United States v. Torres-Chavez
| Citation | 744 F.3d 988 |
| Decision Date | 06 March 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–1340.,13–1340. |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Alfonso TORRES–CHAVEZ, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit) |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Stephen P. Baker, Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
William Donald Shaver, Attorney, Law Office of William D. Shaver, Chicago, IL, for Defendant–Appellant.
Before MANION, KANNE, and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
Alfonso Torres–Chavez appeals his convictions on seven felony counts related to his participation in a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. He challenges three decisions by the district court: (1) the admission of testimony from a co-conspirator concerning that co-conspirator's prior uncharged drug-dealing activity with the defendant; (2) the denial of the defendant's motion attacking the sufficiency of the evidence identifying the defendant as the individual recorded on a series of incriminating telephone calls; and (3) the refusal to consider post-verdict statements made by several jurors in subsequent voir dire proceedings concerning their ability to follow the court's instructions. Finding no basis for reversal, we affirm.
Torres–Chavez's jury trial commenced on September 26, 2011. On September 29, the jury returned a guilty verdict, thereby convicting Torres–Chavez on one count of conspiring with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); and three counts of using a cellular telephone to facilitate the distribution conspiracy, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). On February 4, 2013, the district court sentenced Torres–Chavez to a total of 168 months' imprisonment, plus five years of supervised release. On appeal, Torres–Chavez raises three claims relating to the conduct of his trial. We briefly introduce each below.
The government's star witness was Bartolo Lucatero, a coconspirator. Lucatero was charged along with Torres–Chavez, but agreed to cooperate with the government in exchange for leniency. Among other things, Lucatero testified about the trusting nature of his relationship with the defendant in the years leading up to the formation of the charged conspiracy. It was a business relationship founded on a shared history of drug trafficking. Torres–Chavez objected to Lucatero's testimony about prior instances in which Torres–Chavez recruited Lucatero to accompany a truck driver on a trip transporting marijuana from Phoenix to Chicago. He also objected to testimony concerning prior uncharged cocaine transactions in which the two were involved. The district court admitted the evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)(2) for the purpose of establishing the relationship between Lucatero and Torres–Chavez. The court contemporaneously instructed the jury to consider the evidence only for that limited purpose.
At trial, the government played a series of recorded telephone calls to the jury. Torres–Chavez was caught as a part of a larger operation targeting “La Familia,” a drug trafficking cartel based in Michoacán, Mexico, and operating in the Chicago area. Government wiretaps on phones used by one José Gonzalez–Zavala, known in La Familia as “Panda,” captured twenty-six conversations about the cocaine transaction underlying the indictment. Twelve of those conversations were with an individual referred to as “Guero,” whom the government sought to prove was Torres–Chavez. Toward that end, Lucatero identified Torres–Chavez as Guero, and a contract linguist from the Drug Enforcement Agency testified that the voices matched, as did an additional conspirator. Finally, the government sought to connect Guero to an O'Hare Airport flight record under the name “Alfonso Chavez” on the same day Guero told Panda he needed to catch a plane.
On November 4, 2011, several weeks after the verdict was returned, Torres–Chavez filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c)(1). In it, he argued that the evidence was not sufficient to prove that Torres–Chavez was Guero. The district court found that it was.
After returning the guilty verdict in this case, several jurors were placed back into the Northern District jury pool. Five were questioned during voir dire in connection with subsequent trials, particularly concerning whether a defendant's failure to testify in his own defense would influence their deliberative process. Three gave potentially problematic answers, referencing Torres–Chavez's failure to testify in his trial and suggesting that they could not help but draw an adverse inference. The United States Attorney's Office brought these statements to defense counsel's attention, and defense counsel included an allegation of juror bias in his November 4 motion for a judgment of acquittal. The district court found the juror statements inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) and, in the alternative,held that the statements did not show that Torres–Chavez received an unfair trial.
Torres–Chavez believes he is entitled to a new trial for three reasons. First, he argues that the district court erred by admitting Lucatero's testimony describing prior bad acts, because he believes those bad acts were not themselves proved by sufficient evidence. Second, he argues that the district court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal based on the alleged paucity of evidence identifying him as “Guero” on the incriminating telephone calls. Third, he argues that the juror statements gathered from unrelated court proceedings are admissible, and that they prove that the jury in his case was biased. We address the issues sequentially, and we affirm the judgment of the district court.
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) prohibits the admission of evidence of an uncharged crime, wrong, or other act committed by the defendant when it is used to prove the defendant's character and that the defendant acted in accordance with that character on a particular occasion. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)(1). Such evidence may be admissible, however, when it is introduced to prove an issue other than propensity, including but not limited to motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. Fed.R.Evid. 404(b)(2); United States v. Taylor, 522 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir.2008) (). Courts within our circuit use a four-part test to determine whether Rule 404(b) evidence is admissible, asking if (1) the evidence is directed towards establishing a matter other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crimes charged; (2) the other act is similar and close enough in time to be relevant; (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the other act; and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. United States v. Reese, 666 F.3d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir.2012).
At trial, cooperating co-defendant Lucatero testified to prior uncharged drug dealing activity with Torres–Chavez. He testified that Torres–Chavez recruited him to accompany a truck driver (and a truckload of marijuana) on three cross-country trips from Phoenix to Chicago in the spring of 2007, the last of which ended in an interception by law enforcement. Lucatero was questioned when the truck was stopped but did not expose Torres–Chavez, thereby earning the latter's trust for future ventures. Lucatero also testified that he transported and distributed about seven kilograms of cocaine on behalf of Torres–Chavez on three separate occasions thereafter. The district court found the evidence admissible for the purpose of establishing the trusting relationship between Lucatero and the defendant, a contention which Torres–Chavez does not challenge on appeal, and found that the three remaining prongs of the Rule 404(b) test were satisfied. The introduction of the evidence was accompanied by a limiting instruction.
Torres–Chavez argues against the district court's admission of the evidence on narrow grounds. He believes that the third prong of the test, requiring that the evidence be sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the other act, is not satisfied in this case. The question at the trial level was whether the government proved that the other act occurred by a preponderance of the evidence.See United States v. Foster, 652 F.3d 776, 786 (7th Cir.2011). The question at our level is whether it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to conclude that the government did. United States v. Richards, 719 F.3d 746, 758 (7th Cir.2013). That is a difficult standard for Torres–Chavez to meet. “An abuse of discretion occurs when a district court resolves a matter in a way that no reasonable jurist would, or when its decision strikes us as fundamentally wrong, arbitrary or fanciful.” United States v. Purnell, 701 F.3d 1186, 1189 (7th Cir.2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). We ask only whether the district court's analytical process and result fell within the broad bounds of reasonableness. Id.
We find no abuse of discretion on this record. The district court's decision was not only reasonable, it was correct. Lucatero testified as to the nature of each prior drug transaction and as to the involvement of Torres–Chavez therein. Lucatero was an eyewitness. We have said that “it is black letter law that testimony of a single eyewitness suffices for conviction even if 20 bishops testify that the eyewitness is a liar.” Hayes v. Battaglia, 403 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir.2005). If the testimony of a single eyewitness is sufficient evidence to convince a jury that a defendant committed a charged criminal act beyond a...
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