United States v. Vines

Decision Date13 August 2021
Docket NumberNo. 19-2316,19-2316
Parties UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Elijah VINES, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Adam Eakman, Bradley P. Shepard, Bob Wood, Attorneys, Office of the United States Attorney, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Mark S. Rosen, Attorney, Rosen & Holzman, Waukesha, WI, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before Easterbrook, Manion, and Rovner, Circuit Judges.

Rovner, Circuit Judge.

Following a jury trial, Elijah Vines was found guilty of five counts related to sex trafficking of a minor, including: sex trafficking of a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), and (c) ; sex trafficking of a child, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(2) and (b)(2) ; conspiracy to commit sex trafficking of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1594(c) and 1591 ; transportation of a minor, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) ; and interstate travel in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). He was sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment for Counts I-IV, and 60 months’ imprisonment for Count V, to be served concurrently, placed under supervised release for life, and ordered to pay $13,500 in restitution to the victim ("GMC").

The evidence at trial demonstrated that GMC was a fifteen-year-old girl who ran away from her foster home in August 2016, and in September 2016 was arrested for shoplifting in Ohio. She did not provide her real name or age to police in order to avoid being returned to the foster system. She contacted a friend, Shayana, to pick her up from jail, and Shayana arrived accompanied by the defendant Elijah Vines. Vines was involved in criminal activity that included selling cellphones as part of a scam and prostituting females. He transported GMC to his residence and then to a hotel, and subsequently began prostituting GMC. To further those unlawful ends, he posted ads of GMC online, including on the website Backpage, which was a site commonly used to advertise prostitutes to customers. He also arranged for her to meet with those customers to engage in sex acts, and she gave the money paid for those acts to him. Vines was aware that GMC was a minor.

In October 2016, GMC was taken into custody as a runaway by law enforcement and was evaluated at the emergency room at Riley Children's Hospital in Indianapolis. She informed them that she had run away from home, and that she had been forced to engage in sex in exchange for drugs and money. An examination by doctors determined that she had injuries "too numerous to count."

Vines now appeals his convictions, arguing that the trial court erred in allowing the testimony of an expert witness that related to the credibility of GMC; denying his motion to suppress GMC's identification of Vines through a Facebook photo; and denying the motions to suppress evidence obtained from a search of Vines's iPhone and from a search of his Facebook and iCloud accounts. We address these challenges in turn.

I.

Vines first argues that the court erred in denying his motion in limine to exclude the testimony of the government expert witness, FBI Supervisory Special Agent Hardie, and allowing Hardie to testify at trial as a sex-trafficking expert. In his motion in limine, Vines argued that the expert testimony would address the behavior of victims of sex trafficking, including that they may not be completely forthcoming when questioned by law enforcement or medical personnel, and that such testimony was merely a means of improperly bolstering GMC's credibility. Vines argued that it is inappropriate for an expert witness to discuss another witness's credibility. The government responded that as a blind expert, Hardie would not have even spoken to GMC prior to the testimony or read any of her statements, and therefore his testimony could not possibly address GMC's credibility. It asserted that Hardie's testimony would be limited to the experience of sex-trafficking victims in general. The district court denied the motion in limine, and Hardie was permitted to testify at trial.

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides that:

[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.

Vines alleges that the testimony of Hardie should have been excluded because it exceeded the bounds of permissible expert testimony and addressed the credibility of the victim. Where a defendant challenges the admission of expert testimony, we review de novo whether the court applied the proper Rule's framework, and review for abuse of discretion the ultimate decision to admit. United States v. Brown , 973 F.3d 667, 703 (7th Cir. 2020). "A district court ‘holds broad discretion in its gatekeeper function of determining the relevance and reliability of the expert opinion testimony.’ " Id . (quoting Krik v. Exxon Mobil Corp ., 870 F.3d 669, 674 (7th Cir. 2017) ). Vines does not challenge the legal framework here, so we review the admission of the testimony only for abuse of discretion.

At trial, Hardie's testimony was limited to discussions of the behavior of sex-trafficking victims in general. As to investigators, Hardie discussed the need to gain the trust of sex trafficking victims, and the unwillingness of victims to reveal all details from the start, as part of ongoing victim behavior. Hardie made no reference to any actual behavior of GMC here and presented no testimony as to her credibility.

Vines relies on United States v. Benson , 941 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1991), to assert that such expert testimony was improperly admitted, but the reasoning in Benson actually supports the district court's admission of the evidence here. In Benson , Internal Revenue Agent Gary Cantzler provided expert testimony as to why Benson was required to file income tax returns in 1980 and 1981. Id . at 603. In stating his opinion, Cantzler relied upon the testimony of witnesses whose credibility had been attacked by Benson, thus making his own credibility determination. Id . at 604. He drew inferences from evidence that were not based on any special knowledge or skill, and for which he had no greater qualification than the jury. Id . In short, "Cantzler did not give helpful expert testimony that cast another witness’ testimony in a good or bad light; instead, he simply told the jury whom to believe." Id . at 604–05. Accordingly, we held that the court abused its discretion in admitting much of the testimony of Cantzler. Id . at 605.

In contrast, Hardie's testimony in this case was based on his expertise as to sex trafficking which would benefit a jury in understanding the behavior of trafficking victims. It was not based on any assessment by Hardie as to the credibility of any witness, and did not include any opinion as to the credibility of any persons. Hardie merely provided insight as to sex trafficking generally and the effect on victims, which would aid a jury in understanding and evaluating the evidence presented to it. In fact, Hardie testified that he did not speak with GMC at any point in time and did not read any of her statements, and therefore his testimony could not have been interpreted as opining as to her credibility. Hardie's expert testimony, therefore, was the opposite of the expert opinion in Benson , in that Hardie merely provided expert testimony as to sex-trafficking victim behavior in general that could cast light on the testimony of other witnesses, but did not tell a jury whom to believe.

Accordingly, Vines has failed to demonstrate that the testimony of Hardie exceeded the scope of permissible testimony under Rule 702, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony.

II.

All of the remaining challenges by Vines pertain to the district court's denials of motions to suppress. Vines argues that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress: (1) GMC's identification of Vines in a photograph on a Facebook page; (2) the search of Vines's iPhone; and (3) the search of Vines's Facebook and iCloud accounts. We address these challenges in turn.

A.

First, Vines challenges the district court's refusal to suppress GMC's identification of Vines from a photo on his Facebook page. We review a district court's denial of a motion to suppress an identification de novo with due deference to the district court's findings of historical fact. United States v. Gonzalez , 863 F.3d 576, 584 (7th Cir. 2017) ; United States v. Harris , 281 F.3d 667, 669–70 (7th Cir. 2002).

In the course of her third interview with investigating officers, GMC for the first time told them that her trafficker had a Facebook page under the name "Elijah Kilt Vines," which she sometimes saw when scrolling through his phone. Prior to that time, she told them that she called her trafficker "Deacon" or "Deacon Dollar," but that it was not his real name. In response to that information, the detectives then pulled up the Facebook page associated with "Elijah Kilt Vines" and asked "Is this him? I can't imagine there's another one with the same name like that." Dist. Ct. Order, Doc. 164 at 2, App. at A2. GMC then identified the photo on that page as depicting her trafficker, Deacon. Vines contends that the identification procedure was an unduly suggestive presentation in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Specifically, Vines asserts that law enforcement officials should have been aware that GMC had credibility problems, and that once GMC identified Vines as Deacon's alias,...

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