United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist.
| Decision Date | 20 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:73-cv-00127-MMD-WGC |
| Parties | UNITED STATES of America, et al., Plaintiffs, v. WALKER RIVER IRRIGATION DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
This is an approximately 100-year-old case regarding apportionment of the water of the Walker River, which begins in the high eastern Sierra Nevada mountains of California, and ends in Walker Lake in Northern Nevada. See U.S. v. Walker River Irrigation Dist. , 890 F.3d 1161, 1165-69 (9th Cir. 2018) (" Walker IV ") (); see also Google Maps, Walker River , https://goo.gl/maps/jJsuqbBJB7KbrBaW8 (last visited July 16, 2020) (showing the river). Before the Court is Plaintiff the United States of America's motion for judgment on the pleadings seeking judgment on five affirmative defenses in response to Plaintiff's counterclaims, which essentially seek to reopen a 1936 decree governing water rights in the Walker River to secure increased water rights for the Walker River Paiute Tribe ("Tribe").1 (ECF No. 2606 ("Motion").) Because the Court finds Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these particular affirmative defenses,2 —and as further explained infra —the Court will grant the Motion.
The Court incorporates by reference the factual and procedural background of this long-running case provided in Walker IV. See 890 F.3d at 1165-69. (See also ECF No. 2606 at 3 n.2 ().) Briefly, the parties' rights to use water from the Walker River are governed by a decree entered in 1936, as modified following a Ninth Circuit remand (the "1936 Decree"). See Walker IV , 890 F.3d at 1162, 1166-67. The dispute currently before the Court involves claims filed by Plaintiff as counterclaims in the 1990s to effectively reopen the 1936 Decree to secure additional water rights for the Tribe. See id. at 1167-68. Defendants have filed answers to those counterclaims, in which they assert certain affirmative defenses to Plaintiff's counterclaims. (ECF No. 2619 at 12 n.2 ().) Plaintiff's Motion seeks dismissal of five particular affirmative defenses asserted by most Defendants; (1) laches; (2) estoppel and waiver; (3) no reserved rights to groundwater; (4) the United States lacks the power to reserve water rights after Nevada's statehood; and (5) claim and issue preclusion. (ECF No. 2606 at 3.)
While the Court will discuss Walker IV throughout this order, by way of background, the Walker IV court reversed and remanded a decision of the district judge previously assigned to this case where he dismissed Plaintiff's counterclaims under the doctrine of res judicata. See 890 F.3d at 1168-69, 1172-73. However, the Walker IV court also affirmed the prior district judge's decision that the Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate Plaintiff's counterclaims. See id. at 1169-72. Plaintiff's Motion can be conceptualized as an opening skirmish that will not fully resolve the larger battle on the merits of Plaintiff's counterclaims, which, with its jurisdiction confirmed by Walker IV , the Court will preside over in subsequent proceedings. See id.
"Because a Rule 12(c) motion is functionally identical to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the same standard of review applies to motions brought under either rule." Gregg v. Hawaii, Dep't of Pub. Safety , 870 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "A judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all the allegations in the pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendants spend most of their response to the Motion arguing about general principles of finality and repose. (ECF No. 2619.) But as Plaintiff points out in reply, Defendants largely concede Plaintiffs have the correct understanding of the law when it comes to the specific affirmative defenses targeted by the Motion. (ECF No. 2622.) Thus, much of Defendants' response is beside the point as to the narrow issues presented in Plaintiff's Motion. Defendants' response instead signals to the Court that Plaintiff's counterclaims may present complex issues on the merits—but those issues are not yet squarely before the Court.
Indeed, Defendants' primary arguments in their response highlight—and fall within—the tension created by the Ninth Circuit's Walker IV opinion that will likely have a significant impact on the merits of this case. On the one hand, the Walker IV court clearly stated that "traditional claim preclusion and issue preclusion do not apply" to Plaintiff's counterclaims. 890 F.3d at 1172. On the other hand, citing Arizona v. California , 460 U.S. 605, 619, 103 S.Ct. 1382, 75 L.Ed.2d 318 (1983) (" Arizona II "), the Walker IV court stated Plaintiff's "counterclaims are ‘subject to the general principles of finality and repose, absent changed circumstances or unforeseen issues not previously litigated.’ " 890 F.3d at 1173. When it comes to resolving the merits of Plaintiff's counterclaims, the legal tension between these two statements may be difficult to resolve. Moreover, because of the latter statement, nothing in this order should be interpreted to foreclose Defendants from arguing that general principles of finality and repose preclude the Court from reopening the 1936 Decree in subsequent proceedings in this case. And, of course, the principles of finality and repose are similar in some senses to res judicata, estoppel, waiver, and laches. However, the caselaw is overwhelmingly on Plaintiff's side as pertinent to its Motion, leading the Court to find that Defendants may not explicitly assert the affirmative defenses challenged in the Motion.
The Court will address each of the challenged affirmative defenses in turn, infra —after first addressing the preliminary matter of whether to consider Defendants' exhibits attached to their response. But this order obviously does not resolve Plaintiff's counterclaims.
Defendants attached several exhibits to their response. (ECF Nos. 2619-1 through 2619-14.) Plaintiff replies that the Court should not consider these exhibits, and requests the Court set a supplemental briefing schedule if it decides to consider the exhibits and thus treats Plaintiff's Motion as one for summary judgment. (ECF No. 2622 at 7-8; see also id. at 8 n.24.) The Court agrees with Plaintiff it is more appropriate to resolve the Motion based solely on the pleadings (id. at 7-8), and therefore declines to consider the exhibits.
"If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). "However, judgment on the pleadings is improper when the district court goes beyond the pleadings to resolve an issue; such a proceeding must properly be treated as a motion for summary judgment." See Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co. , 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). Thus, the Court starts from the presumption it should not consider the exhibits, and recognizes it can only consider them if it converts Plaintiff's Motion into one for summary judgment.
The Court declines to convert Plaintiff's Motion into one for summary judgment, and therefore declines to consider the exhibits Defendants attached to their response. "[T]he central question [in determining whether to convert a Rule 12 motion into one for summary judgment] is whether the proffered materials and additional procedures required by Rule 56 will facilitate disposition of the action or whether the court can base its decision upon the face of the pleadings." Dreamdealers USA, LLC v. Lee Poh Sun , Case No. 2:13-cv-1605-JCM-VCF, 2014 WL 3919856, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 12, 2014) (citations omitted). As further explained infra , the Court can base its decision on the face of the pleadings. Thus, there is no need to convert Plaintiff's Motion into one for summary judgment. Moreover, declining to consider Defendants' exhibits better aligns with the judgment on the pleadings analysis the Court must conduct. See Hal Roach , 896 F.2d at 1150 ; see also Ricketts v. CBS Corps. , 439 F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1199 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2020), reconsideration denied , Case No. CV1903895DSFMRWX, 2020 WL 3124218 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2020) () (internal quotation marks, punctuation, and citations omitted). The Court therefore excludes Defendants' exhibits from consideration in ruling on Plaintiff's Motion.
Plaintiff first argues the equitable defense of laches does not apply when, as here, Plaintiff is acting in its sovereign capacity to protect a property right held in trust by the United States for the benefit of an Indian tribe. (ECF No. 2606 at 7-22 ; see also id. at 9-10.) Defendants respond that "even if laches, waiver, and estoppel do not apply in the most technical sense to the [Plaintiff's] claims, they, like res judicata, at a minimum inform the principles of finality and repose that do limit and preclude the [Plaintiff's] claims." (ECF No. 2619 at 49.) That may be true, but it also does not make Plaintiff's assertion any less true. The Court thus agrees with Plaintiff.
Plaintiff asserts Winters3 rights in its counterclaims. (ECF No. 2606 at 9-11 ; see also ECF Nos. 58, 59 (counterclaims).) Winters rights are "federal reserved water rights" that apply to Indian...
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