United States v. Tinklenberg

• Decision Date: 26 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–1498.,09–1498.
• Citation: 179 L.Ed.2d 1080,131 S.Ct. 2007,563 U.S. 647
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Petitioner, v. Jason Louis TINKLENBERG.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

563 U.S. 647

131 S.Ct. 2007

179 L.Ed.2d 1080

UNITED STATES, Petitioner,

v.Jason Louis TINKLENBERG.

No. 09–1498.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Feb. 22, 2011.

Decided May 26, 2011.

Matthew D. Roberts, Washington, DC, for petitioner.

Jeffrey L. Fisher, Stanford, CA, for respondent.

Justice Kagan recused.

Neal Kumar Katyal, Acting Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for United States.

Jeffrey L. Fisher, Pamela S. Karlan, Stanford Law School, Supreme Court Litigation Clinic, Stanford, CA, Steve S. Nolder, Federal Public Defender, Southern District of Ohio, Kevin M. Schad, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Counsel of Record, Cincinnati, OH, for respondent.

Neal Kumar Katyal, Acting Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Roy W. McLeese III, Acting Deputy Solicitor General, Matthew D. Roberts, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Joseph C. Wyderko, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for United States.

Justice BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., provides that in "any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial ... shall commence within seventy days" from the later of (1) the "filing date" of the information or indictment or (2) the defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer (i.e., the arraignment). § 3161(c)(1). The Act goes on to list a set of exclusions from the 70–day period, including "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion." § 3161(h)(1)(D) (2006 ed., Supp. III) (emphasis added).

The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held in this case that a pretrial motion falls within this exclusion only if it "actually cause[s] a delay, or the expectation of a delay, of trial." 579 F.3d 589, 598 (2009). In our view, however, the statutory exclusion does not contain this kind of causation requirement. Rather, the filing of a pretrial motion falls within this provision irrespective of whether it actually causes, or is expected to cause, delay in starting a trial.

I

Jason Louis Tinklenberg, the respondent, was convicted of violating federal drug and gun laws. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm); 21 U.S.C. § 843(a)(6) (possession of items used to manufacture a controlled substance). He made his initial appearance before a judicial officer on October 31, 2005, and the Speedy Trial clock then began to run. His trial began on August 14, 2006, 287 days later. Just before trial, Tinklenberg asked the District Court to dismiss the indictment on the ground that the trial came too late, violating the Speedy Trial Act's 70–day requirement. The District Court denied the motion after finding that 218 of the 287 days fell within various Speedy Trial Act exclusions, leaving 69 nonexcludable days, thereby making the trial timely.

On appeal the Sixth Circuit agreed with the District Court that many of the 287 days were excludable. But it disagreed with the District Court about the excludability of time related to three pretrial motions. The Government filed the first motion, an unopposed motion to conduct a video deposition of a witness, on August 1, 2006; the District Court disposed of the motion on August 3, 2006. The Government filed the second motion, an unopposed motion to bring seized firearms into the courtroom as evidence at trial, on August 8, 2006; the District Court disposed of the motion on August 10, 2006. Tinklenberg filed the third motion, a motion to dismiss the indictment under the Speedy Trial Act, on August 11, 2006; the District Court denied that motion on August 14, 2006. In the Sixth Circuit's view, the nine days during which the three motions were pending were not excludable because the motions did not "actually cause a delay, or the expectation of delay, of trial." 579 F.3d, at 598. Because these 9 days were sufficient to bring the number of nonexcludable days above 70, the Court of Appeals found a violation of the Act. And given the fact that Tinklenberg had already served his prison sentence, it ordered the District Court to dismiss the indictment with prejudice.

We granted certiorari at the Government's request in order to review the Sixth Circuit's motion-by-motion causation test. We now reverse its determination. But because we agree with the defendant about a subsidiary matter, namely, the exclusion of certain holidays and weekend days during the period in which he was transported for a competency examination, id ., at 597, we affirm the Court of Appeals' ultimate conclusion.

II

A

In relevant part the Speedy Trial Act sets forth a basic rule:

"In any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant ... shall commence within seventy days from [the later of (1) ] the filing date ... of the information or indictment, or ... [ (2) ] the date the defendant has appeared before a judicial officer of the court in which such charge is pending ...." § 3161(c)(1) (2006 ed.).

The Act then says that the "following periods of delay shall be excluded in computing ... the time within which the trial ... must commence." § 3161(h) (2006 ed., Supp. III). It lists seven such "periods of delay."

It describes the first of these seven excludable periods as

"(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant including but not limited to—

"(A) delay resulting from any proceeding ... to determine the mental competency or physical capacity of the defendant;

"(B) delay resulting from trial with respect to other charges ...;

"(C) delay resulting from any interlocutory appeal;

"(D) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion;

"(E) delay resulting from any proceeding relating to the transfer of a case [or defendant] ... from another district ...;

"(F) delay resulting from transportation of any defendant from another district, or to and from places of examination or hospitalization, except that any time consumed in excess of ten days ... shall be presumed to be unreasonable;

"(G) delay resulting from consideration by the court of a proposed plea agreement ...;

"(H) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court." Ibid. (2006 ed. and Supp. III) (emphasis added).

B

The particular provision before us, subparagraph (D), excludes from the Speedy Trial period "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion." § 3161(h)(1)(D). The question is whether this provision stops the Speedy Trial clock from running automatically upon the filing of a pretrial motion irrespective of whether the motion has any impact on when the trial begins. Unlike the Sixth Circuit, we believe the answer to this question is yes.

We begin with the Act's language. The Sixth Circuit based its answer primarily upon that language. It argued that the phrase "delay resulting from," read most naturally, requires a court to apply the exclusion provision only to those "motion[s]" that "actually cause a delay, or the expectation of a delay, of trial." 579 F.3d, at 598. We agree that such a reading is linguistically reasonable, but the Court of Appeals wrote that there "is no conceivable way to read this language other than to require a delay to result from any pretrial motion before excludable time occurs." Ibid . See also ibid . ("[T]he statute is clear"). And here we disagree.

When the Court of Appeals says that its reading is the only way any reasonable person could read this language, it overstates its claim. For one thing, even though the word "delay" ordinarily indicates a postponement, it need not inevitably do so. Compare The American Heritage Dictionary 480 (4th ed.2000) ("[t]o postpone until a later time" or "[t]o cause to be later or slower than expected or desired") with ibid . ("[t]he interval of time between two events"). In any event, terms must be read in their statutory context in order to determine how the provision in question should be applied in an individual case.

Statutory language that describes a particular circumstance, for example, might require a judge to examine each individual case to see if that circumstance is present. But, alternatively, it might ask a judge instead to look at more general matters, such as when a statute requires a judge to increase the sentence of one convicted of a "crime of violence" without requiring the judge to determine whether the particular crime at issue in a particular case was committed in a violent manner. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) ("crime of violence" characterizes the generic crime, not the particular act committed). Similarly a statute that forbids the importation of "wild birds" need not require a court to decide whether a particular parrot is, in fact, wild or domesticated. It may intend to place the entire species within that definition without investigation of the characteristics of an individual specimen. See United States v. Fifty–Three (53) Eclectus Parrots, 685 F.2d 1131, 1137 (C.A.9 1982).

More than that, statutory language can sometimes specify that a set of circumstances exhibits a certain characteristic virtually as a matter of definition and irrespective of how a court may view it in a particular case. A statute that describes "extortion" as a "crime of violence" makes that fact so by definition, without asking a court to second-guess Congress about the matter. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006 ed.) (defining "violent felony" to include extortion for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act).

The statute before us, though more complex, can...