United States v. United Verde Copper Company
Decision Date | 09 January 1905 |
Docket Number | No. 68,68 |
Citation | 25 S.Ct. 222,49 L.Ed. 449,196 U.S. 207 |
Parties | UNITED STATES, Appt. , v. UNITED VERDE COPPER COMPANY |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Mr. Marsden C. Burch for appellant.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 207-209 intentionally omitted] Mr.Alfred B. Cruikshank for appellee.
Action brought by the United States against the appellee, which we shall call the copper company, for the sum of $38,976.75, the value of timber cut and removed from certain unsurveyed mineral land in the territory of Arizona.
The timber or wood was alleged to have been cut by one Rafael Lopez, a resident and citizen of Arizona, and amounted to 6,496 1/8 cords, of the value of $6 per cord, or the sum of $38,976.75.
It is alleged that the timber belonged to the United States, and 'was used and consumed by the said defendant for the purpose of roasting ore at the United Verde Copper mines, said mines being the property of defendant, herein, at Jerome, Yavapai county, Arizona territory, in violation of the act of Congress of June 3, 1878 [20 Stat. at L. 88, chap. 150, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 1528], and of the rules and regulations of the Secretary of the Interior, promulgated under the authority of said act of Congress.'
The copper company demurred to the complaint. The demurrer was sustained. The United States refused to amend, and judgment was entered for the copper company. It was affirmed by the supreme court of the territory.
Section 1 of the act of June 3, 1878, upon which the action is based, is as follows:
'That all citizens of the United States, and other persons, bona fide residents of the state of Colorado or Nevada, or either of the territories of New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Wyoming, Dakota, Idaho, or Montana, and all other mineral districts of the United States, shall be, and are hereby, authorized and permitted to fell and remove, for building, agricultural, mining, or other domestic purposes, any timber or other trees growing or being on the public lands, said lands being mineral, and not subject to entry under existing laws of the United States except for mineral entry, in either of said states, territories, or districts of which such citizens or persons may be at the time bona fide residents, subject to such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior may prescribe for the protection of the timber and of the undergrowth growing upon such lands, and for other purposes: Provided, The provisions of this act shall not extend to railroad corporations.'
Section 2 makes it the duty of registers and receivers to ascertain whether any timber is being cut in violation of the provisions of the act, and, if so, to notify the Commissioner of the General Land Office thereof.
Section 3 makes violations of the act or of the rules and regulations made by the Secretary of the Interior misdemeanors, punishable by fine, not exceeding $500, 'to which may be added imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months.'
Among the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior were the following:
'4. The uses for which the timber may be felled or removed are limited by the wording of the act to 'building, agricultural, mining, or other domestic purposes.'
'5. No timber is permitted to be felled or removed for purposes of sale or traffic, or to manufacture the same into lumber, or for any other use whatsoever, except as defined in § 4 of these rules and regulations.
* * * * *
'7. No timber is permitted to be used for smelting purposes, smelting being a separate and distinct industry from that of mining.
* * * * *
The contention of the United States is that roasting ore is smelting, and that smelting is not a purpose permitted by the act of Congress, and is besides forbidden by the regulations of the Secretary of the Interior.
Roasting ore is defined by the supreme court of the territory in its opinion as follows:
The court distinguished this process from smelting, and decided that it is, in practice, a part of mining. It is a step, the court reasoned, in the extraction of the ore from the mine, and the separation of the ore from the rock enclosing it. Roasting ore, therefore, is preparation for smelting, but not smelting, which, according to all of the definitions, is something more than melting,—it is obtaining the metal by heat and such reagents as develop it. Roasting is done crudely in the open air by burning wood and ore mingled in a pile. Smelting is the function of an organized plant. But roasting ore, regarding the production of metal only, is a preliminary step to smelting, and counsel for the government makes much of that circumstance. If this were all that is necessary to consider, the deduction would be easy that wood used for roasting ores is used for smelting purposes.
But the dependence of industries, one upon another does not make them the same, and the division of labor between them is not as marked in new as in old communities, having a more varied industrial development. Regarding, therefore, the conditions which existed in the mining states and territories, roasting ore was more naturally a part of mining than of smelting. The assignment, however, is unimportant in the view we take of the statute, and whether roasting ore be considered a part of mining or of smelting, the use of timber for it has the sanction of the statute.
The statute provides 'that all citizens of the United States . . . shall be and are hereby authorized and permitted to fell and remove for building, agricultural, mining, or other domestic purposes, any timber.' The special enumeration of industries is 'building, agricultural, and mining.' But the permission of the statute is not confined to these. It extends to 'other domestic purposes.' The limitation of the other purposes is in the word 'domestic.'
Counsel for the government recognizes this, and substitutes for 'domestic' the word 'household,' and contends that the word 'other'...
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