United States v. Stickrath

• Decision Date: 22 June 1917
• Docket Number: 932.
• Citation: 242 F. 151
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. STICKRATH.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

242 F. 151

UNITED STATES v. STICKRATH.

No. 932.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

June 22, 1917

Stuart R. Bolin, U.S. Dist. Atty., of Columbus, Ohio.

Timothy S. Hogan, of Columbus, Ohio, for defendant.

SATER District Judge.

On February 14, 1917, Congress enacted a law which provides that:

'Any person who knowingly and willfully deposits or causes to be deposited for conveyance in the mail or for delivery from any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper writing, print, missive, or document containing any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United States, or who knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat against the President, shall upon conviction be fined not exceeding $1,000 or imprisoned not exceeding five years, or both.'

The indictment charges that the defendant on April 6th--

'did unlawfully, knowingly, and willfully make a threat against the President of the United States, to wit, a threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the said the President of the United States, said threat being then and there uttered and spoken by the said Pemberton W. Stickrath in words and substance as follows, to wit: 'President Wilson ought to be killed. It is a wonder some one has not done it already. If I had an opportunity, I would do it myself'-- contrary to the form of the statute,' etc.

The sufficiency of the indictment is challenged by demurrer on the following grounds: (1) The person or persons to whom the threat was made are not named; (2) the threat was not communicated to the President; (3) the language employed by the defendant and set forth in the indictment does not amount to a threat; (4) the offense charged is not sufficiently described.

The act is expressed in plain and unambiguous terms, and it must therefore be held that the Congress meant what it plainly expressed. If there is any room left for its construction such construction must be with reference to the history and situation of the country, to ascertain the reason, as well as the meaning, of its provisions. Preston v. Browder, 1 Wheat. 115, 120, 121, 4 L.Ed. 50. In this country sovereignty resides in the people, not in the President, who is merely their chosen representative. To threaten to kill him or to inflict upon him bodily harm stimulates opposition to national policies, however wise, even in the most critical times, incites the hostile and evilminded to take the President's life, adds to the expense of his safeguarding, is an affront to all loyal and right-thinking persons, inflames their minds, provokes resentment, disorder, and violence, is akin to treason, and is rightly denounced as a crime against the people as the sovereign power. The statute in question was enacted, not only for the protection of the President as the representative and chosen chief executive of the nation, but also to preserve the tranquility of the people and their peace of mind. Its passage came at a time when this country was about to be driven into and to engage in an epoch-making and substantially worldwide war, participation in which it had earnestly sought to avoid. It was then known that there were some who, on account of erratic tendencies, or mistaken views, or want of sympathy with or even loyalty to our country, were unfriendly to its aims and might, by direction or indirection, or both, endeavor to embarrass and cripple it in the great struggle upon which it was about to be forced to enter, and might by threats assail the President, and thereby inspire others to attempt his life, if they themselves should not undertake the commission of that crime. The enactment was opportune, not only on account of our past record of three presidential assassinations and the peculiar stress to which the country was about to be subjected, but that there might hereafter be a deterrent to restrain the disloyal, erratic, misguided, or wickedly disposed. In so far as diligent inquiry has disclosed, the statute under consideration is as unique as it is forceful. There are laws in many of the states against threats to extort money, to gain property or some other advantage, or to compel a person to act against his will but no enactment of a similar nature by the English Parliament, by Congress, or by the Legislature of any of the states has been found. The nearest approach to it is shown in the margin, and is found in article 1442, Vernon's Cr. St. 1916 (Texas Penal Code). ^[1]

The language in which the threat set forth in the indictment is couched is sufficient to send the case to trial, if the indictment is otherwise sufficient. The mildest construction that can be put on the first of the quoted sentences is that 'President Wilson should be killed.' But 'ought' is a stronger word than its frequently used synonym 'should.' 'Should' may imply merely an obligation of propriety or expediency, or a moral obligation; but 'ought' denotes an obligation of duty. Webster's Dict.; State v. Blaine, 45 Mont. 482, 124 P. 516. Indeed, the word 'ought' may be used in the mandatory sense of 'must.' Jackson v. State, 32 Tex.Cr.R. 192, 22 S.W. 831. The language of the averred threat imports a surprise that the duty which should be performed by some one had not been done. The word 'had' in the conditional clause of the last of the quoted sentences is not an auxiliary, but a principal, verb, and relates, not to the past, but to the future. If the defendant had wished to convey the thought that the killing of the President was past fulfillment, his language would have been 'If I had had an opportunity, I would have done it myself. ' 'Had' is the equivalent of 'should have,' and the thought expressed is, 'If I should have an opportunity, I would do it myself. ' It is expressive of expectation and intention of fulfillment, but less vividly so than if it had been said, 'If I shall have an opportunity, I will do it myself.'

It is the threat which is 'knowingly and willfully' made that is condemned by the statute. 'Knowingly' means 'with knowledge.' West v. Wright, 98 Ind 335, 339. 'Willfully' is defined by Webster to mean: 'In a willful manner; obstinately; by design; with a set purpose. ' Doing a thing knowingly and willfully implies, not only a knowledge of the thing, but a determination with a bad intent to do it. Felton v. U.S., 96 U.S. 699, 702, 24 L.Ed. 875; Potter v. U.S., 155 U.S. 438, 446, 15 Sup.Ct. 144, 39 L.Ed. 214. The words 'knowingly and willfully' are used in the statute in substantially the same sense as in section 201 of the Criminal Code (Act March 4, 1909, c. 321, 35 Stat. 1127 (Comp. St. 1916, Sec. 10371)), which makes it a penal offense to obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, and the interpretation given them in U.S. v. Claypool (D.C.) 14 F. 127, 128, is applicable. As used in the statute and indictment, they are intended to signify that the defendant, at the time of making the threat charged against him, must have known what he was doing, and, with such knowledge, proceeded in violation of law to make it. They are used in contradistinction to 'ignorantly' and 'unintentionally.' The offense denounced by the statute is completed at the instant the unlawful threat is knowingly and willfully made. It is not the execution of such threat, or (as claimed by defendant) a continuing intent to execute it, that constitutes the offense, but the making of it knowingly and willfully. If it be thus made, the subsequent abandonment of the bad intent with which it was made does not obliterate the crime. The probabilities that there will be at once set in motion the evil...