United States v. Thomas

Decision Date13 July 2021
Docket Number1:19-cr-00457-RAH-SRW-3
PartiesUNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. CORNELIUS THOMAS, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION[1]

SUSAN RUSS WALKER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

I. Introduction

On January 21, 2021, Defendant Cornelius Thomas entered a plea of guilty to a charge of conspiracy with intent to distribute and possess with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.[2] (Docs. 160-162). Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853, the government filed a motion for preliminary forfeiture of a truck included in Forfeiture Allegation 1 of the superseding indictment (Doc. 37, at 5-6)-specifically, a 2015 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 truck bearing vehicle identification number 3GCPCREC6FG410660. (Doc. 163). The court granted the government's motion. (Doc. 171). The government subsequently provided Christina Thomas-Cornelius Thomas' sister-notice of forfeiture as a possible interested third party. (Doc. 200).

On March 29, 2021, Petitioner Christina Thomas timely filed her Petition by Third Party for Return of Confiscated Property (Doc. 203), contending that her father gave her the vehicle that the title of the vehicle was in her name, and that she had a right to the property superior to that of the Defendant. The government filed a response (Doc. 205) maintaining that, although the vehicle is registered in the Petitioner's name, the Petitioner is merely a nominee with no legal ownership interest in the vehicle. On May 25 2021, the court conducted a hearing to determine whether the Petitioner has standing to seek return of the confiscated property. (Doc. 223). After the parties presented their evidence and arguments, the court continued the hearing until June 10, 2021, to allow further testimony. (Doc. 226). On June 10, 2021, the court heard additional testimony and argument by the parties. (Doc. 228).

For the reasons set forth below, the court concludes that the Petitioner's motion is due to be denied.

II. Applicable Law

“Forfeiture under § 853 applies to ‘any person' convicted of certain serious drug crimes.” Honeycutt v. United States, 137 S.Ct. 1626, 1632 (2017). Section 853(a) mandates that a defendant, once convicted, shall forfeit (1) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds the person obtained, directly or indirectly, as the result of such violation;” and (2) any of the person's property used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, such violation.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(1), (2). “All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under [§ 853].” 21 U.S.C. § 853(c).

Following the entry of a preliminary of forfeiture, [a]ny person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in property which has been ordered forfeited to the United States, ” may petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of a third party's alleged interest in the property. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2). “If a third party files a petition asserting an interest in the property as prescribed by statute, the court must conduct an ancillary proceeding.” United States v. Chavous, 654 Fed.Appx. 998, 1000 (11th Cir. 2016). “An ancillary proceeding constitutes the sole means by which a third-party claimant can establish entitlement to return of forfeited property.” United States v. Davenport, 668 F.3d 1316, 1320 (11th Cir. 2012). [T]he ancillary proceeding for third-party claimants ‘does not involve relitigation of the forfeitability of the property,' which has already been ordered in the criminal case. The ancillary proceeding is only for the purpose of determining ‘whether any third party has a legal interest in the forfeited property.' Id. at 1321 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2, advisory committee's note (2000 Adoption)). “Although it occurs in the context of criminal forfeiture, the ancillary proceeding is civil in nature.” United States v. Amodeo, 916 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S.Ct. 526 (2019). The Federal Rules of Evidence apply to the ancillary proceeding. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2 (Advisory Committee's note) (2000 adoption).

At the ancillary hearing, “the third party must establish that he has standing within the meaning of section 853 by ‘asserting a legal interest' in the property. He must then show his entitlement to relief on the merits by establishing . . . that the order of forfeiture is invalid” under one of the provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6). United States v. Catala, 870 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 2017) (citations omitted); United States v. Watts, 786 F.3d 152, 160 (2d Cir. 2015) (“At the hearing, the petitioner must first establish his standing to challenge the forfeiture order by demonstrating a ‘legal interest' in the forfeited property under § 853(n)(2). The petitioner must then prove his entitlement to relief on the merits by establishing, through a preponderance of the evidence, one of two superior claims to the property under § 853(n)(6).”) (citations omitted); but see United States v. Timley, 507 F.3d 1125, 1129-30 (8th Cir. 2007) (“Because a legal interest is required to bring a claim under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(2), a court must first look to the law of the jurisdiction that created the property right to determine whether the claimant has a valid interest. . . . If a court determines the claimant has an interest in the property under the law of the jurisdiction that created the property right, then at the ancillary hearing, it must next look to federal law, i.e., to 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6), to determine if the claimant will prevail in the ancillary proceeding.”) (citation omitted).[3] To prevail on the merits, the petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence the following:

(A) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property, and such right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right, title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the acts which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property under this section; or
(B) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest in the property and was at the time of purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section[.]

21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6).

In determining whether the petitioner has satisfied this burden of proof, the court must consider the evidence and testimony presented by the parties at the hearing, as well as “the relevant portions of the record of the criminal case which resulted in the order of forfeiture.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(5). “If, after the hearing, the court determines that the petitioner has” met the petitioner's burden, “the court shall amend the order of forfeiture in accordance with its determination.” 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6). A court “looks to state law to determine the nature of a petitioner's interest in the property, but federal law determines whether the petitioner's interest in the forfeited property is superior and requires an amendment to the forfeiture order.” United States v. Tardon, 493 F.Supp.3d 1188, 1208 (S.D. Fla. 2020); see United States v. Fleet, 498 F.3d 1225, 1231 (11th Cir. 2007) (“While state law defines the property interests a defendant has, federal law determines whether those property interests are forfeit able for the commission of a federal crime.”).

III. Factual Record
A. Testimony of Christina Thomas

As noted above, Petitioner Christina Thomas is the sister of Defendant Cornelius Thomas. At the evidentiary hearing, she testified that she found the Chevrolet Silverado 1500 truck online and contacted the seller by telephone. According to the Petitioner, she went to the seller's address to look at the truck before purchasing it. The Petitioner testified that she brought the Defendant with her to inspect the vehicle because she had no mechanical knowledge, but no one else accompanied them to inspect the vehicle. A bill of sale executed on April 2, 2019 states that the Petitioner purchased the truck for $22, 700. Petitioner's Exhibit 1. According to the Petitioner, her father, L. C. Thomas, had agreed to finance the truck for her, and the Petitioner was to pay him “what she could, when she could.” She testified that the Defendant was present with the Petitioner at the time of the purchase of the vehicle, and he delivered the $22, 700 to the seller, although the bill of sale listed the Petitioner as the purchaser. The Petitioner said that she put her parents' address on the bill of sale, rather than her own, because she typically used that address for important documents since she was renting and did not want any important documents being sent to a temporary address. The Defendant was living at their parents' address.

The title of the truck was in the Petitioner's name, and the Petitioner testified that she herself registered the truck. The Petitioner testified that she also paid for the truck's insurance up until its seizure by the Government. The Petitioner said that she had the truck for around five months before she returned it to her father. She said that she made cash payments during that period to her father for a total of approximately $1, 000. The Petitioner did not receive any receipts for her payments, but said she believed that her father kept a record of those payments, although she did not know where he kept it.

The Petitioner testified that because the maintenance, gas and insurance for the truck were more expensive than she realized,...

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