United States v. Straughan, 71-1189.
Decision Date | 12 January 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 71-1189.,71-1189. |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Lester STRAUGHAN, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Mortimer A. Rosecan, Rosecan & Popkin, St. Louis, Mo., for appellant.
John J. Robinson, Roger A. Pauley, Attys., Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., Daniel Bartlett, Jr., U. S. Atty., Harry L. Strachan, III, Sp. Atty., Dept. of Justice, St. Louis, Mo., for appellee.
Before LAY, HEANEY and STEPHENSON, Circuit Judges.
The defendant was convicted by a jury for having received, concealed, stored and sold a stolen Case 580 tractor in violation of the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2313.1 On appeal, the defendant contends (1) that the tractor is not a "motor vehicle" within the meaning of the Dyer Act; (2) that he was prejudiced by the improper admission of evidence concerning his character; and (3) that he was prejudiced by the improper admission of evidence concerning his refusal to give a handwriting exemplar.
We find that the tractor is a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Dyer Act, but hold that the defendant was prejudiced by the improperly admitted character evidence. We do not reach the third contention.
The Case 580 tractor has been characterized by the defendant as construction equipment. He argues that such machines are not "motor vehicles." The Dyer Act definition of "motor vehicle," however, "* * * includes an automobile, automobile truck, automobile wagon, motorcycle, or any other self-propelled vehicle designed for running on land but not on rails." (Emphasis added.) 18 U.S.C. § 2311. We think that the emphasized language is broad enough to include the Case 580 tractor. See, United States v. McGlamory, 441 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Jones, 421 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1970). In Mc-Glamory, the Court held that a bulldozer was a motor vehicle within the meaning of the Act. It reasoned that:
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While the term "motor vehicle" is not wholly free of ambiguity, the inclusion of the Case 580 tractor within its ambit comports with the literal construction of the term. Cf., McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 51 S.Ct. 340, 75 L.Ed. 816 (1931).
The defendant's contention that he was prejudiced by the improper admission of character evidence must be viewed in the light of the only factual issue in dispute at the trial. The defense position was that the defendant did not know the tractor was stolen. Evidence was produced to explain the defendant's possession of the tractor. A number of character witnesses testified to the defendant's good reputation for honesty. The government in rebuttal called a state police officer for the sole purpose of testifying about the defendant's reputation for "honesty, integrity, and being a law abiding citizen." The testimony of that witness and his cross-examination were as follows:
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The government now concedes that "although the defendant had put his character in issue by introducing testimony by several witnesses as to his good reputation in the community * * *, evidence in a group other than the community where he lived or worked was not proper rebuttal."2 The government argues, however, that the error in admitting this improper character evidence was harmless. We do not agree.
In determining whether or not this error was harmless, we are guided by the standard laid down by the Supreme Court in Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946):
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Here, we cannot say with assurance that the jury was not substantially swayed by the admission of the improper character testimony.3
The officer's improper character testimony had three effects: (1) it obviously undercut the testimony of the defendant's character witnesses; (2) it cast doubt on the testimony of the defendant's possession of the equipment was innocent; and (3) it tended to enhance the testimony of the two principal government witnesses, whose reputation for honesty and integrity was not good. The credibility of these two witnesses will be discussed in detail later.
Here, the prejudice was heightened by the fact that the source of the improper character evidence was a police officer.
Furthermore, we must point out that the government was permitted to attack the defendant's character in several ways which were proper. Yet the only evidence produced which was damaging to the defendant's reputation was the erroneously admitted improper character testimony.4
The government next argues that, even though the character testimony was prejudicial, the case against the defendant was so strong that the error was harmless. We cannot agree.
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