United States v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 15 February 2013
• Docket Number: Criminal No. 06–171.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America v. Carl Michaeal TAYLOR, Defendant.

989 F.Supp.2d 1

UNITED STATES of America

v.Carl Michaeal TAYLOR, Defendant.

Criminal No. 06–171.

United States District Court,

District of Columbia.

Feb. 15, 2013.

Martin Dee Carpenter, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for United States of America.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, Chief Judge.

Before the Court is defendant Carl Michael Taylor's Motion [56] to Reduce Sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Upon consideration of defendant's Motion [56] to Reduce Sentence, defendant's Supplement to Defendant's Motion [57], the government's Opposition [61], defendant's Reply [69], the entire record herein, the applicable law, and for the reasons set forth below, defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence will be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2007, pursuant to a written plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess With Intent to Distribute 50 Grams or More of Cocaine Base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and acknowledged responsibility for “more than 1.5 kilograms” of cocaine base, which carried a statutory mandatory minimum sentence of ten years imprisonment. Presenting Investigation Report (“PSR”) ¶¶ 3, 65, rev. Mar. 13, 2007; Am. J. & Commitment Order 1, ECF No. 46; 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii) (2007). After applicable adjustments, defendant's guideline range was 324 to 405 months imprisonment (total offense level 39; criminal history category II). PSR ¶ 26, 33, 66; U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual [ hereinafter USSG] §§ 2D1.1, 5A (2007). The Honorable Henry H. Kennedy sentenced defendant to 180 months imprisonment and 60 months supervised release. Am. J. 2–3.

Since defendant was sentenced, the United States Sentencing Commission (“Commission”) has amended the Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) to lower the base offense levels for crack cocaine offenses. See Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2688, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). In 2010, Congress lowered the statutory mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine offenses in the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”), Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372. In 2011, the Commission responded to the FSA and issued Amendment 750, which retroactively lowered defendant's applicable guideline range from 324 to 405 months to 188 to 235 months (offense level 35, criminal history category II). SeeUSSG §§ 1B1.10; 5A (2012). Thus, the bottom of defendant's now-applicable sentencing range is higher than defendant's current sentence of 180 months.

Defendant argues he is entitled to a reduced sentence of 120 months imprisonment—the statutory mandatory minimum sentence for his offense—because such a reduction would include a downward departure comparable to his original sentence, which was 55.6% below the bottom of defendant's then-applicable guideline range. Def.'s Supp. 2, ECF No. 57. The government opposes any sentence reduction, arguing that section 1B1.10(b)(2) of the Guidelines does not permit this Court to reduce defendant's sentence below the bottom of the amended range.¹ Gov't's Opp'n 1–2, ECF No. 61. Defendant challenges the validity of section 1B1.10(b)(2) as recently amended, claiming the section may not lawfully be applied because it violates the Sentencing Reform Act and separation of powers principles, and because it was amended and promulgated without properly adhering to the Administrative Procedures Act's (“APA”) notice-and-comment requirements. Def.'s Supp. 3–27.

II. ANALYSISA. Defendant's Eligibility for a Reduced Sentence Pursuant to § 3582(c)(2).

Federal courts generally do not have authority to modify a sentence once it has been imposed, but this rule of finality is subject to a few narrow exceptions—including a statutory exception under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Freeman v. United States, ––– U.S. ––––, 131 S.Ct. 2685, 2690–91, 180 L.Ed.2d 519 (2011) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)). Section 3582(c)(2) gives a district court jurisdiction and discretion to reduce a defendant's sentence if the defendant's sentence was “based on” a Guidelines sentencing range that has been subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission, and if such a reduction is “consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission” in section 1B1.10 of the Guidelines. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2); USSG § 1B1.10. In 2010, the Supreme Court affirmed in Dillon v. United States that, by the plain language of § 3582(c)(2), section 1B1.10's policy statements are binding on federal courts. 560 U.S. 817, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2687, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010). Section 1B1.10(b) prohibits a court from reducing a defendant's sentence to a term “less than the minimum of the amended guideline range.” USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A). The only exception to this prohibition is when the original downward departure was made “pursuant to a government motion to reflect the defendant's substantial assistance to authorities.” USSG § 1B1.10(b)(2)(B) (2012).

Because defendant's original sentence was “based on” a Guidelines range, and because the applicable amended range under Amendment 750 is retroactive per section 1B1.10 of the Guidelines, defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). USSG § 1B1.10; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). However, the greatest sentence reduction defendant is eligible for under section 1B1.10(b) is a sentence of 188 months imprisonment. SeeUSSG § 1B1.10(b)(2)(A)-(B). Because defendant's sentence is currently less than the bottom of the amended guideline range, and because defendant's original downward departure was not made “pursuant to a government motion to reflect defendant's substantial assistance to authorities,” this Court does not have the authority to lower defendant's sentence any further. Id.

B. Sentencing Reform Act Violation Claim

Defendant contends that section 1B1.10(b) as amended is invalid and should not be applied in his case because 1B1.10(b)'s terms violate the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) by “interfer[ing]” with the original sentence's departures or variances—a power Congress did not grant to the Commission. Def.'s Supp. 5. Defendant is unable to cite any authority adopting this position; indeed, to this Court's knowledge, every circuit to consider defendant's argument has upheld section 1B1.10(b)'s validity. See, e.g., United States v. Berberena, 694 F.3d 514, 523–26 (3d Cir.2012); United States v. Horn, 679 F.3d 397, 401, 404–09 (6th Cir.2012); United States v. Harris, 688 F.3d 950, 957 (8th Cir.2012) (“Every circuit that has considered [the argument] has held that ‘[the] statutory provisions [in 28 U.S.C. § 994 and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) ] are a sufficient delegation’ of Congress's authority to the Sentencing Commission.”); United States v. Garcia, 655 F.3d 426, 434–35 (5th Cir.2011).

The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 created the Sentencing Commission as an independent agency within the judicial branch, and the Commission derives its authority from the Act. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 362, 368, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989); 28 U.S.C. § 991. The Commission has specific authority to limit sentence reductions pursuant to three statutory provisions: 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(a), 994(u), and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). U.S. v. Strain, 2012 WL 5690573, at *2 (3d Cir. Nov. 16, 2012). Section 994(u) of the Sentencing Reform Act requires the Commission to specify to what extent sentences may be reduced based on retroactive amendments, § 994(a)(2)(C) requires that this specification be in the form of a policy statement, and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) makes those policy statements binding. Id. (citation omitted).

Section 1B1.10(b) of the Guidelines was amended pursuant to § 994(u) of the Sentencing Reform Act, in which Congress granted the Commission the authority to “specify in what circumstances and by what amount ... sentences ... may be reduced.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(u); see Berberena, 694 F.3d at 520. In 2011, when the Commission amended section 1B1.10(b) to prohibit a sentence reduction below the amended guideline range (except when the original departure was pursuant to a government motion under section 5K1.1 of the Guidelines), the Commission was indicating “by what amount” sentences may be reduced on the basis of retroactive amendments. Id. at 520. Thus, the Commission's amendment to section 1B1.10(b) fell well within its statutory authority, as the Commission specified “the circumstances and by what amount” a sentence may be reduced. Id. at 526;28 U.S.C. § 994(u).

Nowhere in the SRA does Congress require the Commission to ensure that a sentence reduction mirror the departures or variances of the original sentence, nor does Congress require the Commission to give judges any tools of departure or variance to use when reducing a sentence. Berberena, 694 F.3d at 521;see also Horn, 679 F.3d at 401–02. In United States v. Anderson, the Eighth Circuit considered whether the Commission lacked authority to “interfere with the structure of the district court's sentence” by preventing a court from applying downward departures and variances imposed at the initial sentencing, as Defendant presently argues. 686 F.3d 585, 589 (8th Cir.2012). The court found that such an argument was “unconvincing” and noted that the Supreme Court had indicated that a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) is not a “plenary resentencing” but instead operates as “a narrow exception to the rule of finality” that “permits a sentence reduction within the narrow bounds established by the Commission.” Id. at 589 (citing Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817, 130 S.Ct. 2683, 2692, 2694, 177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010)). The unfettered judicial discretion that Defendant seeks to preserve is at odds with the plain language of 28 U.S.C. §§ 994(u), 994(a), and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), which is indicative of Congress's explicit intent. See Berberena, 694 F.3d at 522. Thus, section 1B1.10(b) as amended does not violate the Sentencing Reform Act, and defendant's contention is...