United States v. Valencia-Gamboa
| Decision Date | 22 October 2021 |
| Docket Number | 8:21-cr-121-CEH-JSS |
| Parties | UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. VIRGILIO VALENCIA-GAMBOA, CRISTIAN VIERA-GONGORA, and PABLO DAVID ZAMORA-MIRANDA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
This cause comes before the Court upon the Defense Motion in Limine #1 to Introduce Evidence and Request for Special Jury Instructions (Doc. 76), the United States' Response to Defense Motion in Limine #1 (Doc. 79), and Defendants' Joint Reply to United States' Opposition to Defense Motion in Limine #1 (Doc. 82).
In this criminal action under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 46 U.S.C. § 70501 et seq., Defendants Virgilio Valencia-Gamboa, Cristian Viera-Gongora, and Pablo David Zamora-Miranda move the Court to instruct the jury in the upcoming trial that the Government must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendants knew specifically of the cocaine on board their vessel and the cocaine's weight. Defendants also seek to introduce testimony and evidence that they knew about only the marijuana on board the vessel, not the cocaine. However, Defendants' proposed instructions lack legal support and their present effort to introduce testimony and evidence is more appropriate for trial. Therefore, the motion will be denied, in part, and denied without prejudice, in part.
In March of 2021, the United States Coast Guard detected a “go-fast” vessel in a known drug-trafficking area of international waters. Doc. 25-1 at 2. Packages consistent with contraband were visible on the vessel's deck. Id. The Coast Guard suspected the vessel of engaging in drug trafficking. Id. The Coast Guard found Defendants Virgilio Valencia-Gamboa, Cristian Viera-Gongora, and Pablo David Zamora-Miranda on board. See Doc. 1 at 1-3. The Coast Guard also discovered approximately 250 kilograms of cocaine and 100 pounds of marijuana. Doc. 25-1 at 4.
On April 1, 2021, a grand jury indicted Defendants on two counts: (1) knowingly and intentionally conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, while on board a vessel subject to the United States' jurisdiction, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 70506(a) and (b), and punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii); and (2) knowingly and intentionally, while aiding and abetting each other and other persons unknown, possessing with the intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance, while on board a vessel subject to the United States' jurisdiction, in violation of 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503(a), 70506(a), and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and punishable under 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). Doc. 1 at 1-2. The trial of this action is scheduled to commence on October 29, 2021.
Defendants move the Court to allow testimony about knowledge of the controlled substance and to allow jury instructions “requiring the Government [to] prove knowledge of the controlled substance charged in the indictment.” Doc. 76 at 1. In opposing this requested relief, the Government urges the Court to follow controlling precedent from the United States Supreme Court and the Eleventh Circuit and to instruct the jury that the United States must prove only that Defendants knew that they were transporting a “controlled substance, ” not the specifics of the substance or its weight. Doc. 79 at 1. In their reply, Defendants distinguish cases and ask the Court to allow them to present their full defense to the charges. Doc. 82 at 5.
First, Defendants seek to introduce testimony at trial that they were hired and paid to transport only marijuana, not cocaine. Doc. 76 at 2. Although the counts in the indictment pertain to the cocaine on the vessel, Coast Guard Commander Brian Chapman's certification under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C. § 70501 et seq. (“MDLEA”), indicates that the Coast Guard also discovered 100 pounds-the equivalent of 45.36 kilograms-of marijuana on board the vessel. Doc. 25-1 at 4. According to Defendants, the testimony that they seek to introduce would “offer proof” that they “never saw or had any knowledge that cocaine was on board nor did they ever make any agreements regarding cocaine.” Doc. 76 at 2. They also contend that they will introduce evidence showing that they would not have agreed nor participated if they had known cocaine was involved. Id.
Next, Defendants ask the Court to issue instructions to the jury that “require the [G]overnment to prove [Defendants] had knowledge of the cocaine as well as the weight beyond a reasonable doubt.”[1] Doc. 76 at 3. Indeed, Defendants contend that the Court should require the Government “to prove the mens rea as to the facts of drug type and weight that increase a defendant's statutorily prescribed sentence.” Id. Defendants contend that the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (“CSA”), provides for mandatory minimum sentences that differ depending on the particular substance and quantity. Id. at 4. Citing to the CSA, Defendants assert that once the Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed with the intent to distribute a controlled substance and that substance is one of eight controlled substances in an amount specified under the CSA, a mandatory minimum and enhanced maximum sentence automatically applies, despite the absence of any mens rea as to drug type and amount. Id. at 5. These arguments fail.
The analysis begins, as it must, with an overview of the relevant statutory language. The indictment charges Defendants with violations of the MDLEA. See Doc. 1 at 1-2. Under the MDLEA, an individual, while on board a “covered vessel, ” may not knowingly or intentionally possess with intent to distribute a “controlled substance.” 46 U.S.C. § 70503(a)(1).[2] Section 102 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (“Control Act”) supplies a definition for “controlled substance, ” see Id. § 70502(a), defining that term, in relevant part, as meaning “a drug or other substance . . . included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter, ” 21 U.S.C. § 802(6).[3] Cocaine is a schedule II controlled substance. See Id. § 812. Marijuana is currently a Schedule I controlled substance. See id.; United States v. Maupin, 3 F.4th 1009, 1012 (8th Cir. 2021).
The MDLEA provides that an individual who violates § 70503(a)(1) must be punished as provided in section 1010 of the Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 960. 46 U.S.C. § 70506(a). Similarly, an individual who attempts or conspires to violate § 70503(a)(1) is subject to the same penalties as provided for violating § 70503(a)(1). Id. § 70506(b).
In turn, under § 960(a) of the Control Act, any individual who possesses with intent to distribute a controlled substance shall be punished as provided in § 960(b). 21 U.S.C. § 960(a). Subsection (b) provides:
In the case of a violation of subsection (a) of this section involving . . . 5 kilograms or more of a mixture of substance containing a detectable amount of . . . cocaine . . . the person committing such violation shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years and not more than life . . . a fine not to exceed the greater of that authorized in accordance with the provisions of Title 18 or $10, 000, 000 if the defendant is an individual . . . or both.
Id. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). Each count of the indictment states that the statutory violations charged thereunder are punishable under § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). Doc. 1 at 1-2.
The penalties under § 960(b) depend upon the type and quantity of drug involved. For example, in the case of a violation of § 960(a) involving 100 kilograms or more of a substance or mixture containing a detectable amount of marijuana, the individual who commits such violation must be sentenced “to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years and no more than 40 years, ” among other penalties. 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(2)(G). And for a violation under § 960(a) with respect to less than 50 kilograms of marijuana, the individual who commits such violation must be sentenced in accordance with § 841(b)(1)(D), which requires the individual to “be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 5 years, ” among other penalties. Id. §§ 960(b)(4), 841(b)(1)(D).
In Apprendi v. New Jersey, the United States Supreme Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). Recognizing that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an ‘element' that must submitted to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, ” the Supreme Court held over a decade later that, because mandatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime, “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum” is also an element “that must be submitted to the jury.” Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 104 (2013).
But “[o]rdinarily, controlled-substance offenses require the government to prove the defendants' mens rea only with respect to controlled substances generally.” United States v. Nunez, 1 F.4th 976, 989 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Lewis, 676 F.2d 508 512 (11th Cir. 1982)). Thus, in a similar case where the Government charged the defendants under §§ 70503(a)(1) and 70506(b) for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and conspiring to distribute and to possess cocaine with intent to distribute, the Eleventh Circuit held that in the context of...
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