United States v. Stowell
| Citation | 10 S.Ct. 244,33 L.Ed. 555,133 U.S. 1 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. STOWELL et al |
| Decision Date | 20 January 1890 |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
Sol. Gen. Chapman, for plaintiff in error.
E. J. Sherman, for defendants in error.
[Statement of Case from pages 1-5 intentionally omitted]
[Arguments of Counsel from pages 5-11 intentionally omitted]
Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the court.
The property sought to be forfeited consisted of real estate, and of machinery and fixtures and personal property found thereon. The real estate was a single lot of land, part of which was covered by a building and sheds opening by doors into one another, and the rest of which was a yard connected with the buildings. Dixon owned the premises, and used them for a lawful brewery. Stone and Bellows, with Dixon's knowledge and consent, set up and used a still in the principal building, and there carried on the business of distillers, without the still having been registered, and without giving bond or keeping books, as required by the internal revenue laws, and with intent to defraud the United States of the tax on the spirits which they distilled. The omission to register the still was a cause of forfeiture, under section 3258 of the Revised Statutes; the carrying on of the business of a distiller without having given bond, or with intent to defraud the United States of the tax on the spirits distilled, was a cause of forfeiture under section 3281, as re-enacted
in section 16 of the act of February 8, 1875, c. 36; and the omission to keep books was a cause of forfeiture under section 3305 of the Revised Statutes. The questions presented are of the extent of the forfeiture.
By the now settled doctrine of this court, (notwithstanding the opposing dictum of Mr. Justice MCLEAN in U. S. v. Sugar, 7 Pet. 453, 462, 463,) statutes to prevent frauds upon the revenue are cons dered as enacted for the public good, and to suppress a public wrong, and therefore, although they impose penalties or forfeitures, not to be construed, like penal laws generally, strictly in favor of the defendant; but they are to be fairly and reasonably construed, so as to carry out the intention of the legislature. Taylor v. U.S., 3 How. 197, 210; Cliquot's Champagne, 3 Wall. 114, 145; U. S. v. Hodson, 10 Wall. 395, 406; Smythe v. Fiske, 23 Wall. 374, 380.
It will be convenient, in the first place, to ascertain the construction and effect of the provisions of section 16 of the act of 1875, by which, if any person carries on the business of a distiller, without having given bond, or with intent to defraud the United States of the tax on the spirits distilled by him, he shall be punished by fine and imprisonment, and there shall be forfeited to the United States (1) 'all distilled spirits or wines, and all stills or other apparatus fit or intended to be used for the distillation or rectification of spirits, * * * owned by such person, wherever found;' (2) 'all distilled spirits or wines, and personal property, found in the distillery, or * * * in any building, room, yard, or inclosure connected therewith, and used with or constituting a part of the premises;' (3) 'all the right, title, and interest of such person in the lot or tract of land on which such distillery is situated;' (4) 'all right, title, and interest therein of every person who knowingly has suffered or permitted the business of a distiller to be there carried on, or has connived at the same.' 18 St. 310. By the first of these provisions, all distilled spirits or wines, and all stills or other apparatus fit or intended to be used for the distillation of spirits, owned by the illicit distiller, and found on the premises or elsewhere, are forfeited, without
regard to the question whether the apparatus, by reason of the manner in which and the purpose for which it is placed on or affixed to the land, is technically personal property or real estate. But this provision does not extend to property owned by any other person than the distiller. The second provision forfeits 'all distilled spirit or wines and personal property, found in the distillery, * * * or in any building, room, yard, or inclosure connected therewith, and used with or constituting part of the premises.' The last words, 'and used with or constituting part of the premises,' like the words next preceding, 'connected therewith,' aptly designate real estate, and naturally and grammatically relate to and qualify 'any building, room, yard, or inclosure,' and not 'all distilled spirits or wines and personal property.' The provision is clearly not limited to personal property owned by the illicit distiller. To hold it to be so limited would give no effect to that part of this provision which forfeits distilled spirits or wines; for all distilled spirits or wines owned by the distiller, wherever found, have been already forfeited by the first provision. The first provision is restricted in point of ownership, and not in point of place. The second provision is restricted in point of place, and not in point of ownership. Nor can the second provision be restricted to property fit or intended to be used for the distillation of spirits; for while the first provision contains such a restriction as regards apparatus, the second provision omits all requirement of fitness or intention for the unlawful use. Each of the two provisions clearly defines its own restrictions, and the restrictions inserted in the one cannot be imported into the other. The second provision must therefore extend to some property not owned by the distiller, and to some property not fit or intended to be used in distilling spirits. In order to give it such effect as will show any reason for its insertion in the statute, it must be construed to intend, at least, that all personal property which is knowingly and voluntarily permitted by its owner to remain on any part of the premises, and which is actually used, either in the unlawful business, or in any other business openly carried on upon the premises, shall be forfeited, even if he has no participation in or knowl-
edge of the unlawful acts or intentions of the person carrying on business there; and that persons who intrust their personal property to the custody and control of another at his place of business shall take the risk of its being subject to forfeiture, if he conducts, or consents to the conducting of, any business there in violation of the revenue laws, without regard to the question whether the owner of any particular article of such property is proved to have participated in or connived at any violation of those laws. The present case does not require us to go beyond this, or to consider whether the sweeping words 'all personal property' must be restricted by implication in any other respect, for instance, as to personal effects having no connection with any business, or as to property stolen or otherwise brought upon the premises without the consent of its owner. The significance of the omission of all restrictions in point of ownership, and in point of fitness or intention for the unlawful use, in the second provision concerning personal property, is clearly brought out by contrasting that provision with the provisions immediately following it, concerning real estate. The third provision forfeits only 'all the right, title, or interest of' the distiller 'in the lot or tract of land on which the distillery is situated.' And the fourth provision forfeits only 'all right, title, and interest therein of every person who knowingly has suffered or permitted the business of a distiller to be there carried on, or has connived at the same.'
Congress has thus clearly manifested its intention that the forfeiture of land and buildings shall not reach beyond the right, title, and interest of the distiller, or of such other persons as have consented to the carrying on of the business of a distiller upon the premises. In the case, on which the attorney for the United States much relied, of Distillery v. U. S., 96 U. S. 395, the jury, under the instructions given them at the trial, had found that the owner of the distillery, whose title was held to be included in the forfeiture for unlawful acts of his lessee, had leased the property for the purpose of a distillery, which brought the case within the provision of the act under
which the condemnation was sought, corresponding to the fourth provision now under consideration. Act July 20, 1868, c. 186, § 44; 15 St. 143. The intention of congress that no interest in land and buildings shall be forfeited, which does not belong to some one who has participated in or consented to the carrying on of the business of distilling therein, is further manifested in the provision of section 3262 of the Revised Statutes, which directs that 'no bond of a distiller shall be approved, unless he is the owner in fee, unincumbered by any mortgage, judgment, or other lien, of the lot or tract of land on which the distillery is situated, or unless he files with the collector, in connection with his notice, the written consent of the owner of the fee, and of any mortgagee, judgment creditor, or other person having a lien thereon, duly acknowledged, that the premises may be used for the purpose of distilling spirits, subject to the provisions of law, and expressly stipulating that the lien of the United States...
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