United States v. Valenzuela-Rojo

• Decision Date: 07 October 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 15–10086–01,02–JTM.
• Citation: 139 F.Supp.3d 1252
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Jose VALENZUELA–ROJO and Rafael Gastelum–Castro, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

139 F.Supp.3d 1252

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Jose VALENZUELA–ROJO and Rafael Gastelum–Castro, Defendants.

Case No. 15–10086–01,02–JTM.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

Signed Oct. 7, 2015.

Michelle A. Jacobs, Office of United States Attorney, Wichita, KS, for Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

J. THOMAS MARTEN, District Judge.

Before the court is defendants' Jose Valenzuela–Rojo and Rafael Gastelum–Castro's Joint Motion to Suppress Evidence (Dkt. 17). This case arises out of a traffic stop that occurred on Interstate 70 near Colby, Kansas on June 8, 2015. A search of the vehicle revealed 29 packages that field tested positive for methamphetamine. Defendants argue that evidence derived from the stop should be suppressed because the initial stop, the duration of the stop, and the ensuing vehicle search all violated the Fourth Amendment.

At the time of the stop, Valenzuela–Rojo was driving a 2012 Chevrolet Malibu eastbound with Gastelum–Castro in the passenger seat. Deputy Rich Jimerson of the Thomas County, Kansas, Sheriff's Department stopped the Malibu for failing to maintain a single lane of traffic. Valenzuela–Rojo immediately pulled over. Deputy Jimerson approached the car and asked Valenzuela–Rojo if he was tired; he replied in the negative. Valenzuela–Rojo said that the car belonged to his wife and attempted to hand his cell phone to Deputy Jimerson. Defendants both spoke limited English. Valenzuela–Rojo presented a State of Washington driver's license and vehicle registration in the name of Guadalupe Galaviz. Valenzuela–Rojo said that they were driving from Oregon to Kansas City. Gastelum–Castro presented identification in the form of a Sinaloa, Culiacan, Mexico driver's license.

Deputy Jimerson returned to his patrol car and wrote a warning for failure to maintain a single lane of travel, and called for Undersheriff Marc Finley to assist. Deputy Jimerson returned to defendants' car and returned Valenzuela–Rojo's driver's license. He then asked to see the vehicle paperwork again and Valenzuela–Rojo handed his telephone to Deputy Jimerson, stating that his wife was on the line. Deputy Jimerson spoke on the phone with a woman, who said the car belonged to her, the defendants were family, they had permission to use the car, and they were going to Kansas City to look for construction work. Deputy Jimerson returned the telephone.

Deputy Jimerson asked defendants in Spanish whether they had any drugs or weapons in the vehicle. Valenzuela–Rojo replied in the negative. According to the government, Deputy Jimerson then asked in Spanish whether he could search the car. Valenzuela–Rojo replied, "Okay." Defendants argue that Jimerson motioned defendants out of the vehicle due to his limited ability to communicate with them.

The defendants exited the vehicle and Deputy Jimerson asked them to stand on the side of the road. Deputy Jimerson and Undersheriff Finley searched the vehicle, quickly noting fresh tool marks on bolts inside a rear wheel well, indicative of a false compartment. The officers asked defendants to follow them to a vehicle repair shop in Colby, Kansas. At the shop, the rear wheel well was removed, revealing 29 packages that field tested positive for methamphetamine.

The defendants argue that evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop should be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment because: (1) the stop was not supported by probable cause at its inception; (2) the duration of the roadside detention exceeded the permissible scope of the initial stop; and (3) Deputy Jimerson searched the car without consent, probable cause, or a warrant. Defendants do not challenge the search of the car at the repair shop.

The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment and protects against "unreasonable searches and seizures" by the government. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. With certain narrow exceptions, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not admissible as proof of a defendant's guilt. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 139, 129 S.Ct. 695, 172 L.Ed.2d 496 (2009) (citing Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914) ). Evidence seized as an indirect result of a Fourth Amendment violation through the exploitation of that illegality is likewise inadmissible. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine).

The Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable seizure "extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) )

Fourth Amendment analyses of traffic stops are governed by the "reasonable suspicion" standards for investigative detentions expressed in Terry and its progeny. United States v. Winder, 557 F.3d 1129, 1133 (10th Cir.2009). A traffic stop must be supported by a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). The principles of Terry require a two-pronged analysis: (1) the stop must be "justified at its inception," and (2) the resulting detention must be "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop in the first place." Winder, 557 F.3d at 1133–34 ; accord Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868. The stop must be objectively reasonable, considering the totality of the circumstances and information available to the officer; the officer's subjective motivations are irrelevant. Winder, 557 F.3d at 1134 ; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996).

The court finds that Deputy Jimerson had both probable cause to stop the defendants' vehicle, and a reasonable suspicion that the driver was driving inattentively and in violation of Kansas law. "A traffic stop is justified at its inception if the officer has either (1) probable cause to believe a traffic violation has occurred or (2) a reasonable articulable suspicion that this particular motorist violated any one of the multitude of applicable traffic or equipment regulations of the jurisdiction." United States v. Martinez, 512 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir.2008) (quotations and citations omitted). An officer has probable cause when " ‘the facts available to him would warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief’ " that a traffic violation has occurred. Florida v. Harris, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055, 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013) (evaluating Fourth Amendment probable cause in the context of a search).

Kansas law requires that "[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane." K.S.A. § 8–1522(a). The facts here establish that Deputy Jimerson performed a routine "turn around" while patrolling Interstate Highway 70 several miles west of Colby, Kansas. He came upon defendants' vehicle, which was traveling without incident. Defendants' car entered a gradual bend in the road. Deputy Jimerson observed the car suddenly drive onto the centerline, veer back across its lane of traffic, and cross the lane again back onto the centerline in a short period of time. He thus observed a violation of K.S.A. § 8–1522(a) and initiated a traffic stop. The stop was justified by probable cause at its inception.

The defendants argue in their Reply in support of their motion that no violation of the statute could have occurred, because Valenzuela–Rojo only drove onto the centerline, not across it. The defendants stress that federal decisions involving the single-lane statute involve drivers who cross the centerline. See, e.g., United States v. Zabalza, 346 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir.2003). (Dkt. 29, at 3–4). However, the defendants cite no authority for the proposition that K.S.A. 8–1522 is only violated when a driver literally crosses the line.

The Kansas Supreme Court has given the statute a different construction. In State v. Marx, 289 Kan. 657, 215 P.3d 601 (2009), the court interpreted K.S.A. 8–1522(a) as requiring "a driver to keep entirely within a single lane while traveling on a roadway with two or more clearly marked lanes," unless the circumstances make it "impracticable to stay within the lane markers. " 289 Kan. at 673, 215 P.3d 601 (emphasis added). See also State v. Rudolph, 2010 WL 348274, *4 (Kan. Jan. 22, 2010). This construction of the statute is further consistent with both common sense and the underlying purpose of the statute—as a matter of public safety, vehicles should not be driven on lane markers, but between them.

In Bullard v. Kansas Department of Revenue, ––– Kan.App.2d ––––, 2015 WL 3514030 (Kan.App. May 22, 2015), the plaintiff challenged the administrative suspension of his commercial drivers license following an administrative hearing based upon a positive test for driving while intoxicated. The Kansas Court of Appeals held that under state court precedent, the plaintiff could not challenge the validity of the initial traffic stop in the administrative proceedings. 2015 WL 3514030, at *7. The court thus did not address the validity of the stop, but did observe that the investigating officer testified he had seen the plaintiff's "tires drift[ ] onto the yellow centerline at least twice, a violation of K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 8–1522." Id. at *1.

This interpretation appears to be consistent with decisions from other states involving identical lane of traffic statutes. In State v. McBroom, 179 Or.App. 120, 125, 39 P.3d 226, rev. den., 334 Or. 397, 52 P.3d 436 (2002), the court observed that the Oregon statute—which is essentially identical to that of Kansas—"make[s] clear that the phrase ‘within a single lane’ does not mean ‘on’ the lines that mark or divide the lanes. Rather, the statute requires that drivers stay ‘within’ the lines that mark the lanes." The same cou...