United States v. Texas
| Decision Date | 17 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | CAUSE NO. EP-21-CV-173-KC, CAUSE NO. EP-21-CV-178-KC |
| Citation | 586 F.Supp.3d 574 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. The State of TEXAS and Greg Abbott, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Texas, Defendants. Annunciation House; Angry Tias & Abuelas of the Rio Grande Valley; Jennifer Harbury; and Fiel Houston, Plaintiffs, v. Greg Abbott, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Texas; and Steven McCraw, in his official capacity as Director of the State of Texas Department of Public Safety, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas |
Alexander K. Haas, Jean Lin, Michael Joseph Gerardi, Zachary Avallone, Brian Boynton, Joshua M. Kolsky, U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff in EP-21-CV-173-KC.
Judd E. Stone, Amy Snow Hilton, Patrick K. Sweeten, William Thomas Thompson, William D. Wassdorf, Daniel Lawrence Abrahamson, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, General Litigation Division, Austin, TX, for Defendant State of Texas in EP-21-CV-173-KC.
Patrick K. Sweeten, William D. Wassdorf, Amy Snow Hilton, Daniel Lawrence Abrahamson, Office of the Attorney General of Texas, General Litigation Division, Austin, TX, for Defendant Greg Abbott in EP-21-CV-173-KC.
Eric C. Rassbach, Lori H. Windham, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, DC, for Amicus Catholic Charities of the Rio Grande Valley in EP-21-CV-173-KC.
Eric C. Rassbach, Lori H. Windham, The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Washington, DC, for Amicus Catholic Charities of the Rio Grande Valley in EP-21-CV-173-KC.
Andre I. Segura, Law Office of Andre Ivan Segura, Houston, TX, Bernardo Rafael Cruz, Houston, TX, Kathryn Lynn Huddleston, Kathryn Huddleston Law Office, Houston, TX, Adriana Cecilia Pinon, ACLU Foundation of Texas, Houston, TX, Cody Wofsy, Katrina Eiland, Spencer Amdur, ACLU Immigrants' Rights Project, San Francisco, CA, Ming Cheung, Noor Zafar, Omar C. Jadwat, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs in EP-21-CV-178-KC.
Patrick K. Sweeten, Texas Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Defendants in EP-21-CV-178-KC.
On this day, the Court considered Defendants State of Texas and Governor Greg Abbott's Motion to Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim, ECF No. 67. For the reasons discussed herein, Defendants’ Motion is DENIED .
On July 28, 2021, Governor Greg Abbott issued Executive Order No. GA-37, titled "Relating to the transportation of migrants during the COVID-19 disaster" ("GA-37" or "EO"). Tex. Exec. Order No. GA-37 (July 28, 2021), https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/EO-GA-37_transportation_of_migrants_during_COVID_IMAGE_07-28-2021.pdf; see Compl. ¶ 23, ECF No. 1. GA-37 mandates that "[n]o person, other than a federal, state, or local law enforcement official, shall provide ground transportation to a group of migrants who have been detained by [United States Customs and Border Patrol ("CBP")] for crossing the border illegally or who would have been subject to expulsion under the Title 42 order." EO ¶ 1; Compl. ¶ 24. GA-37 directs the Texas Department of Public Safety ("DPS") to "stop any vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a violation of paragraph 1, and to reroute such a vehicle back to its point of origin or a port of entry if a violation is confirmed." EO ¶ 2; Compl. ¶ 24. GA-37 further authorizes DPS to impound any vehicle "being used to transport migrants in violation of paragraph 1, or that refuses to be rerouted in violation of paragraph 2." EO ¶ 3; Compl. ¶ 24.
On July 30, 2021, the United States filed this action against the State of Texas and Governor Abbott in his official capacity as governor of Texas, asserting that GA-37 violates the Supremacy Clause and seeking to enjoin enforcement of GA-37. Compl. In its Complaint, the United States claims that GA-37 is preempted as an obstacle to federal immigration law because it authorizes state officials to make and act on federal immigration determinations and interferes with the federal government's ability to release and transport noncitizens. Compl. ¶¶ 33–37. The United States also claims that GA-37 violates the intergovernmental immunity component of the Supremacy Clause because it purports to directly regulate federal officials and contractors engaged in their official duties. Compl. ¶¶ 38–41.
The United States immediately filed its Emergency Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Injunction. ECF No. 3. On August 26, 2021, the Court granted a preliminary injunction, ordering that "Defendants, their agents, officers, and employees, and all other persons and entities in active concert or participation with them are enjoined from taking any action to enforce the executive order."1 Prelim. Inj. Order, ECF No. 52 at 18. That injunction remains in force.
On October 11, 2021, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss, arguing that the United States’ claim must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. Mot. 3–12. The United States filed its Response in Opposition on November 8, 2021. ECF No. 75. On December 6, 2021, Defendants filed their Reply. ECF No. 78.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs. , 545 U.S. 546, 552, 125 S.Ct. 2611, 162 L.Ed.2d 502 (2005) ; Peoples Nat'l Bank v. Off. of Comptroller of Currency of U.S. , 362 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 2004). Without jurisdiction conferred by statute or the Constitution, federal courts lack the power to adjudicate claims. Exxon Mobil , 545 U.S. at 552, 125 S.Ct. 2611 ; People's Nat'l Bank , 362 F.3d at 336. A party may challenge a district court's subject matter jurisdiction by filing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
A federal court must consider a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) before any other challenge because a court must have subject matter jurisdiction before determining the validity of a claim. Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia , 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1994). The party asserting jurisdiction constantly bears the burden of proof that the jurisdiction does in fact exist. Ramming v. United States , 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001). Where the motion to dismiss is based on the complaint alone, the court must decide whether the allegations in the complaint sufficiently state a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See Paterson v. Weinberger , 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir. 1981).
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) challenges a complaint on the basis that it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept well-pleaded facts as true and view them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Calhoun v. Hargrove , 312 F.3d 730, 733 (5th Cir. 2002) ; Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter , 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000). Though a complaint need not contain "detailed" factual allegations, a plaintiff's complaint must allege sufficient facts "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ; Colony Ins. Co. v. Peachtree Constr., Ltd. , 647 F.3d 248, 252 (5th Cir. 2011). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
"[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Colony Ins. Co. , 647 F.3d at 252. Ultimately, the "[f]actual allegations [in the complaint] must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level."
Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, "a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’ " Id. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes , 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) ).
In their Motion, Defendants first argue that the United States lacks standing to sue both the State of Texas and Governor Abbott, and thus the Court must dismiss this case for lack of jurisdiction. Mot. 3–5. Defendants then argue that the United States has failed to state a claim because it lacks a cause of action under the Supremacy Clause. Mot. 6–7. Next, Defendants argue that GA-37 is not preempted by federal law because its object is public health, an area of traditional state authority, and that the United States has failed to allege that GA-37 is facially preempted in any event. Mot. 7–10. With respect to intergovernmental immunity, Defendants argue that GA-37 does not violate the doctrine because it does not directly regulate federal actors, and that this theory fails to support facial relief. Mot. 11–12. The Court considers each argument in turn, beginning with the threshold issue of standing.
Defendants argue that the United States lacks standing because its injuries are not traceable to either Governor Abbott or the State of Texas, nor can they be redressed by an injunction against either Defendant. Mot. 3–5. Article III of the United States Constitution restricts a court's jurisdiction to the decision of "cases" or "controversies." U.S. Const. art III ; see Arizonans for Off. Eng. v. Arizona , 520 U.S. 43, 64, 117 S.Ct. 1055, 137 L.Ed.2d 170 (1997). Standing is an essential part of the case or controversy requirement in ...
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