United States v. Le Tran
| Decision Date | 20 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-CV-03484-LHK,Case No. 98-CR-20060-LHK-1 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. NHAN LE TRAN, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Re: Dkt. No. 1156 (98-CR-20060-LHK-1)1
Re: Dkt. No. 1 (16-CV-03484-LHK)
Before the Court is a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by Defendant Nhan Le Tran ("Defendant"). Having considered the parties' briefing, the record in this case, and the relevant law, the Court GRANTS Defendant's § 2255 motion.
The instant criminal case was initially assigned to U.S. District Judge James Ware. On May 1, 2001, after a six-week jury trial, Defendant was convicted of (1) conspiracy to commitoffenses against the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 by conspiring to transport stolen goods in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (Count One of the Superseding Indictment); (2) conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (Count Two of the Superseding Indictment); and (3) using a firearm in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Three of the Superseding Indictment). ECF No. 621; see ECF No. 537 (Superseding Indictment). Defendant's § 924(c) conviction under Count Three was premised on the theory that (1) Defendant's conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery offense (under Count Two) constitutes a "crime of violence" within the meaning of § 924(c); and therefore (2) Defendant's use of a firearm in relation to that crime of violence violated § 924(c). See ECF No. 537 at 7. On June 10, 2003, Judge Ware sentenced Defendant to 60 months of imprisonment on Count One, 202 months of imprisonment on Count Two, and 60 months on Count Three, with all counts to run consecutively for a total prison sentence of 322 months. ECF No. 863. Judge Ware also sentenced Defendant to three years of supervised release following his term of imprisonment. Id.
Defendant appealed his sentence. ECF No. 862. In his appeal, Defendant argued that (1) the sentencing enhancements imposed against him were unconstitutional in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); and (2) that his criminal history category was calculated incorrectly at sentencing. See United States v. Tran, 111 F. App'x 496, 497 (9th Cir. 2004). The government conceded on appeal that Defendant's criminal history had been calculated incorrectly at sentencing. Id. As a result, on October 7, 2004, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion vacating Defendant's sentence and remanding for resentencing. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit "decline[d] to consider" Defendant's argument that "his sentencing enhancements [were] unconstitutional in light of Blakely." Id.
Judge Ware resentenced Defendant on August 22, 2005. See ECF No. 1022. At resentencing, Defendant was sentenced to 60 months of imprisonment on Count One and 212 months of imprisonment on Count Two, to run concurrently, and 60 months of imprisonment onCount Three to run "consecutive to the total term imposed on Counts 1 and 2," for a total prison sentence of 272 months. ECF No. 1022. Judge Ware once again sentenced Defendant to three years of supervised release following his term of imprisonment. Id.
Defendant appealed the sentence imposed at resentencing. See ECF No. 1024. In his appeal, Defendant argued that Judge Ware "failed to consider the relevant mitigating factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." United States v. Tran, 200 F. App'x 674, 674 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit rejected Defendant's argument and affirmed his sentence. Id.
On June 22, 2016, Defendant filed the instant motion to vacate pursuant to § 2255. ECF No. 1156 ("Mot."). In his motion, Defendant argues that in light of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), Defendant's conviction under Count Three for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was invalid, and thus Defendant's sentence must be vacated and Defendant must be resentenced. See id. at 1. Because Judge Ware had retired in 2012, the instant case was reassigned to the undersigned judge on June 23, 2016. ECF No. 1159. The government opposed Defendant's § 2255 motion on September 12, 2016, ECF No. 1179 ("Opp."), and Defendant filed a reply on October 25, 2016. ECF No. 1190 ("Reply").
On April 17, 2018, the Court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing regarding the impact, if any, of the U.S. Supreme Court's April 17, 2018 decision in Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. 1204 (2018), on the validity of Defendant's conviction under Count Three for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). ECF No. 1204. On May 8, 2018, Defendant filed a supplemental brief. ECF No. 1209 ("Suppl."). The government filed a supplemental opposition brief on May 29, 2018, ECF No. 1212 ( ), and Defendant filed a supplemental reply brief on June 12, 2018. ECF No. 1214 ( ).
Defendant moves to vacate his sentence on the ground that, based on the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Johnson, Defendant's conviction under Count Three for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was invalid. Mot. at 1. Section 924(c) operates to increase the sentence for a defendantwho uses, carries, or possesses a firearm in the commission of certain underlying crimes—specifically, "crimes of violence" or drug trafficking crimes. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). As discussed above, Defendant's § 924(c) conviction under Count Three was premised on the theory that Defendant's conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery conviction (under Count Two) qualifies as a "crime of violence" within the meaning of § 924(c), and thus Defendant's use of a firearm in relation to that crime of violence violated § 924(c). See ECF No. 537 at 7. As a result, the key question here is whether Defendant's conviction under Count Two for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery qualifies as a "crime of violence." Section 924(c)(3) provides the definition:
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). Subsection (A) is commonly referred to as the "elements clause," and subsection (B) is known as the "residual clause." The Court employs that terminology here.
Defendant argues that his conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery conviction under Count Two is not a "crime of violence," for the following two reasons. First, Defendant contends that his conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery conviction does not satisfy the elements clause. Mot. at 8-9; Suppl. at 4-5. Next, Defendant contends that even if his conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery conviction satisfies the residual clause, Johnson (and now Dimaya) make clear that the residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. Mot. at 4-8; Suppl. at 3-4. The government disagrees with both of Defendant's arguments, and also asserts that Defendant "is procedurally barred" from raising a Johnson-based void-for-vagueness challenge to § 924(c)'s residual clause in his § 2255 motion "because he failed to raise it on direct appeal." Opp. at 3-6.
Because certain aspects of the government's procedural bar argument turn on or areinformed by the merits issues raised in Defendant's § 2255 motion, the Court will address the merits first. See Bolar v. United States, 2017 WL 1543166, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2017) (). Specifically, the Court will first address whether Defendant's conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery conviction under Count Two satisfies § 924(c)'s elements clause. Then, the Court discusses whether, in light of Johnson and Dimaya, § 924(c)'s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. Finally, the Court addresses the government's procedural bar argument.
Defendant argues that his conviction under Count Two for conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) does not satisfy the elements clause of § 924(c). In deciding whether this offense is a "crime of violence" under the elements clause, the Court employs an analytical method called the categorical approach. See United States v. Piccolo, 441 F.3d 1084, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 2006) (); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600-02 (1990). Under the categorical approach, the particular facts of the defendant's case do not matter; instead, the Court examines the elements of the offense. United States v. Dominguez-Maroyoqui, 748 F.3d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 2014). Specifically, the Court compares the elements of the offense with the generic federal definition—here, the definition of "crime of violence" set forth in the elements clause. See United States v. Sahagun-Gallegos, 782 F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2015). The offense is a categorical match if its elements are "the same as, or narrower than, those of" the elements clause. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). In contrast, if the offense covers a"broader swath of conduct than" the elements clause, there is no categorical match. See id.2
As noted above, the elements clause covers any felony offense that "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." Neither party disputes that the...
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