United States v. Valencia-Mendoza
| Decision Date | 10 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 17-30158,17-30158 |
| Citation | 912 F.3d 1215 |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jose Manuel VALENCIA-MENDOZA, aka Jose Valencia-Vargas, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
William Miles Pope (argued), Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho, Spokane, Washington, for Defendant-Appellant.
Matthew F. Duggan (argued), Assistant United States Attorney; Joseph H. Harrington, United States Attorney; United States Attorney’s Office, Spokane, Washington; for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before: Susan P. Graber, M. Margaret McKeown, and Morgan B. Christen, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Jose Manuel Valencia-Mendoza pleaded guilty to unlawfully reentering the United States after having been removed, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). At sentencing, the district court applied a four-level increase to the total offense level, under United States Sentencing Guideline § 2L1.2, because the court concluded that Defendant had been convicted of a "felony" under Washington law. The commentary to § 2L1.2 defines "felony" as "any federal, state, or local offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.2. Defendant’s conviction under Washington law carried a general statutory maximum term of imprisonment of five years. The district court faithfully applied our precedent and stopped its analysis there: Because the general statutory maximum exceeded one year, the enhancement under § 2L1.2 applied.
But the actual maximum term that Defendant could have received was only six months, because Washington law imposed a mandatory sentencing range. Our precedent required the district court to disregard the maximum term that Defendant actually could have received under state law, in favor of the maximum term that Defendant theoretically could have received if different factual circumstances were present. Reviewing de novo the interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines, United States v. Martinez , 870 F.3d 1163, 1165 (9th Cir. 2017), we conclude that later Supreme Court decisions are clearly irreconcilable with our precedent on this point. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
In 2007, Defendant was convicted in Washington state court of possession of cocaine, in violation of Revised Code of Washington ("RCW") section 69.50.4013.1 Defendant’s conviction was for a "class C felony punishable under chapter 9A.20 RCW." RCW § 69.50.4013(2). Section 9A.20.021 provided, in turn:
The general statutory maximum term of imprisonment for Defendant’s crime was, therefore, five years.
But, in addition to providing statutory maximum terms, Washington law specified mandatory limits on criminal sentences. RCW section 9.94A.505 provided, at the relevant time: "Unless another term of confinement applies, the court shall impose a sentence within the standard sentence range established in RCW 9.94A.510 or 9.94A.517." (Emphasis added.) Section 9.94A.517 applied to drug convictions and provided a two-dimensional "[d]rug offense sentencing grid." The grid defined the "standard sentence range[ ]" for an offense, depending on the "seriousness level" and the "offender score." RCW § 9.94A.517(1).
Defendant’s crime had a "seriousness level" of "I." See RCW § 9.94A.520 (); RCW § 9.94A.518 (). The state court calculated Defendant’s "offender score" as 0. See RCW § 9.94A.525 (). Turning back to the drug offense sentencing grid, the "standard sentence range" for seriousness level I and offender level 0 was "0 to 6 months." RCW § 9.94A.517(1).
If certain aggravating circumstances were present, the statutes contained adjustments to that range. RCW § 9.94A.533. For example, the presence or use of a firearm could have resulted in a standard range that exceeded the sentencing range described in the two-dimensional chart. RCW § 9.94A.533(3) – (5). But none of those circumstances was found to be present, so Defendant’s final standard range was zero to six months.2 Defendant’s state criminal judgment summarized the available sentence in a tidy table reproduced below.
COUNT NO. OFFENDER SERIOUSNESS LEVEL STANDARD Plus Enhancements Total STANDARD MAXIMUM TERM
SCORE RANGE (not for Firearm (F), RANGE (including
including other deadly enhancements)
enhancements) weapon finding (D)
VUCSA (V) in a
protected zone
Veh. Hom. (VH)
See RCW 46.61.520
or Juvenile present
(JP); Sexual
Motivation (SM)
1 0 1 0 to 6 months N/A 0 to 8 months 5 years
$10,000.00
The calculation of the final standard range (sometimes referred to as the "presumptive sentence") does not end the statutory analysis. Washington law allowed the sentencing court to deviate from the standard range—but only if certain statutorily permitted findings were made. Section 9.94A.535, titled "[d]epartures from the guidelines," provided that "[t]he court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence range for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence." It further provided that "[w]henever a sentence outside the standard sentence range is imposed, the court shall set forth the reasons for its decision in written findings of fact and conclusions of law." RCW § 9.94A.535.
Critically, whether "substantial and compelling reasons" exist was not an open-ended inquiry. The statute specified two categories of aggravating circumstances that permitted departure from the guidelines: findings by the sentencing court and findings by a jury. See RCW § 9.94A.535(2) (); RCW § 9.94A.535(3) (). If an aggravating circumstance was found, then the sentencing court could impose a sentence up to the statutory maximum term. RCW § 9.94A.537(6). But unless one of the statutorily specified aggravated circumstances was found, the sentencing court was required to impose a sentence within the standard range. RCW § 9.94A.505.
In Defendant’s case, as reflected on the face of the criminal judgment, neither the court nor the jury found an aggravating circumstance. Accordingly, Washington law required the sentencing court to impose a sentence within the final standard sentence range of zero to six months. The state court selected 30 days in jail.
Following that conviction, Defendant was removed from the United States. In 2016, the government indicted Defendant for unlawfully reentering the United States after having been removed, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Defendant pleaded guilty, without a plea agreement.
At sentencing, the district court applied a four-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2. The relevant Guideline3 provided:
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(2) (2016) ; see also id. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(D) (2015) (using similar text). As noted, the commentary to the Guideline defined the term "felony":
"Felony" means any federal, state, or local offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.
Id. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.2 (2016); see also id. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.2 (2015) (defining the term identically). The court concluded that Defendant had sustained a felony conviction in Washington because the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for the drug conviction was five years. The court sentenced Defendant to 24 months of imprisonment. Defendant timely appeals, challenging only the four-level enhancement.
We must decide whether Defendant’s state conviction was a "felony" for purposes of the federal Sentencing Guideline. According to the government, the statutory maximum punishment for Defendant’s state offense was five years, so he was convicted of an "offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 cmt. n.2. Defendant acknowledges the statutory maximum but argues that, because the maximum sentence that he actually could have received was only six months, he was not convicted of an "offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." Id.
A number of years ago, we sided with the government’s argument. In United States v. Rios-Beltran , 361 F.3d 1204,...
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