United States v. Stitt
Decision Date | 10 December 2018 |
Docket Number | Nos. 17–765,17–766.,s. 17–765 |
Citation | 202 L.Ed.2d 364,139 S.Ct. 399 |
Parties | UNITED STATES, Petitioner v. Victor J. STITT, II. United States, Petitioner v. Jason Daniel Sims. |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Erica Ross, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner.
Jeffrey L. Fisher, Menlo Park, CA, appointed by this Court, for Respondents.
Noel J. Francisco, Solicitor General, John P. Cronan, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Eric J. Feigin, Erica L. Ross, Assistants to the Solicitor General, David M. Lieberman, Francesco Valentini, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for Petitioner.
Stephen Newman, Federal Public Defender, Timothy C. Ivey, Catherine Adinaro, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Cleveland, OH, for Respondent Victor J. Stitt.
Chris Tarver, Federal Defender's Office, Little Rock, AR, Pamela S. Karlan, Stanford Law School, Supreme Court, Litigation Clinic, Stanford, CA, Jeffrey L. Fisher, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Menlo Park, CA, Bradley N. Garcia, O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Washington, D.C., for Respondent Jason Daniel Sims.
The Armed Career Criminal Act requires a federal sentencing judge to impose upon certain persons convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm a 15–year minimum prison term. The judge is to impose that special sentence if the offender also has three prior convictions for certain violent or drug-related crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Those prior convictions include convictions for "burglary." § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). And the question here is whether the statutory term "burglary" includes burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation. We hold that it does.
The question here concerns the scope of the statutory word "burglary."
The relevant prior convictions of one of the unlawful firearms offenders, Victor J. Stitt, were for violations of a Tennessee statute that defines "[a]ggravated burglary" as "burglary of a habitation." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–14–403(a) (1997). It further defines "[h]abitation" to include: (1) "any structure, including ... mobile homes, trailers, and tents, which is designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons, " and (2) any "self-propelled vehicle that is designed or adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons and is actually occupied at the time of initial entry by the defendant." §§ 39–14–401(1)(A), (B) (emphasis added).
The relevant prior convictions of the other unlawful firearms offender, Jason Daniel Sims, were for violations of an Arkansas statute that prohibits burglary of a "residential occupiable structure." Ark. Code Ann. § 5–39–201(a)(1) (Michie 1997). The statute defines "[r]esidential occupiable structure" to include:
In both cases, the District Courts found that the state statutory crimes fell within the scope of the word "burglary" in the Armed Career Criminal Act and consequently imposed that statute's mandatory sentence enhancement. In both cases, the relevant Federal Court of Appeals held that the statutory crimes did not fall within the scope of the word "burglary," vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. See 860 F.3d 854 (C.A.6 2017) (en banc) ( ); 854 F.3d 1037 (C.A.8 2017).
The Government asked us to grant certiorari to consider the question "[w]hether burglary of a nonpermanent or mobile structure that is adapted or used for overnight accommodation can qualify as ‘burglary’ under the Armed Career Criminal Act." Pet. for Cert. in No. 17–765, p. i; Pet. for Cert. in No. 17–766, p. i. And, in light of uncertainty about the scope of the term "burglary" in the lower courts, we granted the Government's request. Compare 860 F.3d, at 862–863, 854 F.3d, at 1040; United States v. White, 836 F.3d 437, 446 (C.A.4 2016) ; United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844 (C.A.9 2007) (en banc), with Smith v. United States, 877 F.3d 720, 724 (C.A.7 2017), cert. pending, No. 17–7517; United States v. Spring, 80 F.3d 1450, 1462 (C.A.10 1996).
The word "burglary," like the word "crime" itself, is ambiguous. It might refer to a kind of crime, a generic crime, as set forth in a statute ("a burglary consists of behavior that ..."), or it might refer to the way in which an individual offender acted on a particular occasion ("on January 25, Jones committed a burglary on Oak Street in South San Francisco"). We have held that the words in the Armed Career Criminal Act do the first. Accordingly, we have held that the Act requires us to evaluate a prior state conviction "in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion." Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 141, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008). A prior state conviction, we have said, does not qualify as generic burglary under the Act where "the elements of [the relevant state statute] are broader than those of generic burglary." Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 2243, 2257, 195 L.Ed.2d 604 (2016). The case in which we first adopted this "categorical approach" is Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). That case, which specifically considered the statutory term "burglary," governs here and determines the outcome.
In Taylor, we did more than hold that the word "burglary" refers to a kind of generic crime rather than to the defendant's behavior on a particular occasion. We also explained, after examining the Act's history and purpose, that Congress intended a "uniform definition of burglary [to] be applied to all cases in which the Government seeks" an enhanced sentence under the Act. Id., at 580–592, 110 S.Ct. 2143. We held that this uniform definition includes "at least the ‘classic’ common-law definition," namely, breaking and entering a dwelling at night with intent to commit a felony. Id., at 593, 110 S.Ct. 2143. But we added that it must include more. The classic definition, by excluding all places other than dwellings, we said, has "little relevance to modern law enforcement concerns." Ibid. Perhaps for that reason, by the time the Act was passed in 1986, most States had expanded the meaning of burglary to include "structures other than dwellings." Ibid. (citing W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law §§ 8.13(a)-(f) (1986)).
In addition, the statute's purpose, revealed by its language, ruled out limiting the scope of "burglary" to especially serious burglaries, e.g., those having elements that created a particularly serious risk of physical harm. If that had been Congress's intent, adding the word "burglary" would have been unnecessary, since the (now-invalid) residual clause "already include[d] any crime that ‘involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’ " Taylor, 495 U.S., at 597, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) ); see Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. ––––, –––– – ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2557–2560, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015) ( ). We concluded that the Act's term "burglary" must include "ordinary," "run-of-the-mill" burglaries as well as aggravated ones. Taylor, 495 U.S., at 597, 110 S.Ct. 2143. And we defined the elements of generic "burglary" as "an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime." Id., at 598, 110 S.Ct. 2143.
The relevant language of the Tennessee and Arkansas statutes falls within the scope of generic burglary's definition as set forth in Taylor . For one thing, we made clear in Taylor that Congress intended the definition of "burglary" to reflect "the generic sense in which the term [was] used in the criminal codes of most States" at the time the Act was passed. Ibid. In 1986, a majority of state burglary statutes covered vehicles adapted or customarily used for lodging—either explicitly or by defining "building" or "structure" to include those vehicles. See, e.g., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 635:1 (1974) ( ); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 164.205, 164.215, 164.225 (1985) ( ); see also ALI, Model Penal Code §§ 220.0(1), 221.1(1) (1980) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Mitchell v. Warden, FCI-Greenville, Case No. 19-cv-0539-RJD
...at 662-66. Though Respondent recognizes Naylor's existence, he argues that the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018) effectively abrogated Naylor and dictates a different result here. (Doc. 19, p. 32, n. 8, pp. 34-42). At issue in Stitt were Te......
-
Cordero-Garcia v. Garland
......Merrick B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. No. 19-72779 United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Argued and Submitted February 11, 2022 San Francisco, ...2007) (en banc), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Stitt , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 399, 202 L.Ed.2d 364 (2018) ) (internal quotation marks ......
-
United States v. Scott
......United States , 893 F.3d at 129. This process triggers a categorical inquiry to determine the minimum criminal conduct necessary to satisfy the elements of a crime, without regard to whether the defendant himself engaged in more egregious conduct. See United States v. Stitt , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 399, 405, 202 L.Ed.2d 364 (2018) (instructing that categorical inquiry requires answer "in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion" (internal quotation marks ......
-
United States v. Lockhart
...of an appeal. United States v. White , 836 F.3d 437, 443 (4th Cir. 2016), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Stitt , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 399, 202 L.Ed.2d 364 (2018).1 Judge Wilkinson notes that Lockhart requested a new attorney on appeal. Conc. Op., supra , at 199. We do n......
-
THE TRAJECTORY OF FEDERAL GUN CRIMES.
...Ct. 2272 (2016); Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017); Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017); United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018); Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019); Quarles v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1872 (2019); Rehaif v. United States, 139 S......
-
THE DEFENDER GENERAL.
...(last visited Apr. 3, 2020). His criminal credits include Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020); United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018); Currier v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 2144 (2018); Koons v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1783 (2018); Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017)......
-
Intent or Opportunity? Eighth Circuit Analyzes Intent Element of Generic Burglary.
...that Arkansas's residential burglary statue if broader than generic burglary), vacated and remanded sub nom. United States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399 (2018); United States v. Kinney, 888 F.3d 360, 364 (8th Cir. 2018) (finding that North Dakota's burglary statute is broader than the elements o......
-
The 2018-2019 Term a Review of Significant Supreme Court Decisions
...a conviction in state court on the same conduct. The Court fled several Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) cases. Under US v. Stitt, 139 S.Ct. 399 (2018), the term “burglary” in the ACCA includes burglary of a structure or vehicle that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight acc......