United States v. Vereen, 23173.
Decision Date | 13 May 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 23173.,23173. |
Citation | 429 F.2d 713 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America v. Richard VEREEN, Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Mr. Walter S. Furlow, Jr., Washington, D. C. (appointed by this court) for appellant.
Mr. Terry Philip Segal, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Messrs. Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty., John A. Terry and James E. Kelley, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief, for appellee.
Before FAHY, Senior Circuit Judge, McGOWAN and LEVENTHAL, Circuit Judges.
Appellant was convicted in the District Court of housebreaking and robbery. 22 D.C.Code § 1801, 2901. He now urges error by the trial judge in (1) refusing to permit appellant's counsel to testify and (2) instructing the jury on flight.
On January 3, 1967, one Mason was robbed of $68.00 and a set of keys. It is undisputed that appellant rifled Mason's pockets while another, one "Big Red" Johnson, threatened Mason. Appellant's defense was coercion. He testified that Johnson induced him to go to Mason's room on the pretense of getting some paint.1 Upon entering the apartment, Johnson, who was much larger than appellant or Mason and who had the reputation of being a bully, pulled a knife and threatened to kill appellant if he did not assist in the robbery. Appellant further testified that, after the robbery, Johnson forced appellant to give Johnson the money, and Johnson left the scene "half running." Appellant went nearby for coffee and returned within 30 minutes, intending, so he said, to see Mason. He was arrested in front of the scene of the crime.
At trial, Mason testified on cross-examination as to an interview conducted by appellant's appointed trial counsel:
However, on redirect, Mason recanted:
At the close of the Government's case, appellant moved for dismissal of the charges on the basis of the contradictory nature of Mason's testimony. After that motion was denied, defense counsel represented to the trial judge that Mason had freely told him, in a pretrial office interview, that Johnson had threatened appellant with a knife during the robbery, and that counsel felt obliged to testify as a witness to this effect.
The trial judge at first responded by noting that Mason's credibility had already been questioned by cross-examination, and also would be further undermined by appellant's testimony in his own defense. Finally, in response to defense counsel's formally stated request to testify and his offer to substitute as counsel an associate so that no trial delay would ensue, the court noted that such a course "would not be in the best form" and denied the motion to withdraw, apparently on the ground that "it is inappropriate for counsel to insert himself as a witness."2 The court also appeared to reject defense counsel's claim of surprise in justification of his request to testify. Counsel stated that he had not expected the witness to change his story. The court noted only that the witness appeared to be confused.
It is unfortunate that appellant's only meaningful source for impeaching Mason was the testimony of his trial counsel, who apparently interviewed Mason without other persons present. A committee of the ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice recently recommended the following approach:
(d) Unless the lawyer for the accused is prepared to forego impeachment of a witness by the lawyer\'s own testimony as to what the witness stated in an interview or to seek leave to withdraw from the case in order to present his impeaching testimony, the lawyer should avoid interviewing a prospective witness except in the presence of a third person.
Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function § 4.3 (Tentative Draft 1970). However, after counsel found himself in these circumstances, his suggested solution — personally to withdraw without any trial delay, substitute an associate as counsel, and then take the stand — was manifestly appropriate.3
The Government's view that counsel's testimony was available from other sources is untenable. No others were present during the interview between defense counsel and Mason, and only appe...
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United States v. Harris
...that an innocent man would respond similarly to a guilty one when a brush with the law is threatened. United States v. Vereen, 139 U.S.App. D.C. 34, at 36, 429 F.2d 713, at 715 (1970). See also, Austin v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 261, 414 F.2d 1155, 1157 (1969), where we when we......
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People v. Burrows, 69161
...(2d Cir.1975), 523 F.2d 1357, 1359 (attorney ought to be called as a witness where "his testimony is necessary"); United States v. Vereen (D.C.Cir.1970), 429 F.2d 713, 715 (court erred in refusing to permit the testimony of an attorney where the victim told the attorney a conflicting story ......
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...and the care with which instructions on flight must be given has been the subject of much comment. See, e. g., United States v. Vereen, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 34, 429 F.2d 713 (1970); Austin v. United States, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 259, 414 F.2d 1155 ...
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