United States v. Turner, CR-78-0400-WWS.
Decision Date | 24 February 1982 |
Docket Number | No. CR-78-0400-WWS.,CR-78-0400-WWS. |
Citation | 532 F. Supp. 913 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. James TURNER, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Floy E. Dawson, Asst. U. S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., for plaintiff.
Charles R. Breyer, Jacobs, Sills & Coblentz, San Francisco, Cal., Neal R. Sonnett, Benedict P. Kuehne, Bierman, Sonnett, Beiley & Shohat, P. A., Miami, Fla., for defendant.
Defendant was convicted of importing and conspiring to import cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 952 and 963 on Friday, April 6, 1979, following a two week jury trial. That day, in defendant's presence, the Court set judgment for April 27, 1979, and granted defendant's request for the opportunity to raise bond over the weekend. The Court ordered the defendant to report and post bond the following Monday, April 9. Defendant failed to do so. An arrest warrant was issued on April 10, 1979.
On June 29, the Court issued written notice to defendant's lawyer and defendant's father that sentence and judgment would be imposed on July 20, 1979. On July 20, no appearance was made by or for defendant, and the Court concluded that "by absenting himself knowingly and willfully for three and one half months while under order to surrender himself, the defendant has deliberately and intentionally waived his right to be present at sentencing, as well as his right to appeal." Accordingly, the Court imposed sentence that day: fifteen years on each of the two counts of the indictment, the terms to run concurrently, to be followed by a five year special parole term.
Defendant was apprehended on the fugitive warrant on November 10, 1981, in Miami, Florida. He now moves this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to vacate or correct his sentence on the theory that it was illegal for this Court to sentence him in absentia. The government does not oppose the motion.
That a defendant may waive his right to be present at trial has long been settled. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 32 S.Ct. 250, 56 L.Ed. 500 (1912); see also, Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 94 S.Ct. 194, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) ( ); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970) ( ). The policy reasons underlying this rule are well summarized in Government of the Virgin Islands v. Brown, 507 F.2d 186, 189-90 (3rd Cir. 1975):
We hold that ... defendant's voluntary absence was a waiver of both his constitutional and statutory right to be present at trial .... A contrary rule, as suggested by defendant, runs counter to common sense and would be a travesty of justice. It would allow an accused at large upon bail to immobilize the commencement of a criminal trial and frustrate an already overtaxed judicial system until the trial date meets, if ever, with his pleasure and convenience. It would permit a defendant to play cat and mouse with the prosecution to delay the trial in an effort to discourage the appearance of prosecution witnesses or to continue it in the event he finds the designated trial judge or jury venire disagreeable. A defendant has a right to his day in court, but he does not have the right unilaterally to select the date and hour. He may not distort that right to thwart the effective administration of justice.
On reflection, the Court has concluded that different policy considerations apply to sentencing, and that Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure must be read literally to say that a defendant's presence at sentencing may not be waived. Rule 43 states, in pertinent part:
On its face, Rule 43 distinguishes between arraignment, plea, and imposition of sentence, on the one hand, and trial up to and including the return of the verdict, on the other hand. In the case of the former, the defendant's presence is required; in the case of the latter, presence may be waived.
Reasons support this distinction, at least with respect to sentencing. Once the trial has been concluded by the return of a verdict, the danger that a defendant's misconduct may immobilize or frustrate the justice system, to which part (b) of Rule 43 is addressed, has largely although not entirely disappeared. The appeal process would of course be delayed as well as a possible retrial, with the attendant risk of loss of witnesses and other evidence. Against these risks, however, must be weighed various other policy considerations on the bases of which the common law has traditionally required that the defendant be present at his sentencing. These considerations have been summarized as follows:
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