United States v. Thompson

Decision Date07 October 1971
Docket NumberNo. 71-1182.,71-1182.
Citation452 F.2d 1333
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Benjamin J. THOMPSON, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mr. Allen M. Hutter, Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court), for appellant.

Mr. Stephen W. Grafman, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty., and John A. Terry, Asst. U. S. Atty., were on the pleadings, for appellee. Messrs. Earl J. Silbert and Herbert B. Hoffman, Asst. U. S. Attys., were also on the supplemental memoranda for appellee.

Mrs. Barbara Bowman, Washington, D. C., and Mr. Michael S. Wald, Ventura, Cal., filed a memorandum on behalf of the Public Defender Service as amicus curiae.

Mr. Bruce D. Beaudin, Washington, D. C., filed a memorandum on behalf of the District of Columbia Bail Agency as amicus curiae.

Before WRIGHT, LEVENTHAL* and ROBINSON, Circuit Judges.

Certiorari Denied March 20, 1972. See 92 S.Ct. 1251.

J. SKELLY WRIGHT, Circuit Judge:

This case comes to us on a motion for bail pending appeal following appellant's conviction in the District Court of violation of federal narcotics laws.1 It presents important questions concerning the extent to which Congress can treat residents of the District of Columbia differently from residents of the 50 states and the extent to which Congress has attempted to do so in the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 1970 (hereinafter "Court Reform Act").2

In accordance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,3 appellant first applied for bail in the District Court. The District Judge found that appellant did not meet the stringent requirements for post-conviction release set out in the Court Reform Act4 and accordingly denied the application. Appellant now renews his motion in this court, contending that the trial judge erred in not applying the more lenient standards set out in the Bail Reform Act of 1966 (hereinafter "Bail Reform Act").5 Appellant argues that the bail provisions of the Court Reform Act were intended to apply only to "local" offenses, and that the Bail Reform Act continues to govern bail determination in cases such as this where the defendant is convicted under federal criminal statutes having nationwide application. Alternatively, appellant contends that, if Congress did intend the Court Reform Act to apply to national offenses committed in the District of Columbia, that Act, as applied to him, violates his right to equal protection guaranteed in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.6 For the reasons stated below, we hold that the District Judge erred in judging appellant's bail application under the Court Reform Act, and we remand for a determination of whether appellant qualifies for release under the Bail Reform Act.7

I

Viewed in the abstract, this case poses a difficult issue of statutory construction as to the application of the bail provisions of the Court Reform Act to national crimes. The Court Reform Act nowhere makes clear whether it is intended to apply to all crimes committed in the District or merely to local offenses, and the legislative history is ambiguous at best. However, the first and most important rule for statutory construction is that laws should not be read in the abstract. Instead, courts approach the task of divining legislative intent with a set of presumptions which, while not irrebuttable, provide at least initial guidance. The first of these presumptions is that legislation duly enacted by Congress is constitutional. A corollary to this basic presumption is the principle that, when one interpretation of a statute would create a substantial doubt as to the statute's constitutional validity, the courts will avoid that interpretation absent a "clear statement" of a contrary legislative intent. When a statute is fairly subject to a variety of interpretations all but one of which would make it unconstitutional, then the courts must presume Congress intended the interpretation which is constitutionally permissible. See, e. g., United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 45, 73 S. Ct. 543, 97 L.Ed. 770 (1953); Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295, 90 S.Ct. 506, 24 L.Ed.2d 532 (1970). Thus if appellee's interpretation of the Court Reform Act would produce an unconstitutional result, there is at least a strong prima facie argument that the interpretation is erroneous.

In order to understand the force of appellant's constitutional objection to the construction of the Court Reform Act adopted by the trial judge, it is necessary to review briefly the background of that legislation. Before 1966, there was apparently no local statutory law governing the standards for bail determinations in the District of Columbia.8 In that year, however, Congress passed the Bail Reform Act which provided a complete set of guidelines for pre- and post-conviction bail determinations in all federal courts. Although the Bail Reform Act appeared on its face to govern all bail determinations in the District, Congress made certain of this result in passing the District of Columbia Bail Agency Act,9 in the same year. Section 10 of the Bail Agency Act stated explicitly that the Bail Reform Act "shall apply to any person detained pursuant to law or charged with an offense in the District of Columbia."10 Thus until 1970 when Congress enacted the Court Reform Act, it was clear that the Bail Reform Act governed all bail determinations for both national and local crimes committed in the District. The 1970 legislation repealed Section 10 of the Bail Agency Act.11 It also instituted a system of pretrial detention for "violent" and "dangerous" defendants12 as well as the stringent standards for post-conviction release which "shall apply in the District of Columbia in lieu of the provisions of the Bail Reform Act."13

Appellant does not, of course, quarrel with the application of the Court Reform Act bail provisions to purely local offenses in the District of Columbia. He points out, however, that the Court Reform Act does not purport to replace the Bail Reform Act as it operates in all federal courts. Therefore, if the Court Reform Act were held to govern bail determinations for national or Title 18, United States Code offenses committed in the District, it would create a special exception to the Bail Reform Act based only on the situs of the crime. If appellant committed the same offense in Maryland and was tried under the same federal statute, his request for bail would be judged under the Bail Reform Act. Yet because the crime was committed across the District boundary, that same request is governed by the harsher Court Reform Act. Such discrimination, appellant argues, is "so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process." See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-642, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). In response, the Government points out that Congress has "complete legislative control over the District of Columbia, for every purpose of government, national as well as local," and that the situation in the District is sui generis since "only in the Nation's capital does the federal government * * * prosecute the full range of common law street crimes of violence."

We do not quarrel with appellee's contention that Congress exercises full plenary power over District affairs, see Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 619, 9 L.Ed. 1181 (1838); O'Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 538-539, 53 S.Ct. 740, 77 L.Ed. 1356 (1933), or that it can use this power to serve national as well as local ends, see Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 429, 5 L.Ed. 257 (1821); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 434-435, 52 S.Ct. 607, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932); Neild v. District of Columbia, 71 App. D.C. 306, 311, 110 F.2d 246, 251 (1940). But these propositions are largely irrelevant to the issue before us. Surely appellee does not mean to contend that because Congress has plenary power in the District it can therefore ignore the Constitution.

Congress' power over the District, like all powers in our system of government, has constitutional limits, and it is the duty of the judiciary to insure that those limits are respected. As President Nixon stated in recommending passage of the Court Reform Act, "The District is a Federal city, but it should not be a Federal colony."14 If there was ever any doubt that the Constitution was fully applicable to District residents, the issue was conclusively settled 70 years ago when the Supreme Court held that "the mere cession of the District of Columbia to the Federal government relinquished the authority of the States, but it did not take it out of the United States or from under the aegis of the Constitution. * * * Indeed, it would have been a fanciful construction to hold that territory which had been once a part of the United States ceased to be such by being ceded directly to the Federal government."15 One of the rights which the Constitution guarantees District residents, in common with all residents of the United States, is the right not to be arbitrarily singled out for special treatment not accorded to others similarly situated. Thus it is no response to contend, as the Government apparently does, that Congress was exercising its "plenary powers" when it created such an irrational classification. See D. C. Federation of Civic Associations, Inc. v. Volpe, 140 U. S.App.D.C. 162, 165, 434 F.2d 436, 439 (1970); Hamilton National Bank of Washington v. District of Columbia, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 109, 115, 176 F.2d 624, 630 (1949).

This is not to argue that Congress lacks the power to pass local laws applicable only to the District, or that such laws may not be different from the laws governing the...

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