United States v. Trant, 051519 FED3, 18-3199
| Opinion Judge | SMITH, CHIEF JUDGE. |
| Party Name | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. REHELIO D. TRANT, Appellant |
| Attorney | Gretchen C.F. Shappert Sigrid M. Tejo-Sprotte [ARGUED] Office of United States Attorney Counsel for Appellee Omodare B. Jupiter Office of the Federal Public Defender Melanie Turnbull [ARGUED] Gabriel J. Villegas Office of Federal Public Defender Counsel for Appellant |
| Judge Panel | Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges |
| Case Date | May 15, 2019 |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Argued April 8, 2019
On Appeal from the District Court of the Virgin Islands District Court No. 3-18-cr-00004-001 District Judge: The Honorable Curtis V. Gomez
Gretchen C.F. Shappert Sigrid M. Tejo-Sprotte [ARGUED] Office of United States Attorney Counsel for Appellee
Omodare B. Jupiter Office of the Federal Public Defender Melanie Turnbull [ARGUED] Gabriel J. Villegas Office of Federal Public Defender Counsel for Appellant
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, JORDAN, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges
OPINION OF THE COURT
SMITH, CHIEF JUDGE.
One evening on St. Thomas, in the U.S. Virgin Islands (the V.I.), a minor dispute between two men over the use of a can opener escalated into each man menacingly showing the other his pistol. After law enforcement officers looked into these events, a federal grand jury charged one of them, Rehelio Trant, with being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Trant proceeded to trial and a jury found him guilty. On appeal, Trant argues that his conviction should be vacated because the District Court impermissibly allowed the Government to reopen its case-in-chief and also made two evidentiary errors. Trant also contends that the record contains insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Concluding that none of Trant's challenges have merit, we will affirm the judgment.
I.1
In the fall of 2017, Rehelio Trant and Jimez Ashby had a heated encounter at a gas station in Bovoni, St. Thomas, that ended with each displaying his pistol to the other. Trant wanted to use a can opener inside the gas station, but Ashby was at a counter and in his way. Trant asked Ashby to move, but Ashby did not hear him. Trant then yelled his request in Ashby's ear. Although Ashby complied, he admonished Trant for screaming at him. The encounter seemed to have ended when the two men shook hands and Trant exited the store. Yet Trant signaled Ashby to join him outside. When Ashby did so, a breeze blew hard enough against Trant that Ashby, standing less than a car's length away, was able to see Trant's waistband tighten and the imprint of a gun against his body. Ashby immediately brandished his firearm and backed away. Then standing "a little more than a car length" from Ashby, Trant lifted up his shirt and revealed a gun in his waistband. (App. 61.) Just then, a woman walked between the two men, and Trant left the gas station. Ashby quickly called the police to report the incident.
Several months later, a federal grand jury charged Trant with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Before trial, the Government and Trant stipulated that he had a prior felony conviction. In addition, Trant filed a motion in limine seeking the Court's permission to inquire into "Ashby's unlawful possession of two firearms for impeachment purposes which are probative of his character for untruthfulness." (App. 24-25.) The District Court deferred ruling on this motion until trial.
At trial, the Government's case included the testimony of Ashby and Sergeant Bernard Burke, the Supervisor of the Virgin Islands Police Department's Firearms Unit. Ashby described his encounter with Trant, and added that the light "was good" when he saw both the imprint of a gun in Trant's waistband and Trant lift his shirt to expose the gun. (App. 60, 76-77.) On cross examination, Ashby testified that he knew the imprint in Trant's waistband was of a gun and recalled telling the police that Trant's firearm "look[ed] like a Glock"- a gun that Ashby said resembled his own Glock pistol. (App. 71.) Trant's counsel attempted to ask Ashby three questions about the unlawfulness of his possession of a firearm at the time of the altercation with Trant, but the District Court sustained, apparently under Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 609, the Government's objections to these questions.[2] The Government then called Sergeant Burke to testify that there are no firearm manufacturing facilities within the territorial boundaries of the V.I. After that, the Government rested its case.
Next, Trant moved under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a) for a judgment of acquittal. The District Court, noting that the trial record lacked evidence that Trant was a convicted felon (a requirement for conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), see United States v. Foster, 891 F.3d 93, 111 (3d Cir. 2018)), asked the prosecutor about the missing evidence to support this "essential element." (App. 84.) She responded that she had forgotten to move the admission of the stipulation of Trant's prior felony conviction. The prosecutor then incorrectly asserted that she had "asked the Court prior to the jury coming in to address [the stipulation] and to inquire as to when that stipulation would be presented to the jury." 3 (App. 85.) This left the Government with no alternative but to move to reopen its case-in-chief. In support of its motion, the prosecutor argued that the Court should grant the motion because Trant would not suffer any prejudice from the admission of the stipulation. Trant objected but offered no reason why the Court should deny the motion other than that "it's too late" and "[t]he [G]overnment has rested." (App. 88.)
The District Court granted the Government's motion to reopen. After the stipulation was admitted into evidence, the Government again rested. Trant, not presenting any evidence of his own, also rested.
The jury found Trant guilty of violating § 922(g)(1), and Trant was later sentenced to 71 months' imprisonment and three years of supervised release. Trant timely appealed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a), and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
III.
On appeal, Trant raises three issues. He contends that the District Court erred by granting the Government's motion to reopen its case-in-chief and by restricting his cross examination of Ashby. Trant also asserts that the record lacks the necessary evidence to support his conviction. We reject each of his challenges.
A.
Trant argues that the District Court impermissibly granted the Government's motion to reopen because the Government lacked a reasonable explanation for failing to present the stipulation during its case-in-chief. Trant adds that "the [G]overnment added insult to injury by misrepresenting what had occurred." (Trant's Br. at 21.) He further contends that our review of the District Court's ruling should "end" with the Government's inadequate justification for failing to move the stipulation into evidence because, he implies, a reasonable explanation was necessary for reopening. (Id. at 22.) Alternatively, Trant asserts that the Court abused its discretion by granting the motion because he was prejudiced by the reopening-i.e., he lost the opportunity to be acquitted based on the Government's failure to prove that he is a convicted felon.
1.
There is scarce authority in our circuit on the standard governing this Court's review of a ruling on a motion to reopen the Government's case-in-chief during a criminal trial. We therefore take this opportunity to clarify and build upon our case law.4 When considering a party's motion to reopen its case at trial, "'the district court's primary focus should be on whether the party opposing reopening would be prejudiced if reopening is permitted.'" United States v. Coward, 296 F.3d 176, 181 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213, 220 (3d Cir. 2000)) (explaining how district courts should approach ruling on motions to reopen a suppression hearing). As in the suppression context, two principal considerations for the district court's inquiry are the timing of the moving party's request to reopen (whether, if the motion is granted, the opposing party will have a reasonable opportunity to rebut the moving party's new evidence) and "the effect of the granting of the motion" (whether granting the motion will cause substantial disruption to the proceedings or result in the new evidence taking on "distorted importance"). Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, district courts should assess the reasonableness of the moving party's explanation for failing to introduce the desired evidence before resting and whether the new evidence is admissible and has probative value. See id.
In adopting this standard, we join eight other circuits that have issued essentially the same guidance on how district courts should approach deciding motions to reopen at trial. See United States v. Martinez, 872 F.3d 293, 298-99 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Orozco, 764 F.3d 997, 1001 (9th Cir. 2014); United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 247-48 (2d Cir. 2010); United States v. Nunez, 432 F.3d 573, 579 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Byrd, 403 F.3d 1278, 1283- 88 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Peterson, 233 F.3d 101, 106 (1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 741 (6th Cir. 1985); United States v. Larson, 596 F.2d 759, 778 (8th Cir. 1979).
Although we have announced the standard governing motions to reopen at trial by referring to our suppression-hearing case law, our statement that "'courts should be extremely reluctant to grant reopenings, '" Coward, 296 F.3d at 180 (quoting Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 219 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)), does not apply to a district court's consideration of a motion to reopen at trial. Both Coward and Kithcart explained that this restraint on reopening applies to motions to reopen a suppression hearing. See id.;
Kithcart, 218 F.3d at 219-20. We conclude that any such caution...
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