United States v. Taglianetti, 71-1364 to 71-1366.

• Decision Date: 10 March 1972
• Docket Number: No. 71-1364 to 71-1366.,71-1364 to 71-1366.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Richard TAGLIANETTI et al., Defendants-Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

456 F.2d 1055 (1972)

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Richard TAGLIANETTI et al., Defendants-Appellants.

Nos. 71-1364 to 71-1366.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard February 23, 1972.

Decided March 10, 1972.

Judith H. Porteus, Boston, Mass., and William G. Grande, Providence, R. I., for Richard Taglianetti, appellant.

Kenneth M. Beaver, and Robert S. Ciresi, Providence, R. I., for Richard Ricci and Joseph Stefano, appellants.

Peter M. Shannon, Jr., Atty., Dept. of Justice, with whom were Lincoln C. Almond, U. S. Atty., John R. Tarrant, S. Michael Levin, and Sidney M. Glazer, Attys., Dept. of Justice, for appellee.

Before ALDRICH, Chief Judge, McENTEE and COFFIN, Circuit Judges.

ALDRICH, Chief Judge.

Defendants Taglianetti, Stefano, and Ricci were found guilty by a jury of making, and using extortionate means to collect an extension of credit. 18 U.S.C. §§ 892 and 894. The victim was one Poisson, who was the government's principal witness. No purpose would be served in summarizing the government's evidence, as no defendant considers it insufficient, except that Taglianetti says it fails to show his own participation. We may dispose of that claim very briefly. An after-hours meeting at an auto shop with all defendants present, and at which Poisson was roughed up and seriously threatened, was arranged by Taglianetti. It is true that he took no part in the action. However, if he had arranged the meeting as a true friend of Poisson's, as he now suggests, the jury could reasonably conclude that he had enough influence with the others so that at least he could have protested, if he was surprised at the developments.^* Correspondingly, it could infer from the fact that he remained silent that he was a full, intentional participant.

This discussion also answers Taglianetti's objection to the prosecutor's argument to the jury, "We got $2000 interest for the $300 loan." It was appropriate argument to include Taglianetti in the "We." See United States v. Cotter, 1 Cir., 1970, 425 F.2d 450, 452.

Ricci and Stefano contend with some vigor that the court's participation in the questioning of their witnesses was excessive. We are not unsympathetic with such an objection when well-founded. See, e. g., In re United States, 1 Cir., 1961, 286 F.2d 556, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Fong Foo v. United States, 1962, 369 U.S. 141, 82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629. A defendant may reasonably feel that an over-participating court conveys an appearance of partiality. While not always appropriate, or desirable, it is not normally an abuse of discretion, however, for a court to suggest interrogation of a witness along a line that neither party has chosen to follow. There was no abuse here. We have read the transcript with care, and find defendants' objections to the court's conduct peculiarly ill-founded.

Next, defendant Stefano objects to the refusal, in whole or in part, of several requests for instructions. There was no error. The court does not have to tell the jury that, because a witness was called by the government, he is not entitled to special credence, or to remind it that one witness was the wife of another. Our time is wasted by such contentions. The falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus instruction has long been rejected. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Hayes, 7 Cir., 1898, 87 F. 129, 132. The trial judge gave a general instruction on credibility of witnesses, together with a separate instruction relative to a witness who has been convicted of a felony. Nothing more...