United States v. Stoddard

Citation892 F.3d 1203
Decision Date15 June 2018
Docket Number15-3076,C/w 15-3061,No. 15-3060,15-3060
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Appellee v. Calvin STODDARD, Appellant
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)

Jason M. Wilcox, appointed by the court, argued the cause for appellants. With him on the briefs were William H. Burgess, Columbia, William L. Welch III, and Edward C. Sussman, all appointed by the court.

Peter S. Smith, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were Elizabeth Trosman, John P. Mannarino, and Kenneth Whitted, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

Daniel J. Lenerz, Assistant U.S. Attorney, entered an appearance.

Before: Griffith, Srinivasan and Wilkins, Circuit Judges.

Wilkins, Circuit Judge.

Calvin Stoddard, Sidney Woodruff, and Jerome Cobble were tried together for charges related to a heroin-distribution conspiracy and a conspiracy to launder money. A jury convicted Stoddard and Woodruff under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1), and 846 for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin, and acquitted Jerome Cobble of the same charges. The jury returned a guilty verdict for Cobble on a separate charge of conspiracy to launder money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h).

These prosecutions originated from an investigation the Government began in 2012 that focused on a notorious drug dealer, Jermaine Washington, who had recently been released from prison. After employing traditional surveillance techniques, the Government successfully applied for two wiretaps on Washington's cell phone. The evidence presented at Appellants' trial consisted, primarily, of conversations recorded from the wiretaps and the testimony of Washington interpreting the language in the conversations between Washington and the three defendants. After the Appellants were convicted, the District Court sentenced Stoddard and Woodruff to mandatory-minimum sentences triggered by the drug quantity that the jury had found to be attributable to the conspiracy as a whole. Appellants assert that the District Court committed multiple errors in ruling on pretrial motions, at trial, and at sentencing.

For the reasons discussed below, we (1) affirm the District Court's denial of Appellants' motions to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the wiretaps because the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Government had met the "necessity" requirement; (2) affirm the District Court's denial of Stoddard's and Woodruff's motions for acquittal; (3) affirm the District Court's denial of Woodruff's motion in limine to exclude evidence of a prior conviction if Woodruff had testified in his own defense; and (4) find no plain error in the District Court's jury instructions on the money-laundering charge. But we (5) reverse the District Court's denial of Cobble's motion for acquittal because the evidence was insufficient to sustain his money-laundering conviction.

We also (6) vacate the sentences of Stoddard and Woodruff, remand for resentencing, and hold that, in order for a defendant to be sentenced based on a mandatory minimum triggered by a certain quantity of drugs, a jury must find the drug quantity attributable to the defendant on an individualized basis, not just the drug quantity attributable to the conspiracy as a whole. Finally, we reserve judgment on whether the District Court properly applied the career-offender enhancement before sentencing Woodruff, and instruct the District Court, on remand, to make that assessment based on new briefing from the parties and taking into account the intervening decision in Beckles v. United States , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 886, 197 L.Ed.2d 145 (2017).

I.

In the spring of 2012, the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department partnered with the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to investigate the heroin-trafficking activities of Jermaine Washington in the D.C. metro-area. Washington had been released from prison in 2010. The Government used an informant to make controlled drug-buys in Southeast D.C. and, shortly thereafter, identified Washington as a potential source of heroin. Based on an extensive affidavit by FBI Special Agent Joshua Taylor, filed under seal, the District Court granted the Government's application for a wiretap on Washington's cell phone from July 16, 2012, through August 14, 2012. A second 30-day wiretap, also based on a sealed affidavit, was authorized on August 16, 2012. The Government also began surveilling Washington in the D.C. metro-area. The Government recorded several phone calls between Washington and Woodruff and between Washington and Stoddard. In the course of its physical surveillance, the Government observed Woodruff and Stoddard each meet with Washington one time.

Jerome Cobble is Washington's cousin. During the course of the Government's investigation, Cobble helped Washington purchase two vehicles. After initial reluctance, Cobble agreed to help Washington finance a Nissan Altima, and Cobble purchased the car in his own name. In the summer of 2012, Washington wrecked the Altima and discussed getting Cobble to help him buy a Lexus SUV, again in Cobble's name. On July 23, 2012, Cobble traded in the wrecked Altima and financed the purchase of the Lexus SUV from an auto dealer in Virginia for $30,000, making a $3,700 cash down payment from money Washington had won gambling in Atlantic City. As with the Altima, Cobble financed the car in his name, but the car would be Washington's to use and possess. Shortly after the purchase, the Lexus SUV was stolen.

The Government searched Washington's apartment on December 6, 2012, pursuant to a search warrant, and it recovered 20.1 grams of heroin, a digital scale, and $17,850 in cash. Washington agreed to cooperate, and on April 11, 2013, he pleaded guilty to drug-distribution conspiracy charges, and conspiracy to launder money and commit wire fraud.

A grand jury returned a superseding indictment charging Calvin Stoddard, Jerome Cobble, and Sidney Woodruff with conspiracy to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846, and aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2. The indictment also charged Cobble with conspiracy to launder money and conspiracy to commit wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(h), 1349.

Before the trial proceedings began, Appellants filed motions to suppress evidence obtained through the wiretaps on Washington's cell phone, including the recorded conversations between Washington and each Appellant. Appellants argued that the Government's wiretap applications had not met the necessity requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 2518. The District Court denied the motions, ultimately concluding that the Government had met the necessity requirement and that it had shown in the wiretap application that other investigative techniques were reasonably unlikely to succeed.

At a status conference the day before trial, the Government informed the District Court that it was uncertain if it could proceed because Washington, its star witness, was acting strange and showing signs of reluctance to testify. After a delay to administer a competency evaluation to Washington, which he passed, the trial began.

At trial, the Government presented testimony of three law enforcement officers who had participated in the investigation, testimony from an expert in code words and methods used by drug dealers, and testimony of alleged co-conspirator Sandra Settles. Washington's testimony provided the strongest evidence against all three defendants. Washington interpreted the conversations from wiretapped phone calls, which were played for the jury.

Washington testified at trial about drug transactions with Stoddard and Woodruff, and about Cobble's role in helping him purchase a vehicle. The Government presented evidence consisting of audio recordings of conversations between Washington and Stoddard and between Washington and Woodruff, and Washington's testimony interpreting statements in those conversations. Some of this evidence included statements by Appellants that suggest they were negotiating prices and settling accounts from previous transactions with Washington. See, e.g. , A. 356-58 (Woodruff); A. 397-402 (Stoddard). For example, the Government played a conversation in which Woodruff stated: "I got somebody coming to town, man, that's trying to get 40, man, but he going to be here about 10:00 tonight ...." A. 363. Washington testified that he understood Woodruff to mean that Woodruff had a customer who "wanted to come and purchase 40 grams of heroin." A. 364. In another recorded conversation played at trial, Stoddard said to Washington, "[i]nstead of trying to grab for the extra two, I probably need just to leave that, you know, just keep it," which Washington testified was part of a discussion between the two men about the cut of heroin Stoddard was going to purchase from Washington and the tolerance of different heroin users. A. 390-91. Another conversation featured a discussion between Stoddard and Washington in which the men appeared again to discuss the discrepancies between, and preferences of, heroin-buyers. During that conversation, Washington stated that "[e]verybody's clientele is different." A. 394. Later in the conversation, Stoddard noted that he "learn[ed] a lot" from Washington. A. 395. Washington testified that, from 2011 to 2013, Woodruff purchased heroin from Washington "[o]ver ten times," A. 353, and that Stoddard purchased heroin from Washington between two and four times. A. 378.

Washington also offered testimony against his cousin, Jerome Cobble. Washington testified that Cobble helped him purchase a Lexus SUV from a car dealer in Virginia, and that Washington was dealing heroin during that time period and not otherwise employed. A. 413-16. Cobble "put the [title of the] vehicle in his name for [Washington] because at the time [Washington] didn't have a driver's license." A. 416. Washington recalled that both he and Cobble went to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • United States v. Collazo
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 2 Diciembre 2020
    ...Some circuits rely on Pinkerton without acknowledging the difference between conspiracy and the substantive offense.30 See, e.g. , Stoddard , 892 F.3d at 1221. Other circuits rely on the Guidelines. See, e.g. , Haines , 803 F.3d at 740 ; United States v. Irvin , 2 F.3d 72, 77 (4th Cir. 1993......
  • United States v. Collazo
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit
    • 2 Diciembre 2020
    ...Some circuits rely on Pinkerton without acknowledging the difference between conspiracy and the substantive offense.30 See, e.g. , Stoddard , 892 F.3d at 1221. Other circuits rely on the Guidelines. See, e.g. , Haines , 803 F.3d at 740 ; United States v. Irvin , 2 F.3d 72, 77 (4th Cir. 1993......
  • United States v. Bikundi
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 11 Junio 2019
    ...novo the denial of a motion for acquittal, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government." United States v. Stoddard , 892 F.3d 1203, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2018).A.Money Laundering and Conspiracy. Florence and Michael first claim that the government failed to prove beyond a r......
  • United States v. Williams
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit
    • 10 Septiembre 2020
    ...United States v. Dewberry , 790 F.3d 1022, 1030 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Stoddard , 892 F.3d 1203, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ; Haines , 803 F.3d at 740 ; United States v. Rangel , 781 F.3d 736, 742-43 (4th Cir. 2015) ; United States v. Pizar......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
4 books & journal articles
  • ONE SHOULD NOT PAY FOR ALL: DRUG QUANTITY TRIGGERING MANDATORY MINIMUMS SHOULD BE INDIVIDUALIZED IN CONSPIRACY SENTENCING.
    • United States
    • Suffolk Journal of Trial & Appellate Advocacy Vol. 25 No. 2, June 2019
    • 1 Junio 2019
    ...(emphasizing constitutional requirement of proving defendant guilty beyond reasonable doubt). (2) See United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 2018) ("The question remains 'whether it is the individualized drug quantity that is a fact that increases the mandatory minimum se......
  • Sentencing
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • 1 Agosto 2022
    ...court erred by adopting PSR’s recommendation when no testimony or evidence provided to substantiate number of victims); U.S. v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (sentencing court erred in applying “death results” enhancements when PSR did not include quantity of heroin distrib......
  • Review Proceedings
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • 1 Agosto 2022
    ...of jury instruction not harmless because defendant’s testimony provided suff‌icient evidence against conviction); U.S. v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (error in jury instruction regarding quantity of heroin not harmless because there was no overwhelming evidence of quantit......
  • Trials
    • United States
    • Georgetown Law Journal No. 110-Annual Review, August 2022
    • 1 Agosto 2022
    ...verdict question submitted to jury lacking f‌inding that Schedule 2 drugs were but-for causes of victims’ deaths); U.S. v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (sentences for conspiracy to distribute heroin vacated because jury not properly instructed to f‌ind drug quantity attrib......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT