United States v. Taylor

Decision Date26 April 2023
Docket Number22-cr-20315
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JAMES TAYLOR, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT FOR VIOLATION OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL ACT (ECF No. 19) AND DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 22)

ROBERT H. CLELAND, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Pending before the court are two motions to dismiss filed by Defendant James Taylor.[1] (ECF Nos. 19, 22.) The first challenges Defendant's indictment on the basis that the Government violated his rights under the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C § 3161 et seq., the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 19.) The second seeks dismissal of the indictment on the ground that Defendant's charges are unconstitutional under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 22.) The Government filed responses. (ECF Nos. 25, 26.) The court finds a hearing unnecessary. E.D. Mich. L.R. 7.1(f)(1)-(2). For reasons stated below, the court will deny both motions.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant stands accused of three offenses: Count I, Felon in Possession of a Firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); Count II, Felon in Possession of Ammunition, 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1); and Count III, Felon in Possession of a Firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (ECF No. 1, PageID.1-2.) The allegations underlying Counts I and II arose from events on April 25, 2022. (Id.) Specifically, Defendant reportedly shot at another individual at a gas station in Detroit and stole the individual's vehicle. (ECF No. 19, PageID.50.) The allegations underpinning Count III occurred on April 27, 2022. (ECF No. 1, PageID.1-2.) Believing Defendant to be responsible for the gas station incident, police officers located him through GPS tether tracking[2]and arrested him while he was driving a U-Haul truck with a passenger in Detroit. (ECF No. 19, PageID.51-52; ECF No. 26, PageID.184-85.) As part of the warrantless arrest, the officers searched the interior of the U-Haul and found a firearm, attributing the same to Defendant. (Id.) The officers also seized a firearm from the purse of the passenger, who had a license to carry the gun. (Id.)

At the time of his arrest on April 27th, Defendant had several ongoing Michigan state court matters. Specifically, he had four pending criminal cases with the Third Circuit Court in Wayne County[3] (see ECF Nos. 26-6, 26-7, 26-8, 26-9) as well as an active felony probation case with the Sixth Circuit Court in Oakland County[4] in which a warrant was issued on April 28, 2022 (see ECF No. 26-5, PageID.220-21). Additionally, on April 29, 2022, new charges were authorized in the 36th District Court in Wayne County related to the events from April 25th. (ECF No. 26-2, PageID.209-12.) However, they were ultimately dismissed without prejudice on May 17, 2022 due to the alleged victim's failure to appear at the preliminary examination for that case. (Id.) Nonetheless, Defendant's other pending state cases continued to progress. (See ECF Nos. 26-6, 267, 26-8, 26-9.) A global resolution was reached on September 1, 2022: Defendant pled guilty to a single felony firearm charge with all other pending Wayne County charges being dismissed at sentencing on September 20, 2022 in exchange for a two-year term of incarceration with the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”). (ECF No. 26-9, PageID.230-32.) From his arrest on April 27, 2022 until his transfer to MDOC custody on September 30, 2022, Defendant remained in state custody, initially at the Detroit Detention Center and later at the Wayne County Jail. (ECF No. 26, PageID.185.)

In the interim, on June 13, 2022, Defendant was initially charged by sealed complaint in federal court[5]with one count of felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), for the events that allegedly took place on or about April 25, 2022. (ECF No. 26, PageID.185.) This document remained sealed until March 16, 2023 and was ultimately dismissed on March 20, 2023 because it did not merge with the instant indictment. (Id.) Defendant was charged by sealed indictment in the case at bar on June 21, 2021 with a warrant simultaneously issuing for his arrest. (ECF Nos. 1, 2.) The indictment was unsealed on September 30, 2022. (ECF No. 4.) On the Government's petition, the court issued an order for writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum on December 15, 2022, directing relevant law enforcement officers to produce Defendant for arraignment on December 27, 2022. (ECF No. 5, PageID.10-13.) Defendant initially appeared for the first time in federal court on December 27, 2022 (ECF Nos. 6-10); he was arraigned the next day, consenting to detention pending trial (ECF Nos. 11-14).

Thereafter, on January 3, 2023, the court issued a scheduling order, setting Final Pretrial Hearing and Jury Trial dates for February 16, 2023 and February 28, 2023 respectively. (ECF No. 16.) On January 24, 2023, based on a joint request from the parties, the court granted an extension of the deadlines set in its scheduling order. (ECF No. 18.) Specifically, the court extended the motion cutoff date from January 30, 2023 to March 6, 2023 and reset the Final Pretrial Hearing and Jury Trial dates for April 25, 2023 and June 6, 2023 respectively. (Id.) The parties further stipulated “that the time period between January 30, 2023 and June 6, 2023, shall be deemed excludable delay under the provisions of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §3161, in consideration of the factors listed in §3161(h)(1)(A) and in §3161(h)(7)(A).” (Id. at PageID.40.)

On March 3, 2023, Defendant filed his first motion to dismiss based on claimed Speedy Trial Act, Fifth Amendment, and Sixth Amendment violations. (ECF No. 19.) A few days later, on March 6, 2023, Defendant filed his second motion to dismiss, challenging the constitutionality of the charges against him under the Second Amendment. (ECF No. 22.) On March 23, 2023, the Government filed its responses to both motions. (ECF Nos. 25, 26.) Defendant did not file replies.

II. STANDARD
A. Speedy Trial Act Violation

Defendant asserts a violation of his rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b) of the Speedy Trial Act (“the Act”) and consequently moves this court for a sanction of dismissal with prejudice under 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a). The Act states in relevant part:

(b) Any information or indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges. If an individual has been charged with a felony in a district in which no grand jury has been in session during such thirty-day period, the period of time for filing of the indictment shall be extended an additional thirty days.
(h) The following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing the time within which an information or an indictment must be filed, or in computing the time within which the trial of any such offense must commence:
(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to-
(B) delay resulting from trial with respect to other charges against the defendant;

18 U.S.C. § 3161. At 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(1), the Act further provides:

(a)(1) If, in the case of any individual against whom a complaint is filed charging such individual with an offense, no indictment or information is filed within the time limit required by section 3161(b) as extended by section 3161(h) of this chapter, such charge against that individual contained in such complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped. In determining whether to dismiss the case with or without prejudice, the court shall consider, among others, each of the following factors: the seriousness of the offense; the facts and circumstances of the case which led to the dismissal; and the impact of a reprosecution on the administration of this chapter and on the administration of justice.
B. Constitutional Claims Regarding Delay

Defendant further claims that the Government's excessive pre-indictment and post-indictment delay in bringing him before the court violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment as well as his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment. (ECF No. 19, PageID.57-60.) As explained in United States v. Schaffer, 586 F.3d 414, 424, (6th Cir. 2009), [p]re-indictment delay and post-indictment delay present separate issues. The former is governed by the Fifth Amendment, see United States v. Rogers, 118 F.3d 466, 475-76 (6th Cir. 1997), while the latter is a Sixth Amendment matter, see United States v. Graham, 128 F.3d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 1997).”

The due process clause of the Fifth Amendment protects against oppressive preindictment delay. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324-25 (1971); United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977); Schaffer, 586 F.3d at 424. However, in the Sixth Circuit, “dismissal for pre-indictment delay ‘is warranted only when the defendant shows substantial prejudice to his right to a fair trial and that the delay was an intentional device by the government to gain a tactical advantage.' Schaffer, 586 F.3d at 424 (quoting United States v. Greene, 737 F.2d 572, 574 (6th Cir. 1984)).

The Sixth Amendment provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. “The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial does not come into play until ‘arrest, indictment or other official accusation.' Schaffer, 586 F.3d at 424 (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992)). Moreover, the speedy trial clause does not “require the Government to...

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