United States v. Tarumianz

Decision Date21 May 1956
Docket NumberCiv. No. 1492.
Citation141 F. Supp. 739
PartiesUNITED STATES of America ex rel. Blanche Hobbs McNEILL, Plaintiff, v. Mesrop A. TARUMIANZ, M. D., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Delaware

Oliver V. Suddard (of Wise & Suddard), Wilmington, Del., and Joseph E. Finley, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Frank O'Donnell and Richard J. Baker, Deputy Attys. Gen. of the State of Del., for defendant.

RODNEY, District Judge.

This matter has been before the Court on several occasions. The plaintiff is a resident of Maryland and the defendant is the Superintendent of the Delaware State Hospital, an institution maintained by the State of Delaware for the care and cure of persons suffering from mental disorders. He is State Psychiatrist and Criminologist. The plaintiff on two several occasions in the past has been committed as an inmate to the Delaware State Hospital.

The general tenor of the complaint is that in 1949 the plaintiff came to Delaware and soon thereafter was visited by an emissary of the defendant. The defendant having heard of threats by the plaintiff and serious accusations being made and being of the opinion that the plaintiff was perhaps mentally ill, made it known by the emissary that unless threats and accusations were discontinued that as a prerequisite to her admission to Delaware, as a resident, she should be required to submit to a mental examination pursuant to Delaware law. The particular statute is now found as 16 Del.C. § 5142 concerning the Mental Hygiene Clinic established at the State Hospital. Section 5142(e) provides that:

"The clinic may, through the State Psychiatrist and Criminologist, apply for the commitment of any person to the Delaware State Hospital at Farnhurst under any laws of the State relating to such commitments."

Examination of a person is a preliminary step to a commitment.

The original complaint was an inartistic document, charging deprivation of civil rights, evidently drawn without the benefit of counsel. A motion for summary judgment on behalf of the defendant was refused because this Court felt that a question of fact might be involved. An amended complaint was substituted, (based specifically on 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983), and after some other proceedings, this motion to dismiss the complaint was filed. The defendant has presented grounds for dismissal that had not theretofore been presented.

It will be borne in mind that it is not suggested that the defendant, or anyone in the situation stated, has any personal power of commitment, but here involved is only the question of invoking and bringing into play the ordinary or permissible proceedings under the laws of the state.

It is not suggested that the Delaware law providing for an examination of persons suffering from a mental or nervous disease, and possibly leading to a subsequent commitment to the State Hospital, is an invalid or unconstitutional act. The Statute provides for an examination of the patient by two licensed and qualified physicians or, at the request on behalf of the patient, it provides a trial by a jury of six responsible persons.1

The gravamen of the complaint is that the defendant, State Psychiatrist and Superintendent of the State Hospital, with former knowledge of the plaintiff, suggested that if the plaintiff came to reside in Delaware that he would cause such examination to be instituted in the manner the law prescribes.

Two questions are thus presented. (1) Can there be a violation of the Civil Rights Act by a State official instituting an investigation and calling into play the ordinary processes of the State under a valid, constitutional and unimpeached law? (2) Has the State official, intimating or suggesting that he might call the statute into play, an immunity for his actions?

I am of the opinion that the complaint must be dismissed from a consideration of both questions.

The first Civil Rights provisions, in their origin, had to do with a discrimination by which a person, without proper cause, was denied some right or privilege granted to another. The comprehensive Civil Rights Acts, however, have a somewhat broader scope; the particular section relied upon by the plaintiff, 42 U.S. C.A. § 1983 provides:

"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States * * * to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws * * *".

I am of the opinion that no person has a civil right or a vested right to be immune from an investigation and examination as to mental condition had pursuant to the due processes of a valid law which provides the methods by which such investigation shall be had. There also must be, I think, an actual denial of due process before a cause of action arises under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.2

I am, therefore, of the opinion that no violation of the Civil Rights Statute is shown by the complaint.

2. As to the immunity of the defendant.

Most or all of the cases involving the immunity of a given official for the consequences of his action have involved a specific action to which objection is made. Here it is a suggested course of future action that is complained of.

A discussion of official immunity might include immunity with reference to tort actions in general, such as malicious prosecution or false imprisonment as well as that particular immunity for a violation of the Civil Rights Act under which alone the jurisdiction of this Court is invoked. To some degree the questions coalesce.

The immunity of an official with reference to ordinary liability for a tort concerning an official action is of common law origin. At its inception it seems to have applied to judicial action. From this it has long been extended to much larger classification including quasi judicial officers, legislators and a large group of administrative officers.3 One test seems to be as to whether the official action or non-action involves the exercise of discretion or is merely ministerial in nature. Where the...

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