United States v. Two Hundred and Sixty-Seven Twenty-Dollar Gold Pieces
| Decision Date | 23 January 1919 |
| Docket Number | 4233,4250. |
| Citation | 255 F. 217 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Washington |
| Parties | UNITED STATES v. TWO HUNDRED AND SIXTY-SEVEN TWENTY-DOLLAR GOLD PIECES. SAME v. ONE McLAUGHLIN AUTOMOBILE, NO. 438020. |
Ben L Moore and Robt. C. Saunders, U.S. Dist. Atty., both of Seattle, Wash., for libelant.
Farrell Kane & Stratton, of Seattle, Wash., for claimant.
Two libels are filed, one against 267 $20 gold pieces, and one against one McLaughlin automobile. The same facts are alleged with relation to both cases. The cases were presented together. In substance, it is contended by the libelant that the automobile was owned and operated by Lesage on August 30 1918, and that by the use of said automobile, he did willfully and feloniously attempt to export out of the United States at the port of Blaine, Wash., into the province of British Columbia, the gold pieces, coin of the United States without having first made application to a Federal Reserve Bank, etc., in violation of Espionage Act June 15, 1917, c. 30, 40 Stat. 217, and executive orders pursuant thereto; that at Blaine the said automobile was seized, together with the 267 $20 gold pieces. The libel to forfeit the gold pieces was filed on the 17th of September, and the libel to condemn the automobile was filed on the 18th of September, 1918. On the 23d of September following Lauretta M. Lesage appeared and filed claim for ownership, stipulations for costs and exception to the libel filed against the automobile, and on the 26th the same party appeared and filed a claim of ownership for the gold pieces and also stipulations for costs and exceptions to the libel. The exceptions in substance are that the libel fails to state a cause of action against either the gold or the automobile; that the persons making the seizure did not, within 10 days after making the seizure, or at all, apply to the District Judge of the district having jurisdiction for a warrant to justify further detention; that the libels were prematurely filed; that the claimant owner is entitled to have the property returned, and that the officers have no right to the possession or any lien thereon.
The claimant contends that a strict compliance with the statutory method of procedure outlined in title 6 of the Espionage Act is a condition precedent to a prosecution in rem for a forfeiture. The libelant contends that these provisions of the statute are directory and cumulative, and that they are in no sense jurisdictional.
The proclamations, regulations, and orders of the President, issued pursuant to section 1, title 7, of the Espionage Act (Comp. St. 1918, Sec. 7678a), prohibit the exportation of gold to the Dominion of Canada, without a license from the Federal Reserve Bank, except certain amounts much less than the amount at issue. Section 2 of title 7, supra (section 7678b), makes it a criminal offense to export gold in violation of any regulation made, and also provides 'that any article delivered for exportation * * * shall be forfeited, ' and section 1 of title 6, supra (section 7678a), provides:
'Whenever an attempt is made to export * * * articles * * * in violation of law * * * inspectors of customs * * * may seize and detain any articles * * * about to be exported * * * and the * * * vehicles containing the same, and retain possession thereof until released or disposed of as hereinafter directed.'
Section 2, supra (section 7678e), provides that:
'It shall be the duty of the person making any seizure under this title, to apply, with due diligence, to the judge of the District Court of the United States, * * * having jurisdiction over the place within which the seizure is made, for a warrant to justify the further detention of the property so seized * * * and if the judge refuses to issue the warrant, or application therefor is not made by the person making the seizure within a reasonable time, not exceeding ten days after the seizure, the property shall forthwith be restored to the owner or person from whom seized.'
Section 3 of the act, supra (section 7678f), provides:
'The owner or claimant * * * may, at any time before condemnation proceedings have been instituted, as hereinafter provided, file his application for its restoration in the District Court of the United States, * * * whereupon the Court shall advance the case for hearing and determination with all possible despatch, and after causing notice to be given to the United States attorney for the District and to the person making the seizure. * * * '
Section 4 of the act, supra (section 7678g), provides:
'Whenever the person making any seizure under this title applies for and obtains a warrant for the detention of the property, and (a) upon the hearing and determination of the petition of the owner or claimant restoration is denied, or (b) the owner or claimant fails to file a petition for restoration within thirty days after the seizure, the United States Attorney for the District wherein it was seized, upon direction of the Attorney General, shall institute libel proceedings in the United States District Court * * * having jurisdiction over the place wherein the seizure was made, against the property for condemnation. * * * '
Section 5 of the act, supra (section 7678h), provides that the admiralty proceeding, as nearly as may be, shall be adopted, except that jury trials may be demanded. Concisely stated, the act provides that after seizure, within 10 days, the person making the seizure shall on oath or affirmation apply to the District Judge for a warrant to justify the detention of the seized property, and, if the judge refuses to issue the warrant, or application therefor is not made within 10 days after the seizure, the property shall forthwith be restored to the owner or person from whom seized.
A statutory power to divest the owner of title to the property is here enacted, and I think the mode of procedure prescribed by the act creating this power is complete, and must be strictly construed, and that the provisions are mandatory as to the essence of the thing to be done. Franklin Glass Co. v. White, 14 Mass. 286; Monk v. Jenkins, 2 Hill's Eq. (S.C.) 9.
A new power was here created, and means to execute it provided. The statute expressly says he shall apply for a warrant within ten...
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...147 F.2d 78, 81 (4th Cir. 1945); see Rimmer v. United States, 172 F.2d 954, 959 (5th Cir. 1949); United States v. 267 Twenty-Dollar Gold Pieces, 255 F. 217, 221 (W.D.Wash.1919). There is no indication, however, that the law was also intended to protect persons against the less serious inter......
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United States v. 21 POUNDS, 8 OUNCES, OF PLATINUM, 5265.
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