United States v. Trotter
| Decision Date | 28 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil Case Number 16-12441,Case Number 12-20841 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, v. VANTANEZ TROTTER, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Honorable David M. Lawson
Believing that the Bureau of Prisons has not credited him for all the time he spent in pretrial detention to which he is entitled, defendant Vantanez Trotter brings the present motion to correct his judgement of sentence. It is not clear that Trotter is entitled to the credit he claims. What is clear, however, is that this Court cannot amend the judgment for the reasons Trotter has stated, and any request for relief under the proper statute must be brought in the district in which Trotter presently is confined. Therefore, the Court will deny Trotter's motion to amend the judgment of sentence.
Trotter also filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Johnson v. United States, --- U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015), somehow undermined his convictions for carjacking and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence. Because the Johnson decision does not affect the validity of Trotter's convictions of those offenses, the Court will deny his section 2255 motion summarily.
On April 2, 2014, defendant Vantanez Trotter pleaded guilty to carjacking, brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and possession of a controlled substance. He was sentenced on August 25, 2014 to a custody term for these offenses that totaled 155 months (71 months for carjacking, plus an 84-month consecutive sentence for the firearm offense). That sentence was to be served consecutively to the undischarged term of a state court sentence. Trotter was remanded to the custody of the United States Marshal for designation by the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to a federal prison.
During the pretrial phase of the case, Trotter remained in custody. Initially, he was arrested on December 8, 2012 for carjacking, and was taken into federal custody on December 10, 2012. At the time of Trotter's arrest, he was on probation for state offenses. Approximately a year after he was in federal custody, Trotter was transferred into state custody in December 2013 on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosecundum. He was sentenced by a state court to prison for probation violations related to his state offenses. In state case number 12-005182, the state court sentenced Trotter to a combined sentence of 33 months to 10 years in the custody of the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC). In state case number 11-012786, Trotter was sentenced to a custody term of 9 months to 5 years. The sentences were to be served concurrently.
From the date of his arrest to the date of his state imposed sentences, Trotter was in federal custody for 366 days. But the state court also credited Trotter for certain time served against his state court sentences: he received 402 days of credit in state case 11-012786 and 419 days of credit in state case 12-005182. Because the sentences ran concurrently, presumably the 419 days subsumed the 402 days of credit. There is no indication in the state court or state prison records howthese credits were calculated, what the credits were for, or why there is a discrepancy between the calculations.
From the day of Mr. Trotter's state sentencing to the day this Court sentenced him, he was in federal custody for at least an additional 259 days. According to the records of the U.S. Marshal Service, Trotter remained in their custody for the entire time from December 10, 2012 through the date of his federal sentencing, for a total of approximately 623 days. It is not apparent from the record if those days were ever credited to his state sentence.
Trotter contends that during his federal plea colloquy, the Court discussed the fact that he was transferred to state custody on a writ, and that attention would be paid to calculating the time Trotter spent in federal custody so appropriate credit would be given. But Trotter maintains in his motion that he was short changed.
On September 23, 2015, Trotter submitted an "Inmate Request to Staff to the BOP, explaining that there was a 20-month discrepancy in his projected release date. On September 24, 2015, the BOP responded explaining that Trotter was paroled from the MDOC on August 5, 2015 to the USMS, which is when his federal sentence date computation began. Trotter says that he contacted his case manager about the alleged error and was told to write to the courts. Trotter subsequently filed the present motion in this Court.
The crux of Trotter's motion is that he was in federal custody for approximately 20 months awaiting trial and sentencing, which he believes should be credited toward his federal sentence. He believes that calculating the commencement of his federal sentence to have begun on August 5, 2015is not correct. Trotter asks the Court to modify his judgment by adjusting the commencement of his sentence to reflect the time he served in federal custody.
The government argues that it is the BOP, and not the district court, who has the authority to grant credit for time served. The government argues that the judgment in Trotter's case was prepared properly and does not require correction.
The government is correct. The BOP has the exclusive right to calculate credit given toward service of an imposed term of imprisonment. United States v. Gibbs, 626 F.3d 344, 349 (6th Cir. 2010). The "term of imprisonment commences on the date the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to be served." 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a). It is true that a "defendant shall be given credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence commences . . . that has not been credited against another sentence. " 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b). However, it is the Attorney General and the BOP, rather than the district court judge, that has the "power to determine such credit." Gibbs, 626 F.3d at 349 (citing United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992)).
The sentencing court's authority to modify an imposed term of imprisonment is limited. "[T]he court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error," Fed. R. Crim. P 35(a), but that action must be taken "within 14 days after sentencing," ibid. The time long has expired for taking action under Rule 35(a).
The Court also "may at any time correct a clerical error in a judgment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an error in the record arising from oversight or omission." Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. However, under this rule, only "clerical errors" in a judgment are subject to correction. Aclerical error "must not be one of judgment or even of misidentification, but merely of recitation, of the sort that a clerk or amanuensis might commit, mechanical in nature." United States v. Robinson, 368 F.3d 653, 656 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). Rule 36 "is not a vehicle for the vindication of the court's unexpressed sentencing expectations, or for the correction of errors made by the court itself." United States v. Coleman, 229 F.3d 1154, 2000 WL 11824600, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 15, 2000) (unpublished) (internal quotations omitted). Although Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 authorizes a court to amend a judgment to conform with its express sentencing intention, United States v. Carr, 421 F.3d 425, 433 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Libby, 79 F.3d 1149, 1996 WL 117499, at *2 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished) (), it does not authorize "'the amendment of a sentencing order to conform with an unexpressed sentencing intention.'" Carr, 421 F.3d at 433 (quoting Robinson, 368 F.3d at 657 (emphasis in original)).
At the sentencing hearing, the Court did not express a date on which it intended Trotter's sentence to commence. The Court did state that Trotter should get credit for time served, and if there was some doubt about that credit, the defendant should have made a specific argument to the Court. And if an adjustment to the length of the sentence was necessary to address any discrepancy, the Court could have done so at the time of sentencing. See U.S.S.G. 5G1.3(b)(1) (). Adjusting the sentence under that section of the Sentencing Guideline Manuel would amount to a substantive change in Trotter's sentence, wellbeyond that allowed by Rule 36. See Carr, 421 F.3d at 432-33 () (citation omitted).
Finally, the Court has the authority to change a sentence when the sentence was based on a sentencing guideline that has been subsequently lowered pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994(o). 18 U.S.C. 3582(c). That statute does not apply here.
Trotter's motion could be construed as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.§ 2241, because he essentially is requesting relief from the execution of a federal sentence. United States v. Jalili, 925 F.2d 889, 893 (6th Cir. 1991). Under section 2241, "[a] district court may review the BOP's calculation, but may not compute sentencing credit in the first instance." United States...
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