United States v. Townsel
| Decision Date | 06 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:16-CR-20084,2:16-CR-20084 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. JOSHUA TOWNSEL, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
Before the Court is Defendant Joshua Townsel's Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed on July 20, 2016. (Mot. to Suppress Evidence and Incorporated Mem. in Supp., ECF No. 21 ("Mot. to Suppress").) The United States (the "Government") responded in opposition on August 3, 2016. (U.S. Resp. to Mot. to Suppress Evidence, ECF No. 26 ("Resp. to Mot. to Suppress").) On September 8, 2016, United States Magistrate Judge Diane K. Vescovo issued her Report and Recommendation on Defendant's Motion to Suppress (ECF No. 32 ("Report")), recommending that the Motion to Suppress be granted.
On September 22, 2016, the Government filed objections to the Report. (Gov't Objs. to the R. & R. of the Magistrate, ECF No. 43 ("Gov't Objs.").) Townsel filed a response to the Government's objections on October 20, 2016. (Def.'s Resp. to Gov't Objs. to R. & R., ECF No. 47 ("Resp. to Gov't Objs.").) The Government filed a reply in support of its objections on November 4, 2016. (Gov't's Reply to the Def.'s Resp. to the Gov't's Objs. to the R. & R. of the Magistrate, ECF No. 51 ("Reply ISO Gov't Objs.").)
The Magistrate Judge's Report is ADOPTED, and the Motion to Suppress is GRANTED.
On January 7, 2016, two Memphis Police Department ("MPD") officers, Eric Jones ("Jones") and Tony Brown ("Brown") conducted a traffic stop of Townsel. (See, e.g., August 29, 2016 Hr'g Tr. 9, 15 ("Hr'g Tr.").) The officers based the stop on a purported seatbelt-law violation. (See, e.g., id. at 11-15.) The stop culminated in Jones's finding a Glock 10mm pistol under the driver's seat of Townsel's vehicle. (See, e.g., id. at 26-28.)
On April 27, 2016, a federal grand jury returned a one-count indictment against Townsel. (Indictment, ECF No. 1.) Count 1 charged Townsel, a convicted felon, with possessing the Glock pistol on or about January 7, 2016, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). (Id.)
On July 20, 2016, Townsel filed the Motion to Suppress. Townsel argues that the Court should suppress all evidence of the firearm found during the traffic stop. (See generally Mot.to Suppress.) On July 20, 2016, the Court referred the Motion to Suppress to Magistrate Judge Vescovo for a report and recommendation. (Order of Reference, ECF No. 22.) On August 3, 2016, the Government filed its Response to Motion to Suppress. (ECF No. 26.)
The Magistrate Judge held a hearing on the Motion to Suppress on August 29, 2016. (See generally August 29, 2016 Hr'g Tr. ("Hr'g Tr.").) At the hearing, the Government presented two witnesses: Jones and Brown. (See, e.g., id. at 8, 77.) Townsel presented one witness: Michael Pryor ("Pryor"), an investigator for the Office of the Federal Public Defender. (Id. at 104.) The Report summarizes the hearing testimony. (Report 4-8 (Jones's testimony); id. at 8-10 (Brown's testimony); id. at 10 (Pryor's testimony).)1 The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court grant the Motion to Suppress. (Report 24.)
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 636 to relieve the burden on the federal judiciary by permitting the assignment of district-court duties to magistrate judges. See United States v. Curtis, 237 F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Gomez v. UnitedStates, 490 U.S. 858, 869-70 (1989)); see also Baker v. Peterson, 67 F. App'x 308, 310 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Curtis, 237 F.3d at 602). "The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). After reviewing the evidence, the court is free to accept, reject, or modify the magistrate judge's proposed findings or recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The district court need not review, under a de novo or any other standard, those aspects of the report and recommendation to which no objection is made. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-52 (1985). The district court should adopt the magistrate judge's findings and rulings to which no specific objection is filed. Id.
Certain of the Government's objections to the Report address the Magistrate Judge's credibility determinations. When a magistrate judge's findings and recommendations rest on evaluations of witness credibility, the district court need not rehear the testimony to conduct a de novo determination of the issues. United States v. Johnson, No. 10-20176, 2011 WL 3844194 at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 30, 2011) (quoting United States v. Bermudez, Case No. 99-6097, 2000 WL 1871676, at *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2000)). "'When reviewing a magistrate judge's credibility determinations on a motion to suppress, the districtcourt may accept or reject the magistrate judge's determinations, while recognizing a magistrate judge is in the better position to assess the credibility of witnesses [she] sees and hears.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, No. 1:07-CR-01, 2007 WL 2138635, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. July 23, 2007)). "'Credibility determinations of the magistrate judge who personally listened to the testimony of a witness should be accepted by a district judge unless in his de novo review of the record he finds a reason to question the magistrate judge's assessment.'" Id. (quoting Robinson, 2007 WL 2138635, at *1).
The Government objects to several findings of the Report. First, it "objects to the finding that . . . Jones did not have probable cause to conduct the traffic stop of Townsel's car for a seatbelt violation." (Gov't Objs. 2.) Second, it "objects to the finding that the officers did not conduct a lawful inventory of Townsel's car." (Id. at 6.) Third, the Government "objects to the finding that the officers did not have probable cause to search Townsel's car under the automobile exception." (Id. at 8.) The Government also argues that, "[e]ven if this Court finds that the automobile exception does not apply, since the inventory of Townsel's car was lawful, . . . the [MPD] officers would have inevitably discovered the Glock 10mm after Townsel'scar had been towed and inventoried." (Id. at 9 (citing United States v. Bah, 794 F.3d 617, 624-25 (6th Cir. 2015).)
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. A traffic stop is a "seizure" for Fourth Amendment purposes. See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996) (citing cases); United States v. Dean, --- F. App'x ---, 2016 WL 5219879, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 22, 2016) (citing United States v. Jackson, 682 F.3d 448, 452 (6th Cir. 2012)).
In the Sixth Circuit, when police assert that a traffic violation justifies a traffic stop, the standard for assessing the stop depends on whether the claimed violation has been completed or is ongoing. When the asserted violation has been completed, the probable-cause standard applies. The officers must have probable cause to believe that the violation occurred. See, e.g., Dean, 2016 WL 5219879, at *2; United States v. Collazo, 818 F.3d 247, 253 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Blair, 524 F.3d 740, 748 (6th Cir. 2008)). When the police justify a traffic stop based on an ongoing offense, the reasonable-suspicion standard applies. The officers must have a reasonable suspicion that the violation is occurring. See, e.g., Dean, 2016 WL 5219879, at *2; Collazo, 818 F.3d at 253-54 (quoting Blair, 524 F.3d at 748). In this case, MPD officersjustified Townsel's traffic stop based on an ongoing violation: failure to wear a seatbelt, in violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-9-603(a)(1).2 (See, e.g., Resp. to Mot. to Suppress 3.) The reasonable-suspicion standard applies.
To justify a traffic stop under the reasonable-suspicion standard, "'the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the stop].'" United States v. Alexander, 528 F. App'x 515, 518 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). "Courts judge those facts by an objective reasonableness standard; an 'inarticulate hunch' does not constitute a reasonable suspicion." Id. at 518-19 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22). A court must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether an officer had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981); United States v. Richardson, 385 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir.2004). Courts use a commonsense approach to consider evidence offered in support of reasonable suspicion. Richardson, 385 F.3d at 630 (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417-18).3
Because the police officers did not have a warrant before conducting the traffic stop, the Government has the burden of proving the traffic stop was valid. See, e.g., United States v. Torbert, No. 1:15-CR-114, 2016 WL 4920741, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 2016) (quoting United States v. Haynes, 301 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2002)); United States v. Davis, 565 F. Supp. 2d 841, 850 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (citing United States v. Herndon, 501 F.3d 683, 692 (6th Cir. 2007)). The Government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the MPD officers had a reasonable suspicion that Townsel was committing a seatbelt violation. See, e.g., United States v. Torres-Ramos, 536 F.3d 542, 552 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ruiz, 832 F. Supp. 2d 903, 914 (M.D. Tenn. 2011) (citing cases).
Much of the Government's objection to the Magistrate Judge's reasonable-suspicion finding reiterates the testimony ofJones, who initiated the traffic stop.4 (See, e.g., Gov't Objs. 2-4.) The gravamen of the argument is that Jones's suppression-hearing testimony was credible and that he had a reasonable suspicion that Townsel was committing a seatbelt violation. After reviewing the suppression-hearing testimony and exhibits, the Court has no independent reason to...
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