United States v. Vanderhorst

Citation2 F.Supp.3d 792
Decision Date31 January 2014
Docket NumberNo. 2:13–cr–00294–PMD.,2:13–cr–00294–PMD.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
PartiesUNITED STATES of America, v. Booker T. VANDERHORST.

2 F.Supp.3d 792

UNITED STATES of America,
v.
Booker T. VANDERHORST.

No. 2:13–cr–00294–PMD.

United States District Court,
D. South Carolina,
Charleston Division.

Signed Jan. 31, 2014.


[2 F.Supp.3d 794]


Nathan Stuart Williams, U.S. Attorney's Office, Charleston, SC, for United States of America.


ORDER

PATRICK MICHAEL DUFFY, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Booker T. Vanderhorst's Motion to

[2 F.Supp.3d 795]

Dismiss Counts 1 and 2 of the three-count Indictment filed on April 10, 2013. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is denied.

BACKGROUND

Defendant was charged in a three-count Indictment filed on April 10, 2013. Count 1 of the Indictment charges that from approximately July 2012 to October 2012, in the District of South Carolina, Defendant was involved in the sex trafficking of a minor, hereinafter referred to as “M.M.,” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Count 2 of the Indictment charges that during the same time period Defendant used a telephone, as a facility in interstate or foreign commerce, in connection with the unlawful activity alleged in Count 1 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). Finally, Count 3 of the Indictment charges that Defendant, having previously been convicted of a felony, unlawfully possessed a 9mm firearm on or about October 24, 2012.

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts 1 and 2 of the Indictment raising a variety of objections to the sufficiency of the Indictment, the institution of the prosecution, the sufficiency of the evidence before the Grand Jury, and the elements, as well as the constitutionality, of the underlying offenses. The Motion was heard on January 6, 2014, and denied from the bench on the record. This Order elaborates on the prior ruling and is intended to formalize and fully state the Court's reasoning and conclusions in a nunc pro tunc fashion. This matter was scheduled to be tried before a jury beginning January 21, 2014.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion to dismiss an indictment tests whether the indictment sufficiently charges the offense the defendant is accused of committing. United States v. Brandon, 150 F.Supp.2d 883, 884 (E.D.Va.2001), aff'd,298 F.3d 307 (4th Cir.2002); see also United States v. Sampson, 371 U.S. 75, 78–79, 83 S.Ct. 173, 9 L.Ed.2d 136 (1962) (“[A]t this stage of the proceedings the indictment must be tested by its sufficiency to charge an offense.”). Rule 7 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure merely establishes that an indictment “must be a plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(c)(1). “To pass constitutional muster, an indictment must (1) indicate the elements of the offense and fairly inform the defendant of the exact charges and (2) enable the defendant to plead double jeopardy in subsequent prosecutions for the same offense.” United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir.1998) (citing United States v. Sutton, 961 F.2d 476, 479 (4th Cir.1992)). One of the principal purposes of a grand jury indictment is to notify the defendant of the charges against him so that he can prepare his defense accordingly. Id. (quoting United States v. Fogel, 901 F.2d 23, 25 (4th Cir.1990)).

The “longstanding rule of law that courts may not ‘look behind’ grand jury indictments if ‘returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury ...’ is the touchstone for any inquiry into the legality of indictments.” United States v. Mills, 995 F.2d 480, 487 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956)). Such an indictment, “if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.” Costello, 350 U.S. at 363, 76 S.Ct. 406. This “presumption of regularity ... generally may be dispelled only upon particularized proof of irregularities in the grand jury process.” United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 75, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also

[2 F.Supp.3d 796]

United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 300, 111 S.Ct. 722, 112 L.Ed.2d 795 (1991) (“[T]he law presumes, absent a strong showing to the contrary, that a grand jury acts within the legitimate scope of its authority.”). However, not every irregularity or deficiency in a grand jury proceeding necessitates dismissing an indictment. United States v. Hefner, 842 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir.1988) (citing Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 71–72, 106 S.Ct. 938). The court can exercise its supervisory authority over grand juries to dismiss an indictment for errors in the proceedings only where an irregularity actually prejudicing the defendant has been shown. United States v. Brewer, 1 F.3d 1430, 1433 (4th Cir.1993) (citing Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988)). “Where ... a grand jury irregularity isn't of constitutional dimension, prejudice justifying dismissal of an indictment exists only where (1) the irregularity substantially influences the decision to indict or (2) ‘there is grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such [irregularities].’ ” Id. at 1433 (quoting Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256, 108 S.Ct. 2369 (alteration in original)).

In reviewing a defendant's motion to dismiss alleging a defect in the indictment or in the grand jury process, the scope of the court's review is narrowly circumscribed and “geared only towards ensuring that legally deficient charges do not go to a jury.” United States v. Bergrin, 650 F.3d 257, 268 (3d Cir.2011). “A district court may dismiss an indictment under Rule 12 ‘where there is an infirmity of law in the prosecution; a court may not dismiss an indictment, however, on a determination of facts that should have been developed at trial.’ ” United States v. Engle, 676 F.3d 405, 415 (4th Cir.2012) (quoting United States v. Snipes, 611 F.3d 855, 866 (11th Cir.2010)), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 133 S.Ct. 179, 184 L.Ed.2d 90 (2012). Moreover, “a challenge to the sufficiency of the indictment ... is ordinarily limited to the allegations contained in the indictment.” Id. Therefore, to warrant dismissal of an indictment, a defendant must demonstrate that the allegations contained in the indictment, even if true, fail to state an offense. United States v. Thomas, 367 F.3d 194, 197 (4th Cir.2004); see also Bergrin, 650 F.3d at 268 (stating that the court's analysis “must be based on whether the facts alleged in the indictment, if accepted as entirely true, state the elements of an offense and could result in a guilty verdict.” (quoting United States v. DeLaurentis, 230 F.3d 659, 660–61 (3d Cir.2000))).

DISCUSSION
I. Motion to Dismiss Count 1 Based on Instructions

Defendant first moves, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3)(A) and (B) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to dismiss Count 1 of the Indictment based on a purported misstatement of the applicable law by the Government in advising and instructing the Grand Jury.1 Count 1 of the Indictment,

[2 F.Supp.3d 797]

in relevant part, charges that Defendant

knowingly recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, and maintained by any means, in and affecting interstate and foreign commerce, “M.M.” a minor whose identity is known to the Grand Jury, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that “M.M.” had not attained the age of 18 years and that “M.M.” would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act; In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1591(a).
Indictment 1. Defendant takes issue with this allegation and the corresponding instruction, asserting that the “reckless disregard” clause of § 1591(a) does not modify the “attained the age of 18 years” clause but instead modifies the “force, fraud, or coercion” clause.2 Accordingly, Defendant contends that Count 1 charges Defendant with the commission of a crime that, in fact, does not exist, because the “reckless disregard” of the victim's age is not an element of the offense charged. In sum, Defendant asserts that, as a result of the alleged misstatements, “the Grand Jury returned an indictment based on an incorrect statement of the elements, and on a crime that does not exist,” thereby necessitating dismissal of the Indictment. Def.'s Mot. Dismiss 4. Therefore, Defendant's first argument challenges Count 1 of the Indictment on two fronts: (1) the Government's instructions to the Grand Jury, and (2) the Indictment's failure to state an offense. The Court will address the challenges seriatim.

At the outset, it is important to reemphasize that a court “may not ‘look behind’ ” an indictment that is returned by a legally constituted, unbiased grand jury and is valid on its face. Mills, 995 F.2d at 487 (quoting Costello, 350 U.S. at 363, 76 S.Ct. 406). Consequently, “[c]hallenges going only to the instructions given to the grand jury as to the elements of the offenses are not grounds for dismissal of an indictment that is valid on its face.” United States v. Buchanan, 787 F.2d 477, 487 (10th Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Addington, 471 F.2d 560, 568 (10th Cir.1973)). Notwithstanding this general rule, Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the alleged irregularities or deficiencies were actually prejudicial. See Brewer, 1 F.3d at 1433 (citing Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369). As discussed further below, a review of the record and the relevant case law does not reveal any clear error on the part of the Government in instructing the Grand Jury as to the elements of § 1591(a). Further, Defendant has not established that the Government's purported misstatements in instructing the Grand Jury either substantially influenced the decision to indict or cast serious doubt on whether the decision to indict was free from such influence. Id. (citing Bank of Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369); see United States v. Mussmacher, Crim. No. WDQ–09–0169, 2010 WL 2292214, at *6–7 (D.Md....

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