United States v. Stevens

• Decision Date: 30 July 1925
• Citation: 103 Conn. 7,130 A. 249
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. STEVENS.

130 A. 249

103 Conn. 7

UNITED STATES v. STEVENS.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 30, 1925

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Arthur F. Ells, Judge.

Application by the United States under the National Prohibition Act for an injunction against Charles M. Stevens, and for other relief. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Reversed, with directions.

On April 5, 1924, and for a considerable time prior thereto, the defendant, Stevens, was the owner of certain premises in the town of Canton upon which he maintained a store, restaurant and residence reputed for all of such period to be a place where intoxicating liquors were kept for sale and exchange. On this date he kept with intent to sell, and possessed upon these premises, intoxicating liquors containing more than one-half of 1 per centum of alcohol by volume, fit for use for beverage purposes. On April 9, 1924, he was informed against before a justice of the peace that he " did keep with intent to sell and exchange certain spirituous and intoxicating liquors, fit for use for beverage purposes, and did keep, own, and maintained a place, store, and establishment reputed to be a place * * * where * * * intoxicating liquors were and are kept for sale or exchange." To this information the accused, who was then represented by counsel, pleaded guilty and was adjudged by the court to pay a fine of $400, and be imprisoned 15 days, and pay the costs of prosecution. On April 14, 1924, Stevens paid the fine and costs, but he has not served the jail sentence, its execution having been suspended by the court. There have been no complaints against the defendant or his place of business and its reputation has been good since his conviction. The defendant's store and restaurant since this time have been well and lawfully conducted. This is the only restaurant in the community, and both store and restaurant are a very great accommodation to the people of the community. The store is used without charge as a transfer station and rest-room by the numerous users of the Hartford to Winsted and Collinsville jitneys. The defendant's place of business was not at the time of the hearing a common nuisance. Neither the defendant, nor any of his agents nor any of his employees, if any he has, appeared as a witness.

Plaintiff made the following claims of law upon the trial:

" (1) The defendant having pleaded guilty to keeping with intent to sell and exchange in violation of law certain spirituous and intoxicating liquor fit for use for beverage purposes and to owning, keeping, and maintaining a place having the reputation of being a place where spirituous and intoxicating liquors were kept for sale and exchange in violation of law, it followed that the defendant kept and maintained a common nuisance as defined by section 21, tit 2, of the National Prohibition Act, entitling the plaintiff to an order that no liquors shall be manufactured, sold bartered, or stored on said premises or any part thereof, or an order directing that said premises shall not be occupied or used for one year after the issuance thereof. (2) It was wholly unnecessary and immaterial for the court to inquire whether the premises involved were being unlawfully used at the time of the hearing, and it was immaterial whether the defendant had violated the law after the commencement of this action, or whether there had been any complaints as to the bad reputation of the place after that time. (3) It was not necessary for the plaintiff to offer evidence to show that there was any fear of a continued lawbreaking on the part of this defendant or that the defendant was persistent in his wrongdoing. (4) The court upon the facts found should grant an order restraining and abating the nuisance upon said premises. (5) The court upon the facts found should grant an order that the defendant's premises should not be used for one year. (6) The court upon the facts found should not order judgment for the defendant or the dissolution of the temporary injunction and restraining order, but should render judgment for the plaintiff. (7) The court upon the facts found should grant an order that no liquor shall be manufactured, sold, bartered, or stored upon said premises or any part thereof. (8) Upon finding the premises to be a common nuisance within the definition of the National Prohibition Act, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment under the terms of said act."

The trial court reached the following conclusions:

" (1) That upon the defendant's conviction on April 5, 1924, the said premises became thereby under the definition contained in section 21, tit. 2, of the National Prohibition Act, a common nuisance; (2) that this court has the power to grant in this particular case the relief prayed for; (3) that it does not follow as a matter of law that this court must grant the said relief upon the mere proof of a conviction; (4) that although it is not necessary for the court to find that the property involved was being unlawfully used at the time of the hearing, the court, nevertheless, in its reasonable discretion, can hear evidence as to the situation existing since the date of the conviction and punishment and can act on such evidence; (5) that this court has a reasonable discretion in the matter, and that if it is convinced upon all the evidence that the conviction and punishment stopped the unlawful acts, and that the defendant since his conviction and punishment has not violated the law, and that there is good reason to believe he will not violate it in the future, and that this store and restaurant, since the date of said conviction, have been well and orderly and lawfully conducted, and that the closing of such business for a year will be a great inconvenience and hardship to the great majority of the people of this small community, it may exercise that reasonable discretion and refuse to padlock the premises; (6) that although it would do no harm to enjoin further possible violation of the law, such injunction would be in this case an unnecessary act, and that equity might well refuse to grant this form of relief asked for; (7) that upon all the evidence and after observing the appearance of the witnesses on the stand and their bias or lack of it, the court, in an exercise of its reasonable discretion, should refuse the relief prayed for."

Thereupon the court found the issues upon the complaint for, and rendered judgment for, the defendant.

Hugh M. Alcorn, State's Atty., of Hartford (Reinhart L. Gideon, Asst. State's Atty., of Hartford, on the brief), for the United States.

Edward J. Myers, of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and BEACH, CURTIS, KEELER, and MALTIE, JJ.

WHEELER, C.J. (after stating the facts as above).

Suit is prosecuted in the name and on behalf of the United States, by Hugh M. Alcorn, state's attorney for Hartford county, pursuant to authority thereto granted by section 22 of title 2 of the National Prohibition Act (41 U.S. Stat. at Large, p. 314, U.S. Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 10138 1/2k), and for the purpose of enjoining and abating a certain alleged public and common nuisance as defined in section 21, title 2 (section 10138 1/2jj), of this act, alleged to be now existing on defendant's premises. Defendant moved to quash the information upon the grounds that the superior court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine this action; that Congress could not vest any portion of the judicial power of the United States in the superior court, nor delegate to it any part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States, and that the state of Connecticut has not passed the legislation necessary to permit an application for an injunction to be made by the United States. The motion was overruled by the superior court, and no appeal taken from its decision. Defendant thereupon answered denying the allegations of the complaint, and by special defense alleged that he had been convicted for the offense alleged in the complaint and paid the fine therein imposed, and since his conviction has neither sold nor kept for sale any other intoxicating liquors, and that the remedy by way of the injunction prayed for would be an additional punishment for which no trial by jury is permitted, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the state of Connecticut. It is obvious that defendant's general denial was improperly filed; the body of the complaint manifestly contained facts known to him to be true and should have been admitted. The issue raised by the special defense was in part admitted and in part denied. There was no real issue of fact involved. Issue should have been joined by demurrer raising the clear question of law as to whether the equitable remedy by way of injunction was an additional punishment in violation of federal and state Constitutions. The issue of the special defense was overruled by the trial court and forms no part of the appeal. The ruling of the trial court was right. This proceeding is a civil one, and does not involve the element of punishment.

The appeal to this court is based upon the overruling of plaintiff's claims of law and upon the conclusions reached by the trial court, both of which we quote in the statement. The trial court held that, upon the facts, defendant's premises, upon his conviction, became a common nuisance within the definition of the National Prohibition Act, and that the superior court had the power to grant, upon the facts found, the relief prayed for, but whether it should do so rested within its discretion and gave it the right to find the issues for the defendant and render its judgment for him.

Section 22 of title 2 of the National Prohibition Act provides:

" An action to enjoin any

...