United States v. Tyler

• Citation: 376 A.2d 798
• Decision Date: 13 June 1977
• Docket Number: No. 10289.,No. 10113.,10113.,10289.
• Parties: UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Anthony R. TYLER, Appellee. Anthony R. TYLER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

376 A.2d 798

UNITED STATES, Appellant, v. Anthony R. TYLER, Appellee.

Anthony R. TYLER, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 10113.

No. 10289.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued November 9, 1976.

Decided June 13, 1977.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Richard A. Graham, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and Edward D. Ross, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellant in No. 10113.

Steven D. Gordon, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee in No. 10289.

Akwasi Olu Agyeman, Washington, D. C., appointed by the court, for Anthony R. Tyler.

Before KELLY, KERN and NEBEKER, Associate Judges.

KELLY, Associate Judge:

Appellant Tyler was brought to trial on charges of grand larceny and unauthorized use of a vehicle. D.C.Code 1973, §§ 22-2201, -2204. The trial court granted Tyler's motion for a directed verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity at the close of all the evidence and committed him to St. Elizabeths Hospital pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, § 24-301(d)(1).¹ At a later hearing under § 24-301(d)(2),² Tyler was adjudged ineligible for conditional release from the hospital. The government appeals from the directed verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Tyler appeals the denial of his motion for conditional release.

I.

The complaining witness testified at trial that on November 29, 1974, she left her 1971 Dodge Charger idling at the curb to let it warm up as she was locking up her grocery store. While she was away from the car, Tyler, a recognized patron of her store, entered the car and drove it away. The complainant identified Tyler as the person who took her car and, in addition, a police officer testified that the complainant had identified Tyler at a lineup following his arrest.

Tyler raised a defense of insanity through the testimony of three experts, two of whom were called by the trial judge. Their testimony was that on November 2, 1974, Tyler was admitted to St. Elizabeths Hospital on an emergency basis in an acutely psychotic condition. He was released on November 18 because he was no longer thought to be a threat either to himself or to the community. Eleven days later, on November 30, 1974, Tyler was arrested for the instant crime. He was ultimately released on his personal recognizance on January 10, 1975. On February 8, 1975, Tyler appeared at Providence Hospital in the midst of what was diagnosed as an acute schizophrenic episode. Dr. Joel Cohen saw him there daily until March 12, 1975, when it was decided he had recovered sufficiently to be released. In a report dated April 15, 1975, Dr. Cohen described his diagnosis, the nature of the treatment and the nature of Tyler's recovery. He stated that Tyler had been psychotic for "maybe six months" before his admission. Dr. Howell J. Howard, Jr., of the Department of Human Resources, examined Tyler on June 23, 1975 for one hour. On the basis of this examination and of Dr. Cohen's April report, Dr. Howard concurred in the diagnosis of acute schizophrenia which existed at the time of the offense. Finally, Tyler was committed to St. Elizabeths for observation pursuant to a court order dated July 30, 1975. Dr. Thomas Carl Goldman examined him there for one to two hours on August 7, 1975, having before him Dr. Cohen's April report and the St. Elizabeths' admission report of November 2, 1974. He too concurred in Dr. Cohen's diagnosis.

The government offered no evidence or testimony in its case on the issue of insanity. The prosecutor did examine the defense witnesses extensively, and brought out that the symptoms displayed by Tyler on November 2, 1974 and February 8, 1975 were similar to those found in sufferers of a toxic psychosis caused by drug ingestion. The possibility that those symptoms were caused by drugs was ruled out by Dr. Cohen and Dr. Goldman, however, on the basis of Tyler's statements to Dr. Cohen that although he had in the past used a wide variety of drugs he had not done so before his admission to St. Elizabeths on November 2, 1974, and to Providence Hospital on February 8, 1975. Tyler had not been asked by Dr. Cohen if he had used drugs before the offense, although he himself denied having done so at trial.

At the close of the testimony defense counsel moved for a directed verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Recognizing that he could not rule on the issue absent a finding or admission of guilt, the trial judge asked Tyler if he were inclined to plead guilty "for purposes of the motion" only. Tyler said that he was and the trial judge, over the government's vigorous protest, accepted what he termed as a "partial" plea and granted the defense motion for a directed verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. It is from this order that the government appeals.

Tyler was committed to St. Elizabeths Hospital on September 24, 1975. See D.C. Code 1973, § 24-301(d)(1). At a hearing on November 18, 1975, to determine if he was eligible for conditional release it was held that he was not. See D.C.Code 1973, § 24-301(d)(2). Tyler appeals from that ruling pursuant to the provisions of § 24-301(d)(3).³

II.

A threshold issue is whether the government's appeal from the direction of the insanity verdict is barred by considerations of double jeopardy and/or by the provisions of D.C.Code 1973, § 23-104(c).⁴

The government argues that the trial judge lacked the power to take from the jury the factual issues of guilt or insanity. As a consequence, the entire trial proceeding was a nullity because there was neither a conviction nor an acquittal. It contends that as the fact-finding process was aborted at Tyler's behest, Tyler is in the same position as a defendant who has successfully requested a mistrial, thus permitting reprosecution. United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486, 91 S.Ct. 547, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1970); United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 467, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448 (1964). Consistent with this theory, the government requests a remand for a new trial on the issues of guilt and insanity. Tyler, on the other hand, argues that the directed insanity verdict was the equivalent of an acquittal on the merits, precluding a retrial both on the principles of double jeopardy and the provisions of § 23-104(c). In the alternative, Tyler argues that the trial judge properly directed the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. We conclude for the reasons explained below that the directed insanity verdict was not an acquittal on the merits which bars the government's appeal.

First, stating the obvious, once the issue of insanity has been fairly raised in a criminal case three possible verdicts can be returned — guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity. See Lyles v. United States, 103 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 254 F.2d 725 (1957). A verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is, of course, a misnomer for it simply means that despite the fact that an accused committed a crime, he is not criminally responsible for its commission. But for the fact that he was not culpable he would have been guilty. United States v. Shorter, D.C.App., 343 A.2d 569 (1975); United States v. Battle, 166 U.S.App.D.C. 396, 510 F.2d 776 (1975); United States v. Brown, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 402, 478 F.2d 606 (1973); Rucker v. United States, 108 U.S. App.D.C. 75, 280 F.2d 623 (1960). And the consequence of such a verdict is confinement to a mental institution in lieu of a criminal penalty. See D.C.Code 1973, § 24-301(d)(1).

Tyler moved not for a judgment of acquittal but, having entered a plea, for a directed insanity verdict. It is thus obvious that the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity was not an acquittal on the merits within the meaning of D.C.Code 1973, § 23-104(c), and consequently, that section does not bar the present appeal.⁵

Implicit in the directed verdict is government proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element of the offense. United States v. Shorter, supra; United States v. Ashe, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 457, 478 F.2d 661 (1973). Sanity, as distinct from intent, is not an element of either grand larceny or of an unauthorized use of a vehicle, nor does proof of insanity negate intent. Instead, the lack of sanity relieves a defendant of criminal responsibility for committing the offense. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 705-06, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Bethea v. United States, D.C.App., 365 A.2d 64, 94 (1976); United States v. Greene, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 31, 489 F.2d 1145, 1155 (1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977, 95 S.Ct. 239, 42 L.Ed.2d 190 (1974).

The question of whether a defendant should be held criminally responsible for his antisocial acts cannot be reached until guilt has been found by the trier of fact or admitted by the defendant. See United States v. Brawner, 153 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 40, 471 F.2d 969, 1008 (1972). Here, an alert trial judge had a lengthy conversation with Tyler explaining to him this element of the law. It is nevertheless plain from the conversation that the trial judge did not promise to direct the verdict in favor of Tyler if Tyler would plead guilty. He merely told Tyler that he would only be able to consider the motion if he would plead guilty to the charges, thereby conceding that the government had proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. This Tyler did and his plea has the same effect as any other, i. e., it is the equivalent of a jury finding of proof of all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.⁶ Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1927); Katz v. Katz, D.C.Mun.App., 136 A.2d 261 (1957); United States v. Wiggins, 184 F.Supp. 673 (D.D.C.1960). Because Tyler's plea finally determined the issue of his guilt, we treat the government's appeal as one from the disposition of the case after essential facts for double jeopardy purposes were found. The trial judge did not direct...