United States v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 25 November 2020
• Docket Number: 1:18-CR-00126 EAW
• Citation: 504 F.Supp.3d 160
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, v. Titus THOMPSON, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of New York

504 F.Supp.3d 160

UNITED STATES of America,

v.Titus THOMPSON, Defendant.

1:18-CR-00126 EAW

United States District Court, W.D. New York.

Signed November 25, 2020

Charles J. Volkert, Joseph M. Tripi, Joshua A. Violanti, Emmanuel O. Ulubiyo, U.S. Attorney's Office, Buffalo, NY, for United States of America.

Jason L. Schmidt, Jason L. Schmidt, Esq., Fredonia, NY, for Defendant Titus Thompson.

Frank M. Bogulski, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant Deonte Cooper.

Cheryl Meyers Buth, Meyers Buth Law Group PLLC, Orchard Park, NY, for Defendant Ricky Turner.

Joseph J. Terranova, Elma, NY, for Defendant Argenis Albino Herrera.

Michael G. O'Rourke, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant Diones Bowens.

Justin D. Ginter, Lipsitz Green Scime Cambria LLP, Buffalo, NY, for Defendant Vicky Hofstetter.

R. Thomas Burgasser, North Tonawanda, NY, for Defendant Koree Runyan.

DECISION AND ORDER

ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Titus Thompson ("Thompson") was convicted after a three-week jury trial of the following counts in the Second Superseding Indictment: conspiracy to commit firearms offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count 1); unlawfully dealing in firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A), 923(a), and 924(a)(1)(D) (Count 2); felon in possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2) (Count 3); and using and maintaining a drug-involved premises in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) (Count 4). (Dkt. 334; Dkt. 336; see Dkt. 246). The jury acquitted Thompson of Count 5 charging possession of firearms in furtherance of drug trafficking activities in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). (Dkt. 334; see Dkt. 246). Sentencing is scheduled for December 15, 2020. (Dkt. 477).

Pending before the Court are Thompson's motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 for an acquittal (Dkt. 377), or alternatively seeking a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 (Dkt. 376). The government opposes Thompson's motions. (Dkt. 393). For the reasons discussed below, Thompson's motions pursuant to Rules 29 and 33 are denied. In addition, this Decision and Order memorializes in writing the Court's reasons for denying Thompson's speedy trial and severance motion (Dkt. 252), which the Court ruled upon from the bench on February 21, 2020, but indicated it would issue a written decision setting forth its reasoning in further detail (Dkt. 281).

II. RULE 29 MOTION

A. Legal Standard

Rule 29(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[a] defendant may move for a judgment of acquittal, or renew such a motion, within 14 days after a guilty verdict...." The standard on a motion for a judgment of acquittal is stringent, and a defendant claiming that he was convicted based on insufficient evidence "bears a very heavy burden." United States v. Blackwood , 366 F. App'x 207, 209 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Desena , 287 F.3d 170, 177 (2d Cir. 2002) ). "In considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court must view the evidence presented in the light most favorable to the government." United States v. Guadagna , 183 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 1999). Accordingly, "[a]ll permissible inferences must be drawn in the government's favor." Id.

"If any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime, the conviction must stand." United States v. Puzzo , 928 F.2d 1356, 1361 (2d Cir. 1991) (quotation omitted). "The test is whether the jury, drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence, may fairly and logically have concluded that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quotation omitted). The evidence must be viewed "in its totality, not in isolation," United States v. Huezo , 546 F.3d 174, 178 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted), "as each fact may gain color from others," Guadagna , 183 F.3d at 130. The Court may enter a judgment of acquittal only if the evidence that the defendant committed the crime is "nonexistent or so meager that no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (quotation omitted).

A district court must be careful not to usurp the role of the jury. " Rule 29(c) does not provide the trial court with an opportunity to ‘substitute its own determination of ... the weight of the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn for that of the jury.’ " Id. at 129 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Mariani , 725 F.2d 862, 865 (2d Cir. 1984) ). "A jury's verdict will be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the government, to support it." United States v. Nersesian , 824 F.2d 1294, 1324 (2d Cir. 1987). The government is not required "to preclude every reasonable hypothesis which is consistent with innocence." United States v. Chang An-Lo , 851 F.2d 547, 554 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing United States v. Fiore , 821 F.2d 127, 128 (2d Cir. 1987) ).

B. Analysis

Thompson argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support the jury's verdicts. (Dkt. 377 at 3). In support of that argument, Thompson attacks the credibility of Victoria Orlando ("Orlando") and Robert Williams, Jr. ("Williams"), witnesses who admitted to their involvement in the firearms conspiracy and who testified at trial on behalf of the government. In support of his arguments, Thompson cites to Williams’ and Orlando's background, their history of drug use, the inconsistencies in their testimony, and other similar claims. Thompson made similar arguments to the jury, but they were rejected as evidenced by its verdicts.

Williams testified that some of the guns he purchased in Ohio through straw purchasers were sold on the street, and the rest he sold to Thompson. (Dkt. 347 at 43, 45). Williams explained that he stopped selling the guns on the street because an individual named "Tito" introduced him to Thompson, who became his sole customer. (Id. at 45-47, 55-56). Williams testified that Thompson would front him the money to purchase firearms in Ohio, that Thompson placed orders for specific firearms to be purchased, and that if he ran out of money while in Ohio he contacted Thompson to send him more funds. (Id. at 50-51, 79-80).

Orlando testified that on April 14, 2018, when she went back to Williams’ 116 Reed Street residence in Buffalo from Ohio with firearms, she observed Thompson arrive in a white Cadillac Escalade with about four other men. (Dkt. 317 at 95-96). These men were inspecting the firearms and "basically shopping." (Id. at 96). The men who arrived with Thompson left with the firearms and Thompson stayed behind in the kitchen with Williams where they discussed purchasing more firearms in Ohio. (Id. at 98-102). Williams and Orlando then returned to Ohio, purchased more firearms, and then returned to 116 Reed Street in Buffalo and Thompson came over on April 15, 2018. (Id. at 121-22). Again, two to three other individuals arrived and purchased the firearms. (Id. at 122-23, 126).

In addition to the testimony from Williams and Orlando, evidence was introduced at trial of numerous firearms, drugs, and drug paraphernalia recovered pursuant to a search warrant executed on May 18, 2018, at the upper and lower apartments of 89 Parkridge Avenue, Buffalo, New York—a residence owned by Thompson. Approximately 10 firearms were located in the lower apartment, and two firearms were located in the upper apartment, along with ammunition in both apartments. Also located in the upper apartment were various narcotic packaging materials, a kilo press (located in the attic), and two bags of suspected marijuana. Among the firearms located in the upper apartment was one that was straw purchased by co-defendant Jenna Redding ("Redding") for Williams on May 11, 2018. Among the firearms located in the lower apartment was one that was straw purchased by co-defendant Koree Runyan ("Runyan") for Williams on May 9, 2018, in Ohio. Both Redding and Runyan testified at the trial.

The jury also heard testimony from a number of other witnesses, including Thompson's aunt and uncle, Cynthia and Garfield Nowlin, who lived in the lower apartment at 89 Parkridge Avenue. They paid rent to Thompson for this apartment, and their testimony supported a conclusion that Thompson had access to both the lower and upper apartments, that the firearms located in the lower apartment were stored there without the Nowlins’ knowledge, and that the upper apartment had not been occupied by a tenant for several months before execution of the search warrant.

Perhaps the most incredible testimony offered at trial was from Thompson's brother, Romont, who Thompson called as a witness in an attempt to have him assume all the blame and responsibility for the firearms and other evidence recovered at 89 Parkridge Avenue. Romont claimed that he had been living in the upper apartment, and that the drug packaging material and other paraphernalia was either unknown or for non-drug purposes (including Romont's alleged regular consumption of protein shakes and smoothies).

Overall, the evidence was more than sufficient to convict Thompson. Certain inconsistencies and credibility issues were raised with respect to Williams and Orlando on cross-examination, and defense counsel was given wide latitude to explore those issues. However, in the Court's view those efforts were ultimately unsuccessful in impugning the credibility of the critical parts of the testimony offered by both Williams and Orlando—namely that they were involved in a firearms trafficking conspiracy with Thompson whereby they would acquire firearms for Thompson through straw purchasers in Ohio and then transport those firearms to Thompson in Buffalo.

Deference must be appropriately accorded the jury's resolution of these credibility issues in favor of a guilty verdict. See United States v. Pugh , 945 F.3d 9, 19 (2d Cir. 2019) ("The reviewing court must ‘defer[ ] to the jury's assessment of witness credibility and its assessment of the weight of...