United States v. Toro, Crim. No. 74-121.

Decision Date10 October 1974
Docket NumberCrim. No. 74-121.
Citation383 F. Supp. 397
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Luis Carlos Pineda TORO.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

Carlos Perez Olivo, Hato Rey, P. R., (court appointed), for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

TURK, Judge.

On July 18, 1974, defendant Luis Carlos Pineda Toro was charged in a two-count indictment with violating (1) Title 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) knowingly and intentionally importing one hundred thirteen pounds of marijuana into the United States; and (2) Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1) knowingly and intentionally possessing with intent to distribute one hundred thirteen pounds of marijuana. Defendant was tried from September 30, 1974 until October 2, 1974 before a jury. At the close of the evidence, defendant's court-appointed counsel moved for acquittal pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure; the Court took this motion under advisement and submitted the case to the jury. After extensive deliberations, the jury reported that it was unable to reach a verdict and was therefore discharged. Defense counsel then renewed the motion for acquittal and the government moved that the Court declare a mistrial. The question thus presented is whether defendant is entitled to an acquittal, or otherwise stated, whether the evidence adduced was sufficient as a matter of law to present a jury question as to defendant's guilt or innocence.

In ruling on this motion of acquittal, the role of this Court is similar to that of the appellate court in reviewing a conviction. In both cases the evidence must be viewed in a light most favorable to the government, and the Court may not usurp the province of the jury to determine credibility of witnesses, resolve evidentiary conflicts and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. Although in the case at bar the government's case was based solely on circumstantial evidence, the test to be applied is basically the same as that used in a case involving direct evidence — that is "whether the total evidence, including reasonable inferences, when put together is sufficient to warrant a jury to conclude that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Dirring v. United States, 328 F.2d 512 at 515 (1st Cir. 1964). The test in this case may also be stated in terms of whether jurors could reasonably decide that they would not hesitate to act in their own serious affairs upon factual assumptions as probable as the conclusion that defendant knowingly and intentionally imported the marijuana and possessed it with the intent to distribute it. United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237 (9th Cir. 1969).

Obviously the aforementioned standards do not lend themselves to easy, mechanical application. This is particularly so in the present case as will appear below from a summary of the evidence. The gravity of the decision to be made in this case is, in addition, accentuated by the fact that a decision for the defendant is final with no right to appeal afforded to the government. However, with regard to what has been stated above, the Court believes that the words of Judge Hutcheson in United States v. Riganto, 121 F.Supp. 158 at 160-161 (E.D.Va.1954), remain current and bear repeating here:

"A heavy primary responsibility of safeguarding the fundamental rights of the Government and the accused rests upon the trial court. The appellate court, with only a written record of the trial and the arguments of counsel before it, without an opportunity to weigh the testimony as it falls from the lips of witnesses, may easily fail to comprehend the insignificance of some bit of evidence when considered in relation to the full context, or the converse may be true. The result is that the records on appeal often fail to reflect clearly the nature of facts disclosed at the trial. While the accused has the right to appeal from a conviction and the Government has no such right, it has been repeatedly said that when circumstances make a motion for a directed verdict for the defendant proper, the duty to grant it is equal to the duty to deny the motion when it is not well founded.
The questions presented in many such cases are difficult. There is firmly embedded in the law the principle that the accused is presumed innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt. He may not be found guilty upon speculative theory or conjecture. Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon, as in this case, such evidence should be scrutinized carefully. It must be clear, convincing and inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Until guilt is so proven, the presumption of innocence applies at every stage of the trial."

In light of the above discussion, the Court will recount the pertinent evidence produced at trial. On the morning of July 15, 1974, customs officers boarded the Colombian vessel Tanambi in order to search it. The door to defendant's cabin was found to be locked. They then found defendant on the ship and took him to the cabin. Defendant told the officers that he was the only person with a key to the room; he unlocked the room and accompanied the two customs officers inside. In the cabin the officers noticed two locked compartments — one under defendant's bunk and one in his desk. Defendant stated that he did not know where the keys to these compartments were but after being told that the doors to the locked compartments would be broken open, unless the keys were presented, the defendant searched for them and found the two keys in a drawer. Upon opening the compartment under the bunk, the officers found three packages which were subsequently found to contain marijuana. Defendant opened the desk compartment and removed a fourth package which also contained marijuana. One of the customs officers stated that upon finding the packages, defendant made a statement to the effect that he had economic problems and that he was not paid enough.

The testimony of the officers indicated that a fifth package of marijuana was found in a paint locker on the ship. The fifth package was said to differ from those found in defendant's cabin in that it was wrapped only in plastic. No one was charged with the importation or possession of the fifth package. The customs officers stated that all foreign vessels were routinely searched, however, one of the officers indicated that as a general rule there were more problems with drugs on Colombian vessels. Both officers also stated that the...

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