United States v. Torres

• Decision Date: 23 April 2021
• Docket Number: No. 21-50006,21-50006
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Paul Francisco TORRES III, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

995 F.3d 695

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.Paul Francisco TORRES III, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21-50006

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted March 18, 2021 San Francisco, California

Filed April 23, 2021

James H. Locklin (argued), Deputy Federal Public Defender; Cuauhtemoc Ortega, Federal Public Defender; Office of the Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellee.

Bram M. Alden (argued), Acting Chief, Criminal Appeals Section; Andrew M. Roach and JohnPaul LeCedre, Assistant United States Attorneys, General Crimes Section; Tracy L. Wilkison, Acting United States Attorney; United States Attorney's Office, Los Angeles, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Before: Mary H. Murguia and Morgan Christen, Circuit Judges, and Barbara M. G. Lynn,^* District Judge.

MURGUIA, Circuit Judge:

This case raises traditional questions of statutory interpretation and due process that have been complicated by the COVID-19 pandemic. We are asked to determine the limits that federal law and the Constitution place on holding an accused person in detention solely for the purpose of awaiting trial.

The questions presented in this action begin with the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a "speedy and public trial." U.S. Const. amend. VI. To effectuate the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, Congress enacted the Speedy Trial Act of 1974 ("Speedy Trial Act" or the "Act"). Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975). The Speedy Trial Act sets three time limits to ensure timely prosecution of a criminal action: (1) § 3161(b), which requires a defendant be charged with a crime within thirty days of his arrest; (2) § 3161(c), which requires a defendant be tried within seventy days of being charged with a crime; and (3) § 3164, which requires a defendant who is detained solely for the purpose of awaiting trial be released if his trial does not commence within ninety days of continuous detention. The most commonly invoked provisions of the Speedy Trial Act are those that set the time limits within which a defendant must be charged with a crime and brought to trial. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(b), (c). But at issue in this case is the provision regarding defendants who are detained while awaiting trial. See id. § 3164.

To accommodate the need for flexibility in certain cases, specified periods of delay may be excluded in computing time for purposes of each time limit set by the Speedy Trial Act. Id. §§ 3161(h), 3164(b). The Speedy Trial Act provides an enumerated list of delays that may toll the time periods set by the Act. This enumerated list includes the so-called ends-of-justice provision, which excludes "[a]ny period of delay" based on "findings that the ends of justice served" by the delay "outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A) (emphasis added).

Paul Francisco Torres III has been detained awaiting trial since August 26, 2019. His trial has been delayed and his detention prolonged as a result of the district court's findings that the "ends of justice" served by avoiding the serious public health risks presented by holding a trial during the COVID-19 pandemic outweighed Torres's right to a speedy trial. Torres now appeals the district court's denial of his motion for release from pretrial detention. Torres does not dispute that his trial was rightfully delayed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic pursuant to the ends-of-justice provision. Instead, he argues that the district court erred in concluding that because the ends of justice justified delaying his trial, the ends of justice necessarily justified prolonging his pretrial detention. According to Torres, a continuance that results in extending a defendant's pretrial detention requires a "significantly different" ends-of-justice analysis under the Speedy Trial Act. Alternatively, Torres asserts that due process mandates his release because the length of his pretrial detention exceeds the limits of what due process can tolerate.

We hold that Torres's pretrial detention is consistent with the Speedy Trial Act. This holding is two-fold. First, we conclude that because the plain text of § 3161(h)(7) requires consideration of the best interest of the defendant in a speedy trial, an ends-of-justice analysis will necessarily include consideration of whether the defendant is detained. See United States v. Olsen , 995 F.3d 683, 691–92, No. 20-50329 (9th Cir. 2021). Second, we conclude that § 3164(b) unambiguously provides that time properly excluded under § 3161(h) is properly excluded from § 3164. Because the record suggests that the district court considered Torres's detention in granting the ends-of-justice continuances here, Torres's pretrial detention was properly tolled under the Speedy Trial Act. We further conclude that due process does not yet require Torres's release, but observe that the length of Torres's pretrial detention is likely approaching the outer bounds of due process.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On June 7, 2019, Torres was involved in a traffic stop. At the time of the stop, Torres was subject to post-release supervision with conditions permitting a warrantless search, and he had an outstanding arrest warrant for failing to report, in violation of his probation. A search of Torres and his belongings revealed two rounds of ammunition and approximately forty-six grams of methamphetamine. Torres was taken to the police station, where he was Mirandized and subsequently admitted to possessing the methamphetamine. Torres was indicted on federal charges for possession with intent to distribute approximately forty-six grams of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B)(viii), and being a felon in possession of ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Prior to his arrest in this case, Torres had been convicted of five felonies: possession of marijuana for sale in 2002, assault with a deadly weapon in 2006, prisoner in possession of a weapon in 2007, possession of a controlled substance in 2013, and possession of brass knuckles in 2015. As a result of Torres's criminal history, he faces a mandatory minimum sentence of five years if convicted. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii).

Torres made his first appearance in court for the instant charges on August 26, 2019. Because Torres was charged with a controlled substance offense for which the maximum term of imprisonment exceeded ten years, he was required under the Bail Reform Act to rebut the presumption that no bail conditions would reasonably assure his appearance at court hearings and the safety of the community. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(3)(A). The presiding magistrate judge found that Torres failed to rebut the presumption. She reasoned that there was a high likelihood Torres would fail to appear on account of his apparent substance abuse, and that his prior convictions indicated a danger to the community if Torres were released. Torres was ordered detained pending trial, which was set for October 22, 2019.

On October 3, 2019, the parties stipulated to continue the trial date to February 11, 2020, due to scheduling conflicts for Torres's counsel. The district court granted the continuance on October 4, 2019. On December 11, 2019, the parties again stipulated to continue the trial date to April 7, 2020, due to additional scheduling conflicts; the district court granted the stipulation the same day. The parties further stipulated that the time from October 22, 2019, to April 7, 2020, was excludable time pursuant to the "ends-of-justice" provision of Speedy Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7).

On March 13, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Central District of California issued a general order suspending jury selection and jury trials. See C.D. Cal. General Order No. 20-02. A subsequent order—extending the suspension of jury trials after a significant increase in COVID-19 infections, hospitalizations, and deaths—reasoned that conducting jury trials would likely "place prospective jurors, defendant[s], attorneys, and court personnel at unnecessary risk. Therefore, ... suspending criminal jury trials in the Central District of California ... serves the ends of justice and outweigh[s] the interests of the public and the defendants in a speedy trial." See C.D. Cal. General Order No. 20-09. The COVID-19 pandemic and related court closures have resulted in five continuances of Torres's trial. Torres did not oppose the first two, which together continued Torres's trial from April 7, 2020, to July 7, 2020. The district court also found this time excludable pursuant to the ends-of-justice provision of the Speedy Trial Act.

Torres did, however, oppose the next three continuances, which the government sought on June 3, 2020, August 14, 2020, and October 20, 2020. The district court granted each continuance, concluding that it could not summon jurors into the courthouse to hold a trial pursuant to the general orders suspending jury trials to prevent the spread of COVID-19. These three continuances—granted pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act's ends-of-justice provision—continued Torres's trial from July 7, 2020, to February 16, 2021. The district court has since granted another continuance, over Torres's objection, moving Torres's trial date to May 25, 2021.

Torres began pursuing his release from pretrial detention in June 2020, after the district court granted the third COVID-related continuance—which was the first continuance Torres opposed. Torres received a detention-review hearing before the Magistrate Judge in which Torres argued that he had a new surety to secure his release under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c) and that the intervening pandemic had resulted in undue delay of his trial. The Magistrate Judge denied Torres's request, reasoning that although she "feel[s] for the defendant," there was "just not enough change in circumstances" to warrant overturning the court's previous finding that the presumption against...