United States v. Ten Thousand Six Hundred & Seventy-Seven Dollars (-t_T-10,677.00) in U.S. Currency
Decision Date | 07 June 2018 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 2016-12 |
Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. TEN THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-SEVEN DOLLARS ($10,677.00) IN U.S. CURRENCY, REPRESENTING 5,419 PUERTO RICAN LOTTERY TICKETS, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
ATTORNEYS:
Gretchen Shappert, United States Attorney
Joycelyn Hewlett, AUSA
Sansara Cannon, AUSA
St. Thomas, VI
For the United States of America.
Before the Court is the motion of the United States for default judgment.
On October 13, 2015, United States Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") agents identified a Priority Mail Parcel in St. Thomas that was being shipped from Esperanza Megia ("Megia")in the United States Virgin Islands to Radames Nazario ("Nazario") in Puerto Rico. The agents concluded that further investigation was warranted. Rather than seek a warrant to search the package, the CBP agents, in a decision made among themselves, chose to open and search the package.2
The parcel contained 5,419 Puerto Rican lottery tickets, which the agents seized as contraband. CBP then transported the lottery tickets to Puerto Rico and redeemed the winning tickets for $10,677.
On February 12, 2016, the United States filed a verified complaint in this Court seeking in rem forfeiture of $10,677 in U.S. currency, representing the winnings that were redeemed from the 5,419 seized Puerto Rican lottery tickets. On March 4, 2016, the United States sent written notices of civil forfeiture to Megia and Nazario. No claims were filed in this forfeiture action.
On March 20, 2017, the United States filed a motion for default judgment. The Court addressed that motion at a hearing held on March 13, 2018, and March 14, 2018.3
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) allows courts to enter a default judgment against a properly served defendant who fails to file a timely responsive pleading. Anchorage Assoc. v. V.I. Bd. Of Tax Rev., 922 F.2d 168, 177 n.9 (3d Cir. 1990). In considering a motion for default judgment, the factualallegations in the complaint are treated as conceded by the defendant, except those relating to the amount of damages. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Pepe, 431 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2005); Comdyne I, Inc. v. Corbin, 908 F.2d 1142, 1149 (3d Cir. 1990). Default judgment is only appropriate where a plaintiff's well-pleaded facts, taken as true, demonstrate that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. See, e.g., City of N.Y. v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 n. 23 (2d Cir. 2011) (). "But while a defaulted defendant is deemed to 'admit the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations of fact,' he 'is not held to admit facts that are not well-pleaded or to admit conclusions of law.'" Cotton v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1278 (11th Cir. 2005) (alteration omitted) (quoting Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975))
Even where a plaintiff is entitled to default judgment, the plaintiff is still "required to prove the amount of damages that should be awarded." Oberstar v. F.D.I.C., 987 F.2d 494, 505 (8th Cir. 1993). Instead of relying on the allegations in the complaint, the Court must conduct an inquiry to ascertain the amount of damages. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b) (); see also United States v. Di Mucci, 879 F.2d 1488, 1497 (7th Cir. 1989) ( ); Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism and the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) .
A motion for entry of default judgment must also contain evidence of the following: (1) that all pleadings were validly served upon the defendant; (2) that the defendant has not appeared; (3) that default was entered; (4) that the defendant is not an infant or incompetent; (5) an affidavit of non-military service; and (6) the amount of judgment and how it was calculated. See Bank of Nova Scotia v. Abdallah, No. CV 20012- 0033, 2014 WL 2976232, at *3 (D.V.I. July 1, 2014). In addition, the Court must consider three factors when determining whether to grant a default judgment: "(1) [the] prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied, (2) whether the defendant appears to have a litigable defense, and (3) whether defendant's delay is due to culpable conduct." Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000).
The United States seeks forfeiture pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) ("Section 1305"). Section 1305 provides that "[a]ll persons are prohibited from importing into the United States from any foreign country . . . any lottery ticket . . ." and authorizes forfeiture proceedings with respect to such tickets. See 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a)-(b).
"The term 'United States' includes all Territories and possessions of the United States except the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Wake Island, Midway Islands, Kingman Reef, Johnston Island, and the island of Guam." 19 U.S.C. § 1401(h). The territories included within the term "United States" are part of the United States customs territory. The excluded territories are not. See United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d 116, 121 (3d Cir. 1994). As such, Puerto Rico is part of the United States customs territory, but the Virgin Islands is not.
The term "foreign country" is not defined as it appears in Section 1305(a).
The United States argues that shipping Puerto Rican lottery tickets from the United States Virgin Islands into Puerto Rico constitutes importing lottery tickets into the United States from a foreign country, in violation of Section 1305(a). Indeed, at the March 13, 2018, hearing, the United States took the position that, under the Tariff Act, the Virgin Islands is a foreign country. See March 13, 2018, Hearing, ECF No. 19, at 9:25-10:7.
In support of its position, the United States directs the Court to the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Couvertier v. Gil Bonar. 173 F.3d 450 (1st Cir. 1999). In that case, the First Circuit held that transporting Puerto Rican lottery tickets from the United States Virgin Islands into Puerto Rico violated Section 1305(a). Id. at 452. The First Circuit reasoned that:
This Court is not bound by decisions of the First Circuit, but those decisions may be persuasive. In this case, the Court is not persuaded that the First Circuit's interpretation of Section 1305(a) is correct. When interpreting a statute, the Court "start[s] . . . with the statutory text, and proceed[s] from the understanding that [u]nless otherwise defined, statutory terms are generally interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning." Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376, 133 S. Ct. 1886, 1893, 185 L. Ed. 2d 1003 (2013). In addition, the Court generally "assume[s] . . . that every word in a statute has meaning and avoid[s] interpreting one part of a statute in a manner that renders another part superfluous." Disabled in Action of Pennsylvania v. Se. Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2008).
Section 1305(a) forbids an individual from "importing [certain goods] into the United States from any foreign country." 19 U.S.C. § 1305(a) (emphasis added). The text references two geographic categories: the United States and foreign countries. It does not necessarily follow that there are only two dichotomous geographic categories for customs purposes: the United States customs territory (which excludes the Virgin Islands) and foreign countries (of which the Virgin Islands would be...
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