United States v. Tsuji Suekichi

• Decision Date: 07 October 1912
• Docket Number: 2,044.
• Parties: UNITED STATES v. TSUJI SUEKICHI.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

199 F. 750

UNITED STATES v. TSUJI SUEKICHI.

No. 2,044.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

October 7, 1912

This is a proceeding by writ of habeas corpus, on the petition of Tsuji Suekichi, the appellee, a subject of the Emperor of Japan. The petitioner migrated, and was admitted to the territory of Hawaii July 27, 1906. He took up his domicile in Honolulu, and so continued until September 26, 1910, when he departed for Japan on a short visit, with intention of returning to Honolulu and continuing his domicile there. Petitioner was lawfully married in Japan to Masa Tsuji, a Japanese woman. Masa Tsuji arrived in Honolulu about August 28, 1906, and took up her domicile there also; the husband and wife residing together. The wife did not accompany Suekichi to Japan. Petitioner returned to Honolulu about June 17, 1911, but on his arrival he was refused landing by the United States immigration inspector. a Board of Special Inquiry was called, to determine the question of his right to land, and, after a hearing, it was ordered that he be rejected and sent back to Japan as a person convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Being held for deportation Suekichi invokes the writ of habeas corpus for his discharge having waived his right of appeal from the findings of the Board of Inquiry. It appears from a supplemental return of the inspector in charge that Suekichi was, on April 18, 1909 indicted in the District Court of the United States for the Territory and District of Hawaii, for the offense of importing and harboring for the purposes of prostitution an alien woman, to wit, the wife of Suekichi, that on the same day he pleaded guilty thereto and was sentenced to imprisonment for the term of three months, and has since duly served his sentence. This the petitioner admits. The District Court discharged the petitioner, and the United States appeals.

Robert W. Breckons, U.S. Atty., of Honolulu, Hawaii, Robert T. Devlin, U.S. Atty., and Benjamin L. McKinley, Asst. U.S. Atty., both of San Francisco, Cal.

J. Lightfoot, of Honolulu, Hawaii, for appellee.

Before GILBERT and ROSS, Circuit Judges, and WOLVERTON, District judge.

WOLVERTON District Judge (after stating the facts as above).

It is first insisted by the government that the finding and judgment of the Board of Special Inquiry is final and conclusive, and that habeas corpus will not lie for the relief of the petitioner. While it is true that habeas corpus will not lie to correct the errors of tribunals intrusted with special matters of inquiry, it has always been held to afford an efficient remedy against the action of such tribunals, where they exceed their power or authority, or proceed upon an erroneous interpretation of the law. As to questions of fact, their findings are final, and preclude further inquiry. United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621, 8 Sup.Ct. 663, 31 L.Ed. 591; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660, 12 Sup.Ct. 336, 35 L.Ed. 1146; Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1, 24 Sup.Ct. 177, 48 L.Ed. 317. In the Ekiu Case the court makes use of this specific language:

'An alien immigrant, prevented from landing by any such officer claiming authority to do so under an act of Congress, and thereby restrained of his liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is lawful.'

And in the Gonzales Case the court says:

'If she (Gonzales) was not an alien immigrant, within the intent and meaning of the act of Congress, * * * the commissioner had no power to detain or deport her; * * * and in the present case, as Gonzales did not come within the act of 1891, the commissioner had no jurisdiction to detain and deport her by deciding the mere question of law to the contrary.'

The next question presented is, the petitioner having once been regularly admitted to the territory of Hawaii, and having acquired a domicile there and lived there for several years, and having gone on a short visit to his native country, with an intention of returning to Hawaii, whether he can lawfully be excluded from the territory on application for admission on his return, although he committed an offense in the territory involving moral turpitude prior to his visit to his native country. The question involves a construction of Act Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134, 34 Stat. 898 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 499), as it respects the signification of the term 'aliens' as employed therein, and also a construction of Act March 26, 1910, c. 128, 36 Stat. 263 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1911, p. 501), as it may affect the present subject of inquiry.

The act of 1907, supra, is amendatory of Act March 3, 1903, c. 1012 32 Stat. 1213, and this latter was likewise amendatory of Act March 3, 1891, c. 551, 26 Stat. 1084 (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1294), all treating of the same subject-matter. 'The act of 1891,' as is said by this court in United States v. Nakashima, 160 F. 842, 844, 87 C.C.A. 646, 648, Gilbert, Circuit Judge, speaking for the court, 'had uniformly been held to apply solely to alien immigrants, and not to affect the rights of alien residents. ' Such being the interpretation of the term 'aliens,' as used in the act of 1891, the question presented in the Nakashima Case was whether a different signification should be given to the same...