United States v. Townsend

• Decision Date: 01 March 2021
• Docket Number: Case Number 19-20840
• Parties: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ASHLEY TOWNSEND, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. ASHLEY TOWNSEND, Defendant.

Case Number 19-20840

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

March 1, 2021

Honorable David M. Lawson

CORRECTED OPINION AND ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION TO ACCEPT PLEA AGREEMENT

In the summer of last year, in the midst of a global pandemic that closed the courthouses in this district and halted jury trials for months, the United States Attorney adopted a policy that radically altered customary local practice by requiring as a condition of all plea agreements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c) that every defendant waive all rights to appeal any aspect of the proceedings and forfeit most post-conviction rights. The government seeks to apply this stringent policy in the present case, in which it charged the defendant with a constellation of crimes that will mandate a minimum prison sentence of 20 years if the defendant is convicted on all counts. The Court expressed concern over the blanket appeal waivers, which serve to embargo consequential judicial and advocate mistakes and to insulate the government's conduct from judicial oversight, and advised that it was not inclined to accept the plea agreement as contrary to the interests of justice. In response, the parties presented a joint motion to accept a proposed plea agreement in which the government would dismiss charges and penalty enhancements, thereby reducing the mandatory minimum prison sentence to 10 years (although it intends to recommend a sentence of 25 years). However, the government has failed to identify any discernible substantial criminal justice interest that is achieved by the overly broad waivers on which it insists. And the waivers as framed are contrary to the public interest in the fair administration of justice, because they purport entirely to insulate the conduct of the executive branch in this prosecution from any form of judicial review, consistent with the practice adopted by the Department of Justice's former leadership of resisting all reasonable oversight by a concomitant branch of government. The motion will be denied.

I.

Ashley Townsend is charged in a four-count superseding indictment with a violation of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") (Count One), two counts of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances (Counts Two and Three), and one count of possessing firearms in furtherance of the crimes charged in Counts Two and Three (Count Four). Three of those charges subject Townsend to mandatory prison sentences. The ACCA charge carries a mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years. One of the two drug charges (Count Three) normally would carry a mandatory minimum sentence of five years, but because the government has filed a prior felony information under 21 U.S.C. § 851, that minimum sentence is doubled to ten years. Finally, Count Four carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years, which must run consecutively to any other sentences imposed. Altogether, if Townsend were convicted at trial on all charges, he would face a minimum aggregate prison term of 20 years. His maximum exposure is life in prison.

The parties have presented a proposed plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) in which Townsend agrees to plead guilty to Counts Three and Four, and the government agrees to dismiss Counts One and Two and withdraw the prior felony information. The agreement thus lowers the effective mandatory minimum term for the remaining charges to an aggregate of 10 years. The agreement also states the parties' concurrence thatTownsend is classified as a career offender within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a), and the government's recommendation that the total sentence imposed should not exceed 25 years.

The agreement includes broad waivers of the defendant's rights to challenge his convictions and sentences by direct appeal and on collateral review. The waivers state as follows:

12. Appeal Waiver. The defendant waives any right he may have to appeal his conviction on any grounds. If the defendant's sentence of imprisonment does not exceed 300 months, the defendant also waives any right he may have to appeal his sentence on any grounds.

13. Collateral Review Waiver. The defendant retains the right to raise claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, as long as the defendant properly raises those claims by collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The defendant also retains the right to pursue any relief permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), as long as the defendant properly files a motion under that section. The defendant, however, waives any other right he may have to challenge his conviction or sentence by collateral review, including, but not limited to, any right he may have to challenge his conviction or sentence on any grounds under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 or 60.

Proposed Plea Agrmt., ECF No. 36-3, PageID.149-50. The Court has not discussed the proposed plea agreement with the parties, other than expressing concern on the record over the appeal waiver provisions. Nor has the Court discussed the charges, the strength of the government's evidence, or any other aspect of the case. The trial has been adjourned due to the pandemic that has closed the courthouses in this district since last March and has curtailed in-person proceedings since then.

The parties argue in their joint motion that (1) although the Court has discretion to accept or reject a plea agreement, it must articulate "sound reasons" for rejection, which may not be premised merely on blanket disapproval of certain types of provisions, (2) rejection of the agreement would comprise improper judicial participation in plea bargaining, due to the Court's expressed disapproval of certain terms, which effectively amounts to a judicial imperative to rewrite those terms, (3) the defendant would suffer "extreme prejudice" if the agreement is rejected because he would be forced to proceed to trial facing double the mandatory sentence that he wouldotherwise, and (4) it is well settled in this Circuit that appellate waivers are valid and enforceable, and the "finality" afforded by the waiver here is reasonable consideration for the concessions that the government has offered by agreeing to dismiss charges with substantial additional penalties.

Because of the questionable validity of some of these arguments, and in the absence of adversarial testing due to the joint nature of the motion, the Court appointed the Honorable John Gleeson, retired United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York, to file a response as amicus curiae. Judge Gleeson has performed admirably, and the Court thanks him for his work.

II.

When a plea agreement contemplates dismissal of charges, it is governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A), which states that, upon consideration, the Court "may accept the agreement, reject it, or defer a decision until [it] has reviewed the presentence report." Rule 11 sets forth specific procedures and requirements for receiving and evaluating guilty pleas. But it "does not establish criteria to guide a district court's discretion with respect to accepting or rejecting a plea agreement." United States v. Walker, 922 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 2019), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, Walker v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 474 (2019). A criminal defendant "has no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted." United States v. Moore, 916 F.2d 1131, 1135-36 (6th Cir. 1990). But the "court must exercise sound discretion in determining whether or not to reject a plea." Ibid. A defendant undoubtedly has a right "to plead guilty," and "the district court [must] articulate a sound reason for rejecting the plea." Ibid.

Beyond a guilty plea itself, however, it is well established that "district courts have broad discretion in deciding whether or not to accept a plea agreement," as the parties acknowledge. Id. at 1135 (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)). That discretion, of course, isnot unbridled. Instead, when considering whether to accept or reject a plea agreement, the district court must reach a "rational decision" based on "all relevant factors." United States v. Cota-Luna, 891 F.3d 639, 648 (6th Cir. 2018). And it is generally held that "district courts 'must set forth, on the record, both the prosecutor's reasons for framing the [charge] bargain as he did and the court's justification for rejecting the bargain.'" Moore, 916 F.2d at 1136 (quoting United States v. Miller, 722 F.2d 562, 566 (9th Cir. 1983)); see also Walker, 922 F.3d at 249 ("To ensure the existence of sound reasons for rejection of a plea agreement, and to facilitate appellate review, the rejection and its justification should be on the record.").

First and foremost among the relevant factors, the court must "weigh whether the plea agreement is in the public interest." Walker, 922 F.3d at 250 (citing In re Morgan, 506 F.3d 705, 712 (9th Cir. 2007); see also Moore, 916 F.2d at 1136 (holding that the district court "may reject a plea 'if [it] has reasonable grounds for believing that acceptance of the plea would be contrary to the sound administration of justice'") (quoting United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 46 (2d Cir.1986)). That assessment "should be predicated on the circumstances of the case," Ibid., and not a conceptual antipathy to plea bargaining in general.

A.

The proposed plea agreement in this case contains broad and comprehensive waivers of the traditional rights to appeal convictions and sentences, and waivers of the right to collateral review on most grounds. Under the circumstances of this case, those provisions are contrary to the sound administration of justice.

A defendant may waive his right to appeal by means of a plea agreement. United States v. Smith, 960 F.3d 883, 886 (6th Cir. 2020). The scope of permissible...