United States v. Sweet, No. 99
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
| Writing for the Court | VAN DEVANTER |
| Citation | 38 S.Ct. 193,62 L.Ed. 473,245 U.S. 563 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. SWEET |
| Docket Number | No. 99 |
| Decision Date | 28 January 1918 |
v.
SWEET.
[Syllabus from pages 563-564 intentionally omitted]
Page 564
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Kearful, for the United States.
Messrs. A. C. Ellis, Jr., W. H. Dickson, and Albert R. Barnes, all of Salt Lake City, Utah, for appellee.
Arguments of Council on pages 564-566 intentionally omitted.]
Page 566
Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a suit by the United States to quiet the title to section 32 of a designated township in Carbon county, Utah the suit being specially directed against a claim asserted by the defendant, as an assignee of the state, under the school land grant to the latter. Whether this tract passed to the state under that grant or was reserved to the United States as mineral land is the matter in controversy. In the District Court the United States prevailed as to all but 40 acres, but in the Circuit Court of Appeals that decree was reversed and one for the defendant was directed. 228 Fed. 421, 143 C. C. A. 3.
The evidence shows that the entire section, excepting 40 acres, is valuable for coal and has been known to be so since before Utah became a state. Land valuable for coal is mineral land within the meaning of the public land laws. Thus the ultimate question for decision is whether the school land grant to Utah embraces mineral and. The grant is found in section 6 of the act of Congress of July 16, 1894, c. 138, 28 Stat. 107, and is copied in the margin 1
Page 567
with another closely related section of the same act. It neither expressly includes mineral lands nor expressly excludes them. If it did either, it would be conclusive of the will of Congress upon the point. But, as it makes no mention of such lands, it is permissible—indeed, is essential—to inquire whether the congressional will is otherwise made manifest, that is to say, whether the general words of the grant are to be read in the light of other statutes and a settled public policy in respect of mineral lands.
In the legislation concerning the public lands it has been the practice of Congress to make a distinction between mineral lands and other lands, to deal with them along different lines, and to withhold mineral lands from disposal save under laws specially including them. This practice began with the ordinance of May 20, 1785, 10 Journals of Congress (Folwell's Ed.) 118, and was observed
Page 568
with such persistency in the early land laws2 as to lead this court to say in United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. 526, 10 L. Ed. 573, 'It has been the policy of the government, at all times, in disposing of the public lands, to reserve the mines for the use of the United States,' and also to hold in United States v. Gear, 3 How. 120, 11 L. Ed. 523, 838, that an act making no mention of lead-mind lands and providing generally for the sale of 'all the lands' in certain new land districts, 'reserving only' designated tracts, 'any law of Congress heretofore existing to the contrary notwithstanding,' could not be regarded as disclosing a purpose on the part of Congress to depart from 'the policy which had governed its legislation in respect to lead-mine lands,' and so did not embrace them. A like practice prevailed in respect of saline lands, and in Morton v. Nebraska, 21 Wall. 660, 22 L. Ed. 639, where a disposal of such lands under an act providing generally for the sale of lands in certain territories was drawn in question, this court said that it could not be supposed 'without an express declaration to that effect' that Congress intended by such an act to permit the sale of saline lands and thus to depart from 'a long-established policy by which it had been governed in similar cases.'
While the early land laws occasionally and specially provided for the sale of mineral lands, they very generally evinced a purpose to reserve such lands for future disposal; and this purpose was given particular emphasis following the discovery of gold in California in 1848, as is shown in the Oregon Donation Act, the Homestead Act (which
Page 569
adopted the mineral land reservation of the Pre-emption Act of 1841), the grant to the several states for the benefit of agricultural colleges, the railroad land grants and other land acts of that period.3 Noticeable among those acts is one which, in dealing with grants to Nevada and surveys in that state, declared, 'in all cases lands valuable for mines of gold, silver, quicksilver, or copper shall be reserved from sale,' chapter 166, § 5, 14 Stat. 86, and another declaring, 'no act passed at the first session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress, granting lands to states or corporations, to aid in the construction of roads or for other purposes, or to extend the time of grants heretofore made, shall be so construed as to embrace mineral lands, which in all cases shall be, and are, reserved exclusively to the United States, unless otherwise specially provided in the act or acts making the grant.' 13 Stat. 567. Although applied in one instance to lands in Nevada and in the other to grants made at a particular session of Congress, these declarations were but expressive of the will of Congress that every grant of public lands, whether to a state or otherwise, should be taken as reserving and excluding mineral lands in the absence of an expressed purpose to include them; and upon this theory both declarations were carried into the Revised Statutes as being general and per-
Page 570
manent in their nature—the first in enlarged terms as section 2318 (Comp. St. 1916, § 4613)4 and the other as section 2346 (section 4658).
By the act of March 3, 1853, c. 145, 10 Stat. 244, Congress granted to the state of California sections 16 and 36 in each township for school purposes and large quantities of lands for other purposes. Mineral lands were neither expressly excepted from nor expressly included in the grant of the school sections, but were specially excepted from the other grants. This difference led to a controversy over the true meaning of the school grant, the state authorities taking the view that it did, and the land officers of the United States that it did not, include mineral lands. Ultimately the controversy came before this court in Mining Co. v. Consolidated Mining Co., 102 U. S. 167, 26 L. Ed. 126, and the position taken by the land officers of the United States was sustained, the court saying (102 U. S. 174, 26 L. Ed. 126):
'Taking into consideration what is well known to have been the hesitation and difficulty in the minds of Congressmen in dealing with these mineral lands, the manner in which the question was suddenly forced upon them, the uniform reservation of them from survey, from sale, from pre-emption, and above all from grants, whether for railroads, public buildings, or other purposes, and looking to the fact that from all the grants made in this act they are reserved, one of which is for...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State of Utah, By and Through Division of State Lands v. Kleppe, No. 76-1839
..."by implication" in the Utah Enabling Act. This interpretation was upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563, 38 S.Ct. 193, 62 L.Ed. 473 (1918) where the Court held that because the Utah Enabling Act of July 16, 1894, did not make specific mention of mi......
-
West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, No. 11187.
...each township, of the public lands to the State of California for school purposes did not cover mineral lands.36 United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563, 38 S.Ct. 193, 62 L. Ed. 473 (1918), rules that the Utah Enabling Act of 1894 granting school sections to Utah, silent as to minerals, did no......
-
State v. Lewis, No. 3039
...7 L.Ed.2d 573 (1962). 19 See, e. g., Wyoming v. United States, 255 U.S. 489, 41 S.Ct. 393, 65 L.Ed. 742 (1921); United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563, 38 S.Ct. 193, 62 L.Ed.2d 473 (1918); Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U.S. 392, 6 S.Ct. 95, 29 L.Ed. 423 20 See, Alaska Constitutional Convention Proc......
-
Trustees for Alaska v. State, No. S-1142
...contained therein. United States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. at 443, 67 S.Ct. at 1321, 91 L.Ed. at 1593. Third, in United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563, 572-73, 38 S.Ct. 193, 195, 62 L.Ed. 473, 481 (1918), the Supreme Court held that congressional grants of school lands to a state conveyed no titl......
-
State of Utah, By and Through Division of State Lands v. Kleppe, No. 76-1839
..."by implication" in the Utah Enabling Act. This interpretation was upheld by the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563, 38 S.Ct. 193, 62 L.Ed. 473 (1918) where the Court held that because the Utah Enabling Act of July 16, 1894, did not make specific mention of mi......
-
West Coast Exploration Co. v. McKay, No. 11187.
...each township, of the public lands to the State of California for school purposes did not cover mineral lands.36 United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563, 38 S.Ct. 193, 62 L. Ed. 473 (1918), rules that the Utah Enabling Act of 1894 granting school sections to Utah, silent as to minerals, did no......
-
State v. Lewis, No. 3039
...7 L.Ed.2d 573 (1962). 19 See, e. g., Wyoming v. United States, 255 U.S. 489, 41 S.Ct. 393, 65 L.Ed. 742 (1921); United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563, 38 S.Ct. 193, 62 L.Ed.2d 473 (1918); Deffeback v. Hawke, 115 U.S. 392, 6 S.Ct. 95, 29 L.Ed. 423 20 See, Alaska Constitutional Convention Proc......
-
Trustees for Alaska v. State, No. S-1142
...contained therein. United States v. Wyoming, 331 U.S. at 443, 67 S.Ct. at 1321, 91 L.Ed. at 1593. Third, in United States v. Sweet, 245 U.S. 563, 572-73, 38 S.Ct. 193, 195, 62 L.Ed. 473, 481 (1918), the Supreme Court held that congressional grants of school lands to a state conveyed no titl......