United States v. Strickland

• Decision Date: 10 May 1962
• Docket Number: Crim. No. 38828.
• Citation: 205 F. Supp. 299
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Eugene STRICKLAND, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

205 F. Supp. 299

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Eugene STRICKLAND, Defendant.

Crim. No. 38828.

United States District Court E. D. Michigan, S. D.

May 10, 1962.

Lawrence Gubow, U. S. Atty., Paul J. Komives, Asst. U. S. Atty., Detroit, Mich., for plaintiff.

Nicholas Smith, Smith & Franklin, Detroit, Mich., for defendant.

FREEMAN, District Judge.

The defendant was indicted and tried to a jury for an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 659 (possession of goods stolen from an interstate shipment). The government's evidence showed that a certain shipment of steel shipped by motor carrier from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, and destined for Van Dyke, Michigan, was stolen from a highway on the outskirts of Detroit where the carrier's trailer with the shipment thereon had been disconnected from the tractor due to mechanical trouble on April 4, 1960; that an identical shipment was delivered to Copco Warehouse in Detroit on April 5, 1960, presumably for temporary storage by an unidentified person or persons; that a bill of lading purporting to cover this shipment was submitted to Copco on the date of delivery which contained the defendant's handwriting, including defendant's initials, according to the testimony of a handwriting expert witness for the government; that it was not the custom of the trade for drivers delivering such shipments to prepare bills of lading; and that it was the custom of Copco to have delivering drivers initial the bill of lading accompanying a shipment and thereby attest to the weight and contents of the shipment received by Copco and any variances between the shipment consigned and Copco's check thereof. The steel covered by the bill of lading submitted to Copco purported to be consigned from J. & M. Steel Company, Chicago, Illinois, to Rasak Steel Company, C/o Copco Steel Company, a Detroit steel broker who claimed and acknowledged ownership of this shipment of steel that was allegedly delivered by the defendant to Copco.

At the close of the government's case, the defendant moved for a judgment of acquittal, and in support of his motion contends that even if the stolen steel was the same as that delivered to Copco, there is not sufficient evidence to submit the case to the jury because, in order to convict, the jury would have to first infer from the government's evidence that the defendant had actual and exclusive possession of the recently stolen steel, and from such inference of possession, it would also have to infer that defendant had knowledge that the steel was stolen. Defendant argues that this would allow the jury to pyramid inferences to establish the ultimate fact of possession with guilty knowledge, which the law does not permit.

The government contends that it is proper to draw these inferences and that the doctrine of not permitting an inference to be drawn from another inference does not apply to the instant case.

On a motion for judgment of acquittal, "the trial judge, as well as this court, must view the evidence and the inferences that may justifiably be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the government." United States v. Berkley (C.A. 6), 288 F.2d 713. In the case of Battjes v. United States (C.A. 6), 172 F.2d 1, 5, the Court said:

"This Court in reviewing a judgment for the purpose of determining whether the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction must take that view of the evidence with inferences reasonably and justifiably to be drawn therefrom, most favorable to the government, and determine therefrom whether the finding was supported by substantial and competent evidence, and where there is substantial and competent evidence, which if believed, supports the conviction, the appellate court can not weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. Citing cases. Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

"The question, whether a judge shall submit the evidence to a jury for a verdict, is no different in a criminal prosecution from the same question in a civil action; in each it is whether the evidence will rationally support a finding in favor of the party having the affirmative. The only added protection given the accused in a prosecution is that the jury must be satisfied of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." U. S. v. Sherman (C.A. 2), 171 F.2d 619, 621.

As a general proposition, "the unexplained exclusive possession of stolen property shortly after the commission of larceny or robbery may warrant a finding that the possessor has guilty knowledge." Pearson v. U. S. (C.A. 6), 192 F.2d 681, 689.

A knowing possession for the benefit of the thief, or any knowing possession with the intent and effect of depriving the owner of his property, would be a felonious possession. Applebaum v. U. S. (C.A. 7), 274 F. 43, 44. However, in the absence of "actual and exclusive" possession of stolen property or in the absence of "other circumstances shown from which the jury, without any consideration being given to the implied possession, could properly infer that the defendants had guilty knowledge," there is insufficient evidence with which to convict. U. S. v. Russo (C.A. 3), 123 F.2d 420, 422. In other words, constructive or implied possession, standing alone, is not sufficient to...