reduce a previously imposed term of imprisonment. See First Step Act § 404; see also Jones , 962 F.3d at 1297. Under section 404(b) of the First Step Act, "[a] court that imposed a sentence for a covered offense may ... impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed." (citation omitted). The statute defines a "covered offense" as "a violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act ... , that was committed before August 3, 2010." Id. § 404(a). The First Step Act leaves to the district court's discretion whether to reduce a sentence by stating that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to require a court to reduce any sentence pursuant to this section." Id . § 404(c).

On appeal, Stevens argues that the district court (1) erred in finding that he was ineligible under the First Step Act and (2) abused its discretion in determining that, even if the First Step Act applied, it would exercise its discretion and deny a sentence reduction. We address each issue in turn.

A. Stevens's Eligibility under the First Step Act

When the district court ruled on Stevens's motion, it was an open question in this Circuit whether eligibility for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act was based on the statute of conviction or on the defendant's actual conduct. See Jones , 962 F.3d at 1298–1301. The district court based Stevens's eligibility on his actual conduct. But, in Jones , we rejected that view. See id. at 1301. Rather, this Court held that the district court should...