United States v. Taylor

• Decision Date: 11 February 2016
• Docket Number: No. 09–5517.,09–5517.
• Citation: 814 F.3d 340
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Rejon TAYLOR, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

814 F.3d 340

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Rejon TAYLOR, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 09–5517.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: Oct. 1, 2014.

Decided and Filed: Feb. 11, 2016.

ARGUED:Barry J. Fisher, Federal Public Defender, New Albany, NY, for Appellant. Christopher D. Poole, United States Attorney's Office, Chattanooga, TN, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:Barry J. Fisher, Federal Public Defender, New Albany, NY, Leslie A. Cory, Chattanooga, TN, S. Adele Shank, Law Office of Adele Shank, Columbus, OH, for Appellant. Christopher D. Poole, United States Attorney's Office, Chattanooga, TN, for Appellee. G. Ben Cohen, The Promise of Justice Initiative, New Orleans, LA, for Amicus Curiae.

Before: ROGERS, McKEAGUE, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.

ROGERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which McKEAGUE, J., joined, and WHITE, J., joined in part. WHITE, J. (pp. 379–98), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

OPINION

ROGERS, Circuit Judge.

Rejon Taylor appeals his convictions and death sentence for carjacking resulting in death, kidnapping resulting in death, and using a firearm to commit murder while committing carjacking and kidnapping. His appeal raises fifteen issues, none of which warrants reversal or remand.

The district court described the crimes underlying this case as follows:

[Taylor] had been responsible for various thefts and burglaries from [Guy] Luck's house and other nearby residences in Atlanta between 2001 and 2003. On August 6, 2003, [Taylor], along with codefendants Sir Jack Matthews and Joey Marshall, went to Luck's house with the intention of robbing him. After confronting Luck at gunpoint, Marshall guarded Luck while [Taylor] began looking through Luck's house. Inside the house, [Taylor] took around $600 or $800. Marshall testified [Taylor] later told him there was a warrant or other document connected with [Taylor's] arrest on theft charges in another case, which suggested Luck could be a witness against [Taylor].

At gunpoint, Luck was forced outside his house and into his van. [Taylor] got in the driver's seat, while Matthews guarded Luck in the back. [Taylor] and Matthews each had a gun. [Taylor] drove the van onto Interstate 75 and traveled north from Atlanta. They made a brief stop at a gas station in north Georgia before eventually crossing into southeast Tennessee, where [Taylor] exited the expressway and drove into the Chattanooga suburb of Collegedale. During the trip, Marshall followed behind in a car registered to [Taylor's] mother.

As [Taylor] drove the van around relatively isolated roads in Collegedale, there was a confrontation in the back of the van, in which Matthews fired a shot, which hit Luck in the arm. [Taylor] turned around from the driver's seat and fired three shots at Luck. The third bullet hit Luck in the mouth and caused his death later that day at Erlanger Hospital. [Taylor] and Matthews left their guns in the van and walked briskly from the van to the car driven by Marshall. They then drove back to Atlanta.

[Taylor] was subsequently arrested and incarcerated pre-trial at the Hamilton County Jail in Chattanooga. While incarcerated there, [he] was part of a group of inmates that attempted to escape.

United States v. Taylor, 583 F.Supp.2d 923, 926–27 (E.D.Tenn.2008).

A jury convicted Taylor of carjacking resulting in death, kidnapping resulting in death, and using a firearm to commit murder while committing carjacking and kidnapping. The jury recommended a death sentence, which the district court imposed. The question in this case is whether particular acts or omissions in the course of Taylor's trial require remand. Taylor has identified fifteen potential grounds for reversal or remand.

Ground I: Juror Bias

Taylor first argues that the district court should have more strenuously questioned Juror 1 (later determined to be the foreperson) to determine whether exposure to an out-of-court remark affected her ability to be impartial. Taylor claims that the district court's failure to do so—or to replace Juror 1 with an alternate juror—requires remand for resentencing. While it might well have been advisable for the district court to ask more questions of Juror 1, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to press on with the questioning once the district court satisfied itself that Juror 1 had not been prejudiced by the out-of-court remark.

The jury found Taylor guilty on September 8, 2008. Just over a week later, on the eve of the sentencing hearing, the Government announced its intention to use at the hearing recordings of phone calls Taylor made from jail after the verdict. In one of those calls, the Government indicated, Taylor allegedly referred to the jurors as "racist rednecks."¹ Local media reported the alleged remark. On September 19, 2008, Taylor's counsel moved for a mistrial and asked that the district court question the jurors outside the presence of counsel about their exposure to media reports of Taylor's reported remark. Taylor's counsel expressly declined the opportunity to participate in or be present at the questioning, theorizing that the jurors might be less forthcoming in his presence. The Government agreed that questioning by the court was appropriate and so, on September 23, 2008, the district court questioned each of the jurors and alternates privately, without the parties or their lawyers being present. The district court told the jurors that, because of the break between the guilt phase and the sentencing phase, the attorneys had asked the court to make sure that none of the jurors had been exposed to publicity about the trial. Eleven of the eighteen jurors and alternates reported that they had been exposed to publicity about the trial. The district court asked all but one of the jurors who had heard about a "racist" or "redneck" remark whether the remark would affect their decision and whether they could put the remark out of their minds. All of the jurors who were asked assured the district court that the remark would not affect their ability to be impartial.

The district court questioned Juror 1 as follows:

THE COURT: The lawyers, just as a matter of precaution more than anything else, asked if I would meet with each one of the jurors this morning to make sure that no one was exposed to any publicity during the break. The break was pretty long. And I did not see any harm in acquiescing in their request, so I agreed to do so. During the break were you exposed to any publicity at all about the trial?

JUROR 1: Well, I'll have to say that the only thing that really—and I did not read or anything—just that I've had a couple people say, "I didn't know you were a redneck." So, you know, obviously there are some comments that have been made along those lines. But, no, sir, I have not read anything or seen anything. And the only reason I knew we were going to talk today is because I turned the TV on, after turning off Dancing with the Stars last night, it was on Channel 3, and it said, "Judge Collier is going to talk—" I couldn't get it off fast enough. So ...

THE COURT: You did not follow up on the conversations, then, when people said they did not know you were a redneck?

JUROR 1: No. I obviously have speculated. In your head ... THE COURT: Did they tell you where that comment came from?

JUROR 1: Not necessarily, no, sir. I assumed it was from either the defendant or some of his friends. My colleague said to me last Tuesday—we were there Wednesday—"We knew you'd be here today."

I said, "You did?"

So they knew about it, but ...

I said, "I can't talk about it."

THE COURT: Well, we are working when you guys are not here. We're still doing things.

JUROR 1: I understand that. But evidently they knew we weren't.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, thank you.

JUROR 1: Oh, a couple of things I'd like to ask if I may.

THE COURT: Uh-huh. (Moving head up and down.)

JUROR 1: Is it the usual procedure that the defendant knows the jurors' names? I've had some concern, you know. It is a murder trial, after all. And there might be some repercussions down the pike, of being found and something happening, with friends. Is that normal for jurors' names to be called? I know polling the jury, but is there a reason it couldn't be Juror 1, Juror 2, that kind of thing?

THE COURT: We collect the information once the jury is impaneled. We give a long list, including information, and we have a standing—is it a rule, or just an order?—a practice that we collect the information. We don't—

THE CLERK: I'm not sure if it's an order. I know Mari puts a cover sheet on the jury list that it's to be returned.

THE COURT: To be returned as soon as the jury is selected. The lawyers might have some of their own notes with names on it, but defendants would not have that.

JUROR 1: Okay.

THE COURT: They would have to have an extremely good memory to recall all of that. And we don't put addresses on anything. So even if someone remembered a name, it would take quite an effort to go further than that.

JUROR 1: Well, with the Internet nowadays, it's not so tough. So, you know, there was some concern. My husband and I, that's the only thing we've talked about. So, thinking about getting a weapon.

I didn't bring my purse. Okay.

After reviewing the jurors' and alternates' responses, Taylor moved for a mistrial due to incurable juror prejudice. In the alternative, Taylor requested a hearing during which counsel could question the jurors and alternates and after which the district court could decide whether to dismiss the entire jury or remove the most "taint[ed]" jurors. The district court heard argument on Taylor's requests and ultimately denied them both. Noting "the obvious risk" of reinforcing the allegedly prejudicial publicity by further questioning jurors and alternates about it, the district court observed that a simple stipulation—that Taylor "never said [racist rednecks]"—could resolve the issue without running the risk of further juror prejudice. In a...